Security fixes are released for the latest published version of SMBark only. Please upgrade before reporting an issue.
The current supported release is v1.2.1.
Please do not report security vulnerabilities through public GitHub issues.
Report vulnerabilities privately using GitHub's private vulnerability reporting, or by email to zack@z19r.com.
Please include:
- A description of the vulnerability and its impact.
- Steps to reproduce, or a proof-of-concept.
- The affected version(s) and your environment (OS, kernel,
cifs-utils/sambaversions).
You can expect an initial acknowledgement within 72 hours. We will keep you informed as we investigate, and will credit you in the release notes unless you prefer to remain anonymous.
SMBark orchestrates privileged system operations. When assessing security, please keep the following in mind:
- Privileged commands — SMBark shells out to
mount -t cifs,umount,systemctl, and writes to/etc/fstaband systemd unit paths. These operations typically requiresudo/root. Command-injection or path-traversal issues that let a share name, host, or mount option escape into a privileged command are in scope. - Credential handling — SMB usernames and passwords are passed to
smbclientandmount.cifs. Reports about credentials being leaked to logs, process listings, world-readable files, or shell history are in scope. - Generated configuration — systemd
.mount/.automountunits and/etc/fstabentries are generated from user and network input. Malformed or hostile input that produces unsafe persistent configuration is in scope. - Network input — data returned from
avahi-browse,nmblookup, andsmbclientoriginates from untrusted hosts on the network. Improper handling of that input is in scope.
Out of scope: vulnerabilities in the underlying tools (cifs-utils, samba,
avahi, systemd) themselves, and issues that require an already-root local
attacker.
We follow coordinated disclosure. Once a fix is available, we will publish a GitHub Security Advisory and note the fix in the CHANGELOG.