node:tls: a handshake that did not complete is never an established session by robobun · Pull Request #44422 · oven-sh/bun

robobun · 2026-10-02T03:46:01Z

Stacked on #44290. Draft until its self-review returns.

Problem

Over a Duplex, a node:tls client reports secureConnect with authorized === true for a peer that shows a trusted chain and fails the key proof. Node reports an error. Bun 1.4.2 and 1.3.13 do the same. Nothing leaves after that event: a write gets ERR_SOCKET_CLOSED, and 0 bytes reach the transport.
onClientHandshake (src/js/node/net.ts) ends the socket only for a failure with a TLS reason. Any other failed handshake goes on as an established session. Over a Duplex the engine reports a failure with the chain's verdict only: null for a verified chain.

Fix

A handshake that did not complete ends in onClientHandshake, as in the server handler.
With no TLS reason the client gets ECONNRESET. After its own end() it gets nothing, as before.
A chain that the client refuses keeps its X509 error.
Verified: node-tls-duplex-end-verify.test.ts, 6 new tests. node:tls: check the server's name for a handshake that completes after end() #44290 alone fails 4. Node v26.3.0 passes 55, skips 1.

Background

Since node:tls: check the server's name for a handshake that completes after end() #44290, the handler's success is the handshake result for node:tls. Before, (false, null) could be a completed handshake.
Considered the engine alone (node:tls: report the fatal TLS alert when a handshake over a Duplex fails #32929 reports the TLS reason over a Duplex): the right error code, but the handler still reads any other failure as a session.

Downsides

Over a Duplex the error is ECONNRESET where Node gives the TLS reason (ERR_SSL_...), until node:tls: report the fatal TLS alert when a handshake over a Duplex fails #32929 lands.
With rejectUnauthorized: false, a failed handshake that gave secureConnect now gives 'error'.

Notes

How to reproduce

// A TLS 1.2 server with a certificate that the client trusts. A relay changes one byte of the signature in
// ServerKeyExchange, so the peer does not prove that it has the key. The client runs TLS over a Duplex.
// Run it from the root of the repository.
const tls = require("tls");
const net = require("net");
const fs = require("fs");
const { duplexPair } = require("stream");
const dir = "test/js/node/tls/fixtures/";
const server = tls.createServer(
  { key: fs.readFileSync(dir + "agent1-key.pem"), cert: fs.readFileSync(dir + "agent1-cert.pem"), maxVersion: "TLSv1.2" },
  c => c.on("error", () => {}),
);
server.on("tlsClientError", () => {});
server.listen(0, "127.0.0.1", () => {
  const [transport, otherEnd] = duplexPair();
  const upstream = net.connect(server.address().port, "127.0.0.1");
  upstream.on("error", () => {});
  otherEnd.on("data", chunk => upstream.write(chunk));
  let pending = Buffer.alloc(0);
  upstream.on("data", chunk => {
    pending = Buffer.concat([pending, chunk]);
    while (pending.length >= 5 && pending.length >= 5 + pending.readUInt16BE(3)) {
      const record = Buffer.from(pending.subarray(0, 5 + pending.readUInt16BE(3)));
      pending = pending.subarray(record.length);
      if (record[0] === 0x16) {
        for (let at = 5; at + 4 <= record.length; ) {
          const end = at + 4 + record.readUIntBE(at + 1, 3);
          if (record[at] === 12 && end <= record.length) record[end - 1] ^= 0xff;
          at = end;
        }
      }
      otherEnd.write(record);
    }
  });
  const s = tls.connect({ socket: transport, servername: "agent1", ca: fs.readFileSync(dir + "ca1-cert.pem") });
  const ev = [];
  s.on("secureConnect", () => { ev.push("secureConnect authorized=" + s.authorized); s.destroy(); });
  s.on("error", e => ev.push("error " + e.code));
  s.on("close", () => { console.log(ev.concat("close").join(", ")); upstream.destroy(); server.close(); });
});

Runtime	Output (3 runs each)
Node v26.3.0	`error ERR_SSL_FIRST_OCTET_INVALID, close` or `error ERR_SSL_LAST_OCTET_INVALID, close`
Bun 1.3.13, Bun 1.4.2, canary 1.4.3-canary.1 (`367d939`)	`secureConnect authorized=true, close`
this PR	`error ECONNRESET, close`

