feat(sdk,cli): settable segment and root integrity algorithms (DSPX-4736) - #1030
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Included review availability: Your plan provides up to 1 included review per hour; 0 remain after this review. 📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe PR adds configurable root and segment integrity algorithms. The encryption pipeline validates and canonicalizes them. The public API and CLI expose the options. Tests cover defaults, round trips, rejection cases, and validation order. ChangesIntegrity algorithm configuration
Priority: ⬇️ Low Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~25 minutes Change: Feature Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant CLI
participant OIDCProvider
participant TDF3Client
participant writeStream
CLI->>CLI: Parse and validate integrity algorithm options
CLI->>OIDCProvider: Authenticate after option validation
CLI->>TDF3Client: Create TDF with parsed options
TDF3Client->>writeStream: Encrypt using root and segment algorithms
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Inline comments:
In `@lib/tdf3/src/tdf.ts`:
- Around line 192-203: Update writeStream to canonicalize validated
rootSignature.alg and segmentHashAlg values to uppercase before signing and
manifest serialization. Reuse these normalized values throughout the write path
so manifests produced from lowercase SDK inputs remain readable by the SDK while
preserving case-insensitive validation.
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📒 Files selected for processing (7)
cli/src/cli.tslib/src/opentdf.tslib/tdf3/src/client/builders.tslib/tdf3/src/client/index.tslib/tdf3/src/models/encryption-information.tslib/tdf3/src/tdf.tslib/tests/mocha/integrity-algorithms.spec.ts
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dmihalcik-virtru
added this pull request to stack #1032
September 10, 2026 19:33
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…736)
Adds explicit controls for the two integrity algorithms a ZTDF writer picks,
and makes an unsupported choice fail loudly instead of being silently accepted.
The two are not interchangeable:
- A segment hash covers ciphertext AES-GCM actually produced, so "GMAC" there
means reading back a real authentication tag. Both HS256 and GMAC are valid.
- The root signature covers the aggregate of the segment hashes, which never
passes through AES-GCM. There is no tag to read out, so HS256 is the only
value that authenticates anything.
sdk:
- SegmentIntegrityAlgorithm ('GMAC' | 'HS256') and RootIntegrityAlgorithm
('HS256'), so a root algorithm cannot even be *typed* as 'GMAC'.
IntegrityAlgorithm stays as a deprecated alias.
- isSegmentIntegrityAlgorithm / isRootIntegrityAlgorithm guards, plus
ROOT_INTEGRITY_ALGORITHM and SEGMENT_INTEGRITY_ALGORITHM for the defaults.
- rootIntegrityAlgorithm and segmentIntegrityAlgorithm on EncryptParams and
OpenTDF's create options, threaded through to EncryptConfiguration.
writeStream previously hardcoded 'HS256'/'GMAC' at the call site.
- Both are validated in Client.encrypt and again in writeStream, so an
unsupported value throws ConfigurationError before any KAS round trip.
cli:
- `encrypt --root-integrity-algorithm` and `--segment-integrity-algorithm`,
with explicit yargs aliases: the kebab-case forms are what the cross-SDK
xtest feature detectors grep for in help output, and yargs does not render
them automatically from a camelCase key.
EncryptConfiguration.integrityAlgorithm is renamed to rootIntegrityAlgorithm.
It names the root signature's algorithm and always did; the old name invited
exactly the confusion this change is about.
This is the control surface for evaluating DSPX-4703. It does not itself change
how a manifest that already declares a GMAC root is verified on read.