What the handler did with each failed handshake, and what it does now

Pair from the native socket	Where it comes from	Before	Now
`false, ECONNRESET`	the peer closed before the handshake finished	`onConnectEnd` reports `ECONNRESET`	same
`false, EPROTO` or `ERR_SSL_*`	a failure with a TLS reason	`error ERR_SSL_*`	same
`false, X509 code`, client rejects	a chain that the engine refused inside the handshake	`error <code>`	same
`false, null`, after this side's `end()`	the handshake ended with this side's FIN	no event	same
`false, null`, no `end()`	over a Duplex: a failure after a verified chain	`secureConnect authorized=true`	`error ECONNRESET`
`false, X509 code`, client does not reject, no `end()`	over a Duplex: a failure before or after a bad chain	`secureConnect authorized=false`	`error ECONNRESET`
`false, X509 code`, client does not reject, after `end()`	a failure after this side's FIN with a checked chain	`secureConnect authorized=false`	no event

The last three rows are the change.
Over a Duplex, with a client that rejects, a failure before any certificate still reports UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT (row 3). node:tls: report the fatal TLS alert when a handshake over a Duplex fails #32929 gives it the TLS reason.
No data moved in these cases: the native socket is marked unusable after a failed handshake (transport_unusable in on_handshake). Measured on 1.4.2 and the canary with the script above and a write in secureConnect: write() returns true, its callback gets ERR_SOCKET_CLOSED, the socket emits error ERR_SOCKET_CLOSED and close, and 0 bytes reach the transport. So the harm is to code that acts on secureConnect, on authorized, or on the certificate that getPeerCertificate() returns, in another way than by a write to that socket.

Measured over a Duplex (client does not call end())

The peer answers the ClientHello with	`rejectUnauthorized`	#44290 alone, `main`, Bun 1.4.2	This PR	Node v26.3.0
a fatal `handshake_failure` alert	`true`	`error UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT, close`	same	`error ERR_SSL_SSL/TLS_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, close`
a fatal `handshake_failure` alert	`false`	`secureConnect authorized=false authError=UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT`, `end`	`error ECONNRESET, close`	`error ERR_SSL_SSL/TLS_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, close`
bytes that are not TLS	`false`	`secureConnect authorized=false authError=UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT`, `end`	`error ECONNRESET, close`	`error ERR_SSL_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER, close`
a trusted chain with a bad key proof	`true` or `false`	`secureConnect authorized=true authError=null`	`error ECONNRESET, close`	`error ERR_SSL_*`, `close`
a `close_notify` alert	either	no event	no event	`end, error ECONNRESET, close`

The last row is not changed: the engine over a Duplex never calls the handler for it.
Over TCP the same five peers give the same lines before and after this PR (ECONNRESET or ERR_SSL_*).

Tests

6 new tests: a fatal alert, bytes that are not TLS, and a trusted chain with a bad key proof, each with rejectUnauthorized true and false. They assert that the first event is an error and that no secureConnect follows. So they pass with either error code.
On node:tls: check the server's name for a handshake that completes after end() #44290 alone 4 of them fail: both tests of the bad key proof (secureConnect authorized=true authError=null), and the alert and the non-TLS bytes with rejectUnauthorized: false.
The four helpers of the file that record client events now share one function. An automated review of node:tls: check the server's name for a handshake that completes after end() #44290 asked for that.

Suites on this change (debug build, Linux x64)

node-tls-duplex-end-verify (56 of 56), node-tls-connect (121), tls-reject-before-client-cert (121), node-tls-server (99), node-tls-cert (48), node-https-agent-checkserveridentity-reuse (30), renegotiation (21), node-tls-wrapped-socket-close (15), node-tls-connect-hostname-verification (11), node-tls-upgrade (5), node-tls-raw-end (4), node-https-checkServerIdentity (4), node-tls-duplex-close-throw-uaf (4).
Vendored Node tests: all 186 test-tls-*.js files pass. Of 66 test-https-*.js and sequential TLS files, 65 pass. test-https-timeout.js does not end on this debug build, and not on a debug build of main (3 of 3 runs each). It passes on the release builds of 1.4.2 and of the canary.
Not run on this machine: macOS, Windows.

…r end() A node:tls client that called end() during its handshake dropped the result of a handshake that completed later when the server's chain was trusted and its certificate was for another name. No 'error' and no 'secureConnect' followed, and the client read the server's data. The native socket passed its own name verdict to the handshake handler as the success flag. net.ts reads a failure with no error after end() as the client's own close, so it never ran checkServerIdentity. node:tls sockets now get the result of the handshake itself. Their name check stays in JS, as before.

A node:tls socket applies `checkServerIdentity` in JS. `on_handshake` still ran the native name check for it, and no reader of the result was left. The check now runs only for a socket that does not carry `DEFERS_SERVER_IDENTITY`, so the flag that the handler gets is the result of the handshake with no second variable.

The doc of `DEFERS_SERVER_IDENTITY` still said that a name mismatch is reported natively. The comment that moved with `let flags` repeated it, so it is removed.

…nd for a resumed session - end() and end("") in the turn of tls.connect(), over a socket that is still connecting and over a Duplex. - end() while a resumed handshake runs over a Duplex.

…comment on the handshake flag - `tls.connect({ socket })` on a net.Socket that is already connected, then `end()` in the same turn: three tests. No other test reached that path. - The comment in `onClientHandshake` said that a failure with an X509 code means an established session. It now says what the code does.

- The test passed for a full handshake too. The name check of the client now records `isSessionReused()`, and the test asserts it. - A first connection that fails no longer leaves the test waiting. - The comment on the handshake flag in `onClientHandshake` is one line.

…ession `onClientHandshake` went on to the code for an established session for each failed handshake that had no TLS reason. Over a Duplex the engine reports a failure with the chain's verdict only. So a peer with a trusted chain and a bad key proof got `secureConnect` with `authorized === true`, and a client with `rejectUnauthorized: false` got `secureConnect` for a fatal alert. A failed handshake now ends in that function: - with a TLS reason, the error of that reason (as before), - with an X509 code on a client that rejects, that error (as before), - after this side's `end()`, nothing (as before for a failure with no error), - else `ECONNRESET`, the error of a connection that ended before the session was established. The tests share one recorder of client events.

robobun · 2026-10-02T04:25:48Z

Status

Closed. #44618 supersedes this PR and is merged. The fix and its tests are on main.

How to reproduce

The script is in the Notes of the PR body: a TLS 1.2 server with a trusted certificate, a relay that changes one byte of the signature in ServerKeyExchange, and a client that runs TLS over a Duplex.

Runtime	Output
Node v26.3.0	`error ERR_SSL_FIRST_OCTET_INVALID, close` or `error ERR_SSL_LAST_OCTET_INVALID, close`
Bun 1.3.13, Bun 1.4.2, canary 1.4.3-canary.1	`secureConnect authorized=true, close`
this PR	`error ECONNRESET, close`
`main` with #44618 (`f0c6cbc`)	the tests of this case pass

Test: bun bd test test/js/node/tls/node-tls-duplex-end-verify.test.ts

robobun · 2026-10-02T05:07:23Z

^{Updated 10:07 PM PT - Oct 1st, 2026}

✅ @robobun, your commit 13e283bf8323e03537c08ce69ffdfbeb6b0eaf4d passed in Build #122681! 🎉

🧪 To try this PR locally:

bunx bun-pr 44422

That installs a local version of the PR into your bun-44422 executable, so you can run:

bun-44422 --bun

robobun · 2026-10-02T14:26:59Z

State of this PR, in answer to a question about its self-review.

The self-review has not returned yet. It started on 10-02 at about 04:25 UTC, and it still runs. When it returns I post its result here: the count of concerns, the ones that I addressed, and the ones that I rejected with the reason.
Two reasons keep this PR a draft: that review, and the stack. Its base is the branch of node:tls: check the server's name for a handshake that completes after end() #44290, because the change needs the flag that node:tls: check the server's name for a handshake that completes after end() #44290 defines.
When node:tls: check the server's name for a handshake that completes after end() #44290 merges, I rebase this branch onto main, change the base to main, run the tests again, and say here that the head moved.
The Problem section now says what the client can do after the false secureConnect: nothing leaves. Measured on Bun 1.4.2 and on the canary: write() returns true, its callback gets ERR_SOCKET_CLOSED, the socket emits error ERR_SOCKET_CLOSED and close, and 0 bytes reach the transport.