Signed-off-by: Dave Mihalcik <dmihalcik@virtru.com>
…(DSPX-4736) The type guards accept any casing so callers can pass user input through, but writeStream then serialized that casing verbatim. Readers -- including this SDK's own -- match the spec's uppercase spelling exactly, so a lowercase segmentIntegrityAlgorithm produced a TDF nothing could open. Canonicalize once at the write boundary and use that value for both signing and serialization, in the 4.2.2 and 4.3.0 branches alike. The guards are left case-insensitive on purpose: the read path needs to recognize 'gmac' in order to reject it as a root algorithm. Signed-off-by: Dave Mihalcik <dmihalcik@virtru.com>
…-4736) encrypt had been reordered to check create options before any network activity, but parseCreateTDFOptions opens the input file first, so the file check preempted the oidcEndpoint check and bin/opentdf.bats went red. Split the pure flag validation out of parseCreateTDFOptions and run the stages in a deliberate order: flags, oidcEndpoint, file, then auth. Each stage is pinned by a bats test that also asserts the later stages have not run, so the ordering cannot quietly drift back. Signed-off-by: Dave Mihalcik <dmihalcik@virtru.com>
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X-Test Failure Reportcoverage-web-app-browser |
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Red phase only. Every test here reproduces a defect found reviewing #1031; none of them are fixed, so `cd lib && npm test` fails on this branch by design. Each new describe carries controls that pass, so a failure is attributable to the defect and not to the harness. Runtime failures (16 under mocha, 17 under karma): - 4.2.2 + HS256 segments write an archive nothing can read. The legacy writer HMACs a lossy UTF-8 round-trip of the ciphertext; the reader HMACs the raw bytes. Newly reachable since #1030 made the algorithm settable. - A tampered file that fails in more than one segment leaves an unhandled rejection even when the caller catches the error, because only the first failed chunk is ever awaited. - A CryptoService whose hmac returns a pooled view (the obvious Node implementation) writes 4.2.2 files that fail their own read: the writer hex-encodes sig.buffer, the reader hex-encodes the view. - Malformed manifests surface as bare TypeError / InvalidCharacterError rather than TdfError, on the same read path this PR hardens. - A GMAC-rooted file still costs a full KAS rewrap before it is refused. - Assertions -- including attacker-supplied JWT headers that name their own verification key -- are interpreted before the root signature is checked. - Unknown-but-not-forgeable root algorithms are reported as tampering rather than as unsupported. (This contradicts an assertion in root-signature.spec.ts, which is the point: both cannot hold.) - streamToBuffer returns an empty or all-zero buffer, reported as success, for any chunk that is not a Uint8Array; and decrypt no longer accepts the stream sources fromSource still does. - seekable.ts still drains {type:'stream'} through Response, so the modern OpenTDF read path launders an IntegrityError into "Failed to fetch". Red in the karma run only, which is where the masking happens. - Two controls added to root-signature.spec.ts show the file's own fixtures are inert: the forged 4.2.2 GMAC signature is not one any 4.2.2 reader would compare against, and reverseSegments silently drops bytes on a payload that is not an exact multiple of the segment size. Type-level failure: - tests/types holds @ts-expect-error assertions that the manifest's alg fields carry the invariant tdf.ts documents. `alg: RootIntegrityAlgorithm | string` collapses to string, so they do not. Checked by a new `npm run test:types`, run after the suite so it cannot mask the runtime failures, and excluded from the build's tsconfig for the same reason. New specs share tests/mocha/helpers/tdf-fixtures.ts rather than adding a third copy of the scaffolding; folding the existing two specs into it is left alone here. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Flynn <pflynn-virtru@users.noreply.github.com>
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What
Lets a caller choose the integrity algorithms a ZTDF records, and refuses the
combinations that don't mean anything.
A ZTDF stores two integrity algorithms and they are not interchangeable:
segmentHashAlgcovers each segment's ciphertext, which AES-GCM actuallyproduced.
GMAChere means reading back a genuine authentication tag, soboth
GMACandHS256are real choices.rootSignature.algcovers the aggregate hash — a concatenation of thesegment hashes, which AES-GCM never processed. There is no tag to read out,
so
HS256is the only value that authenticates anything.So the new surface is deliberately asymmetric: segments take either, the root
takes only
HS256, and anything else is aConfigurationErroratconfiguration time rather than a file nobody can trust.
Why
Two reasons.
The immediate one is that xtest's feature detectors probe for these flags to
decide which cross-SDK integrity cases to run. Without them the js SDK is
skipped, and a skipped test looks exactly like a passing one.
The second is that this PR is the control arm for #1031. It adds the knobs
and the write-side refusals but changes no read-path behavior, which makes it
a clean "before" baseline: the follow-up's attack corpus can be run against
this commit to show which cases the fix is actually responsible for.
What's in it
RootIntegrityAlgorithm('HS256') andSegmentIntegrityAlgorithm(
'GMAC' | 'HS256') as distinct types, withisRootIntegrityAlgorithm/isSegmentIntegrityAlgorithmguards andROOT_INTEGRITY_ALGORITHM/SEGMENT_INTEGRITY_ALGORITHMdefaults.IntegrityAlgorithmstays as adeprecated alias for
SegmentIntegrityAlgorithm.rootIntegrityAlgorithmandsegmentIntegrityAlgorithmonEncryptParamsand
EncryptConfiguration, validated inClient.encryptand again inwriteStream.--root-integrity-algorithmand--segment-integrity-algorithmon the CLI.GMAC_TAG_LENGTHconstant in place of the two bareslice(-16)calls.How to test
lib/tests/mocha/integrity-algorithms.spec.tsis new: 7 cases pinning thedefaults (HS256 root, GMAC segments), the round-trip for an explicit HS256
root and for each segment algorithm, and the three refusals (GMAC root,
unknown root, unknown segment).
Verified on this commit alone, with the follow-up absent:
tsc --noEmit,npm run lint, andnpm run buildare clean in bothlib/andcli/, andthe full suite is 376 passing / 6 pending.
Risk
Touches the crypto write path. Defaults are unchanged — an HS256 root with
GMAC segments is what the SDK already emitted — so existing callers get the
same files. Read-path behavior is untouched in this PR by design; the GMAC
root signature problem is fixed in #1031.
DSPX-4736
Summary by CodeRabbit
Cross-SDK coverage lives in opentdf/tests#594.