…r end() (#44290) Regression from #42181 (in no release). Merge before 1.4.3 is tagged, and before #43957 and #43962. ### Problem - After `end()` during its handshake, a node:tls client accepts a trusted certificate for another name: no error, and it reads the server's data. Node and Bun 1.4.2 report `ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID`. - `on_handshake` (`src/runtime/socket/socket_body.rs`) passed its name verdict to the handler as the success flag. After `end()`, `onClientHandshake` (`src/js/node/net.ts:496`) reads a failure with no error as the client's own close and skips `checkServerIdentity`. ### Fix - `on_handshake` no longer runs the native name check for a node:tls socket. The handler's flag is the handshake result. - `Bun.connect` and `upgradeTLS` sockets do not change. - Verified: `node-tls-duplex-end-verify.test.ts`, 19 new tests. `main` fails 18. Node v26.3.0 passes 49, skips 1. - Self-reviewed: 10 concerns raised, 10 addressed. One is #44422 (`onClientHandshake` reads some failed handshakes as established). ### Background - node:tls checks the name in JS (`checkServerIdentity`), on sockets that `DEFERS_SERVER_IDENTITY` marks. The native check ran for them: another name gave `(false, null)`, like a handshake that fails after this side's FIN. - Considered a `getAuthorizationError()` test in the guard, or a second flag variable: both keep an unused native check. ### Downsides - Needs a maintainer's yes: the internal `socket._handle.authorized` and `getAuthorizationError()` of a node:tls client drop the name check (no reader in `src/js` or `test`). The public values do not change. - Still open (#43957): only the first such connection of a process reports if its server keeps its side open. <details><summary>Notes</summary> **The regression** (`tls.connect({ socket })` on a connected socket, then `end()`. Trusted chain, certificate for another name, server in the same process, 3 runs each) | Runtime | Output | |---|---| | Node v26.3.0 | `finish, error ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID, close` | | Bun 1.4.2 (744846f) | `error ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID, close` | | Bun 1.3.13 | `end, finish, error ECONNRESET, close` | | canary 1.4.3-canary.1 (367d939, has #42181) | `finish, end, close`, no error | | this PR | `finish, error ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID, close` | - #42181 (44e51b7) is on `main` and is not an ancestor of the tag `bun-v1.4.2`. The client handler at that tag has no such guard. **Merge order, and why** - This PR first. Both later PRs let more handshakes complete after `end()`, and on `main` each of those accepts a certificate for another name. - #43957 removes the engine defect that today keeps the second and later connections of a process from completing such a handshake. Merged before this PR, it turns one silently accepted connection into all of them. Measured with five connections in one process (`tls.connect({ socket })`, another name, server keeps its side open): on `main` 1 of 5 handshakes completes, and the client reports no error for it. On `main` with the source change of #43957, 5 of 5 complete with no error. - #43962 sends a client's FIN after its ClientHello. It contains this PR's commits. - With #43957 only the test file conflicts: both PRs insert a block. Keep both. **Where the native check came from** - #31339 added the native name check for all clients. - #32359 proposed to remove it and was closed for #33755. #33755 added `DEFERS_SERVER_IDENTITY`: the check stayed enforced for `Bun.connect`, and for node:tls it was computed but not enforced. It took node:tls sockets out of `reject_unauthorized` and out of the error argument. - #42181 then added the guard for "failed after our own FIN", which is the same pair as "computed, another name". - #43863 says "Each connection has one server name check", and lists node:tls as "checked after the handshake, in JS". - This PR is the node:tls half of #32359. It does not touch the check for `Bun.connect`. - #43865, #43924 and #43947 are the fixes of the chain check in the same test file. **What the client handler gets from the fd engine** (`packages/bun-usockets/src/crypto/openssl.c`) `on_handshake` calls the handler with `(socket, flag, error)`. For a node:tls client: | Case | Before | Now | |---|---|---| | Handshake completed, chain and name good | `true, null` | `true, null` | | Handshake completed, chain good, another name | `false, null` | `true, null` | | Handshake completed, chain bad | `true, X509 error` | `true, X509 error` | | Chain refused inside the handshake | `false, X509 error` | `false, X509 error` | | Handshake failed after this side's FIN | `false, null` | `false, null` | | Handshake failed with a TLS reason | `false, EPROTO` | `false, EPROTO` | | The peer closed before the handshake finished | `false, ECONNRESET` | `false, ECONNRESET` | - Row 2 and row 5 were the same pair. The guard that #42181 added for row 5 also caught row 2 once the client had ended. - With no `end()`, row 2 already reached `checkServerIdentity`, because the guard tests `writableFinished`. So a client that does not end behaves as before. - `Bun.connect` and `upgradeTLS` sockets do not carry `DEFERS_SERVER_IDENTITY`. Their flag is `authorized`, as documented. **Rows that this PR does not change** The engine for a Duplex, a named pipe and TLS inside TLS (`SSLWrapper`, `src/uws/lib.rs`) reports no TLS reason. A failed handshake arrives as `(false, null)` after a verified chain and as `(false, X509 code)` otherwise. `onClientHandshake` reads both as an established session unless the client rejects the code. Measured on this PR with a client over a Duplex that does not call `end()`: | The peer answers the ClientHello with | `rejectUnauthorized` | `main`, Bun 1.4.2 and this PR | Node v26.3.0 | |---|---|---|---| | a fatal `handshake_failure` alert | `true` | `error UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT, close` | `error ERR_SSL_SSL/TLS_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, close` | | a fatal `handshake_failure` alert | `false` | `secureConnect authorized=false authError=UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT`, `end` | `error ERR_SSL_SSL/TLS_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, close` | | bytes that are not TLS | `false` | `secureConnect authorized=false authError=UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT`, `end` | `error ERR_SSL_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER, close` | | a `close_notify` alert | either | no event | `end, error ECONNRESET, close` | - These rows are older than this PR: Bun 1.4.2 prints them too. The native socket is marked unusable after a failed handshake (`transport_unusable` in `on_handshake`). - Owners: #32929 (the engine reports the fatal alert over a Duplex), #44223 and #44021 (a refused renegotiation). - #44422 makes a handshake that did not complete terminal in `onClientHandshake`, as it is in the server handler. This PR is the step before it: while `(false, null)` could be a completed handshake, that arm could not go. It stays out of this PR so that this PR can land, or be reverted, alone. **What the native handle of a node:tls client reports** (trusted chain, another name, `rejectUnauthorized: false`, measured) | Value | `main` | This PR | |---|---|---| | `socket.authorized` | `false` | `false` | | `socket.authorizationError` | `ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID` | `ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID` | | `socket._handle.authorized` | `false` | `true` | | `socket._handle.getAuthorizationError()` | `ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID` | `null` | - The native check for these sockets had three effects on `main`: the flag in row 2 above, and the two internal values. - The in-handshake check (`server_identity`) already left node:tls sockets out. Both sites now agree. - `Flags::HOSTNAME_MISMATCH` has no reader on `main`. This PR does not remove it. - The hunk that stops the native check came from an optional finding of an automated review. No person has reviewed it yet. **Measured** (Linux x64, debug builds, Node v26.3.0, server in its own Node process, 40 s watchdog) `tls.connect({ socket })` on a connected socket, then `end()`. The chain is trusted, the certificate is for another name, `rejectUnauthorized: true`: | Server | TLS | Node | `main` (d115f54) | This PR | |---|---|---|---|---| | keeps its side open | 1.3 | `finish, error ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID, close` | `finish`, never exits | same as Node | | ordinary | 1.3 | `finish, error ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID, close` | `finish, end, close`, no error | same as Node | | keeps its side open | 1.2 | `finish`, never exits | `finish`, never exits | same as Node | | ordinary | 1.2 | `finish, end, error ECONNRESET, close` | same as Node | same as Node | - `end()` in the same tick and `end()` one `setImmediate` later give the same lines. - In the new tests the handshake completes after the client's `end()` under TLS 1.2 and over a Duplex as well. There `main` delivers `secret-banner` to a client with `rejectUnauthorized: true`. - A client that passes its own `checkServerIdentity` is asked: one test asserts the name that it gets, and `authorized=true` when it accepts. **Still open, the engine** - Each line of the table above is the first connection of its process. Five such connections, one after the other in one process, against a server that keeps its side open: with this PR the first reports and the other four print `finish` only. `main` does the same when the name is good. The flight that the first socket seals after its FIN takes the event loop's one spill slot and never leaves it. #43957 is open for that. - `tls.connect(port)` followed at once by `end()` still sends its FIN before its ClientHello, so no handshake runs there. #43962 changes that order. - #43957 is open for the spill slot. Measured with its source change on this PR: all five connections report, for another name and for a good name. - A handshake that fails after `end()` with no certificate still reports nothing. The tests of #42181 and #43947 for that case pass. **Tests** - 19 new tests against `main`: the name check after `end()` over a Duplex, over TCP behind a record proxy (TLS 1.2 and 1.3) and on a connected `net.Socket` (3 each), `end()` and `end("")` in the turn of `tls.connect()` over a socket that is still connecting and over a Duplex (6), and a resumed session (1, Bun only). - 7 of them are the commit of another branch (`robobun/baba0385/tls-early-end-hostname-check`), taken as it is. The resumed-session test now asserts `isSessionReused()`. - `main` (4b02e10) fails 18 of the 19. The one that passes is `end("")` over a Duplex. **Suites** (this machine ran at a load average of 200 to 800) - On this head: `node-tls-duplex-end-verify` (50 of 50), `node-tls-connect` (121), `tls-reject-before-client-cert` (121), `node-https-agent-checkserveridentity-reuse` (30), `renegotiation` (21), `node-tls-wrapped-socket-close` (15), `node-tls-connect-hostname-verification` (11), `node-tls-upgrade` (5), `node-tls-raw-end` (4), `node-https-checkServerIdentity` (4). - On the head before the rebase: 14 vendored Node tests that use `checkServerIdentity` or the name error, `fetch.tls` (61). `socket.test.ts`, `node-tls-cert` and `node-tls-server` had only failures that `main` has on this machine too (timeouts of child processes, and one test that needs `www.example.com`). - Not run on this machine: macOS, Windows. </details>

robobun · 2026-10-03T05:15:04Z

The self-review of this PR returned (on 10-02, for head 13e283b). Its result: the change should exist, and the diff needs rework before the PR leaves draft. 8 concerns survived. None is rejected.

Changes to the diff (in the next push)

The branch that stays silent after this side's end() is too wide. It also takes a failure with an X509 code on a client with rejectUnauthorized: false. That client then gets end, close and no error. I narrow the branch to a failure with no code. The other case reports ECONNRESET.
No test needs this guard for a renegotiation. The engine reports a renegotiation that the client refuses as a failed handshake. On main that report runs the code for an established session again and emits a second secureConnect. With this PR it does not. I add a test for that.
The comment above ssl_failed_handshake_verify_error in openssl.c says that node:tls reads a failure with an X509 code as an established session. After this PR that is only true for a client that rejects, which then gets that certificate error. I correct the comment.

Changes to the PR body (with the same push)

The effect on a refused renegotiation (point 2) is not in the body.
The order against node:tls: report the fatal TLS alert when a handshake over a Duplex fails #32929 is not in the body. The two PRs do not depend on each other. node:tls: report the fatal TLS alert when a handshake over a Duplex fails #32929 gives a failed handshake over a Duplex its TLS alert as the error. This PR decides what a failure with no TLS reason does.
Two of the six new tests pass on the base. They pin a case that is already right (rejectUnauthorized: true). The body must say that.
A client with default options over a Duplex still reports UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT for a fatal alert that arrives before a certificate. That is an error, but not the right one. node:tls: report the fatal TLS alert when a handshake over a Duplex fails #32929 changes it. This goes into Downsides.

Done

The review asked for a maintainer's decision on node:tls: check the server's name for a handshake that completes after end() #44290 first, because this PR builds on its flag. node:tls: check the server's name for a handshake that completes after end() #44290 merged on 10-02.

State of the branch

node:tls: check the server's name for a handshake that completes after end() #44290 merged, and GitHub changed the base of this PR to main. The pushed head (13e283b) conflicts with main now.
The rebase onto main is made locally. Its test run with the debug build is not complete yet. I push when it passes, and I say here that the head moved.
The PR stays a draft until the push with points 1 to 7 is up and its checks pass.

Jarred-Sumner · 2026-10-06T06:18:47Z

Superseded by #44618, which consolidates the open TLS pull requests. This fix and its tests are in there, either as written, rewritten smaller, or merged with the other PRs that patched the same cause (see the "By area" list in that PR). Closing in favor of it.

…ession (#44422) onClientHandshake tore the socket down only for a failure that carried a TLS reason. Every other failed handshake went on as `_secureEstablished`, so over a Duplex a peer with a trusted chain and a bad key proof got `secureConnect` with `authorized === true`. A failed handshake now ends there: the TLS reason if there is one, the X509 error of a chain this client refuses, ECONNRESET otherwise, and nothing after the client's own end().

…ps, WebSocket, SQL) (#44618) ### What does this PR do? Consolidates the open TLS pull requests into one. Each was reproduced on `main` and, for `node:*` behavior, on Node v26.3.0 first. About a third are ported as written, the rest are rewritten smaller or merged into one fix where several PRs patched the same cause. One commit per fix, so it can be read commit by commit. Fixes #43520, fixes #31396, fixes #43635, fixes #37193, fixes #43846, fixes #17932, fixes #41061, fixes #36887, fixes #31810, fixes #35240, fixes #32234, fixes #44365, fixes #43807, fixes #42280, fixes #44517. Addresses #41856 (SNI and `servername`; not `checkServerIdentity` for SQL), #24845 (the spin is gone, shown with fault injection on Linux; not run on macOS), #19754 (node-fetch forwards the agent's TLS options; the Kubernetes client itself was not run). #### The ones that matter most | | On `main` | PRs | |---|---|---| | Client certificate disclosure | `https.request()` with a client certificate sends it to a server it then refuses (wrong name, `checkServerIdentity`, `destroy()` in `'secureConnect'`, `terminate()` in `handshake`). A server can force it with a junk record behind its Finished | #43946 | | False `authorized` | Over a Duplex, `secureConnect` with `authorized === true` for a peer that failed the key proof; `secureConnect` for a plaintext peer with `rejectUnauthorized: false` | #44422, #32929 | | Cleartext https | `https.createServer()` without a usable key/cert answers plain HTTP | #41672, #33539 | | Revoked client certificates | An https mTLS server never sees `crl`, so a revoked client is `authorized` | #41641 | | Pooled sockets | Requests with different client certificates or CAs share an `https.Agent` socket and session | #42498 | | Silent plaintext | `tls: [...]` given to `Bun.listen` / `Bun.connect` is plain TCP | #41490 | | Server weakened by a client knob | `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0` turns off a server's client-certificate enforcement | #35245 | | Pins never checked | `WebSocket` never calls `tls.checkServerIdentity` and ignores `tls.serverName` | #41648 | | `verify-full` dropped | `PGSSLMODE=verify-*` is lost next to a `TLS_*` URL variable; `tls: true` sends no SNI | #44498 | | Crashes | use-after-free from `destroy()` in `ALPNCallback` over a Duplex; `abort()` on a late `setSession()`; SIGABRT in `fetch` with an https proxy from the environment and a `Bun.file()` body | #44462, #41671, #44458 | | Stream corruption | A TLS `write()` can lose 16 KiB it reported as written while another socket on the loop is stalled | #44529 | | Hangs and spins | 100% CPU on a failing `send()`; a fatal `SSL_write` leaves the socket open forever; `idleTimeout` never sheds a TLS client that ignores `close_notify` | #34510, #38176, #42336 | | Wrong certificate (regression since 1.3.14) | Connections accepted before `stop()` / `close()` get the default certificate and skip their entry's `requestCert` / `ca` | #42355 | | Quadratic Duplex / proxy tunnel | Reading one chunk over a Duplex, CPU: 8 MB 0.88 s → 0.14 s, 16 MB 3.18 s → 0.23 s, 32 MB 11.75 s → 0.39 s; `fetch` upload through CONNECT: 1.7 s → 0.18 s (debug build) | #44464 | #### By area - **fd engine, write path** (`openssl.c`, `socket.c`): #42352, #34510 + #38176 + #42336 as one change, #44529, #44458, #44192. A rejected `send()` ends the write side only and closes at the next writable event unless the peer's bytes are still queued (a 413 sent before a reset is still read). No new per-socket state. Also, on kqueue, **a FIN no longer ends a socket that waits in the low-priority queue** (`loop.c`): with more than 5 TLS handshakes at once, a client that ended right after its handshake could be reset and its server socket report `socket hang up`, because the eof that the sentinel read knote reports was acted on ahead of the unread Finished. That is on `main` too (the macOS entry for `node-tls-server.test.ts` in `test/flaky-tests.txt`: 7 of 48 recent builds of other branches), and this branch made it likelier (6 of 8 builds), since Finished now leaves in one segment with the close_notify. - **Error reporting, both engines**: #44422, #32929, #44516, #37094, #41272 + #42324 + #44223 as one change, #44021, #37472, #43946, #33630. One channel: a fatal error on an established session is reported, then **the engine closes the connection itself**, whatever the owner does with the report. `test/js/bun/net/tls-fatal-error-closes.test.ts` asserts closed-and-nothing-delivered for every owner (node:tls, `Bun.connect`, `Bun.listen`, `fetch` direct and through CONNECT, `Bun.serve`, `WebSocket` direct and through a proxy, Postgres, MySQL, Valkey, Duplex). - **Duplex engine** (`SSLWrapper`, `UpgradedDuplex`): #44462, #43529, #42332, #44464. #43877 + #44394 were in and are **out again**, see "Worth a look" 5. - **node:tls wrap lifecycle** (`net.ts`, `tls.ts`): #38007, #38058, #38028 + #38122 + #38076 as one change (six copies of the attach code become two helpers), #38311, #39008, #38154, #42340 + #42343 + #42339 + #42453 as one change, #43791, #42425, #44085, #42683, #39088, #39040, #40375, and what was still real of #36534. - **SNI, ALPN, server contexts**: #43080, #42050, #37195 + #43849 as one change (**one** SNI matcher for TCP and HTTP/3), #42355, #42285, #33253, part of #37896, part of #37013. A `tls.Server` has one `SSL_CTX`. - **Verification and options**: #44738, #41490, #37005 + the cwd pin of #40984, #31811, #43982, #33483 + #35245, #41810, #32235, #44441, #38092. - **node:tls API and CA store**: #41671, #38145, #32824, #43594, #39997, #41696, #33534, #34748, #42991, #42996, #42970. - **node:https, Agent, `ws`, node-fetch**: #41672 (https half), #41641, #38261, #42498, #44346, #35609, #31397, #42325. - **WebSocket client**: #41648, #37487 + #43048 as one change. - **SQL, Redis**: #33666, #41711, #44498, part of #42054. - **Tests only**: #41426, #40040, #44395, #44016, #37860, #40591, #44440, #41424. Found on the way and fixed here: an upload that a TLS 1.2 server interrupts with a renegotiation never completes on `main` (0 of 32 runs over `https.request`, `fetch`, `node:tls` and `Bun.connect`: the renegotiation ClientHello lands inside an application record that is still unsent, or the socket gets no `drain` again) and completes here, with two tests from robobun; the fix for #40653 (final flight and first write in one segment) stopped working whenever another TLS socket on the loop was stalled, on `main` too; the `tls.Server` prototype pinned the last server constructed and every `SSL_CTX` it owned; `Object.create(process.env).NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED = "0"` turned verification off process-wide once a `SHARE_ENV` worker existed; two debug panics when wrapping a shut-down or still-connecting socket; a `fetch` POST through a proxy sent its headers twice when the origin renegotiated; `BlockList` ignored IPv6 zone ids; a test now ties `root_certs.der` to `certdata.txt`. #### Behavior changes - **A server's `ca` without `requestCert` no longer asks for a client certificate** (`Bun.serve`, `Bun.listen`, HTTP/3, node:tls). It matches the docs and Node. On `main` such a server refused clients with no certificate but served any unrelated self-signed one, so it was never authentication. **Set `requestCert: true` to require a certificate.** A matrix test pins that `requestCert: true` still refuses no certificate and an untrusted one on 8 kinds of server, TLS 1.2 and 1.3, with `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED` unset and `0`. - `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0` no longer relaxes a server. - `Bun.connect` / `Bun.listen` hear of a fatal TLS error after the handshake through `error(socket, err)`. With no `error` handler the socket just closes. - HTTP/3 server names match like TCP: `*.` covers exactly one label, case is ignored, a trailing dot is ignored, the last registration of a name wins. - `requestCert` on node:https is `=== true`, as in Node. - An array where a generated options dictionary is expected throws (`tls: []`, `jest.useFakeTimers([])`). - `key` / `cert` arrays serve every identity. A client that can use both gets ECDSA, where `main` served whichever pair came last. - `ecdhCurve` is forwarded by node:https, `ws` and node-fetch now, so a group BoringSSL lacks (`X448`) throws there as it already does in `tls.createServer`. - A wrapped socket's error is re-emitted on the TLS socket as in Node, so `raw.destroy(err)` with a listener on `raw` only is uncaught, as in Node. - `sql.options.tls` is always an object, never `true`. `RedisClient` sends SNI. - `tls: { secureContext }` alone asks for TLS on `Bun.listen` / `Bun.connect` (it was plain TCP), and a value that is not a `SecureContext` throws. The context is served as it is: the `requestCert` / `rejectUnauthorized` it was created with hold whatever the options next to it say, and `requestCert` in the options over a context that does not ask throws at `listen()`. - `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS` reaches every client once assigned (`fetch`, `WebSocket`, `Bun.connect`, `RedisClient`, `Bun.SQL`, `S3Client`, proxy tunnels) and servers again. A list that selects no cipher throws `ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_MATCH` at the assignment. `fetch.preconnect()` dials nothing after an assignment. - The warning for an unreadable `NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS` is Node's one line, without the `warn:` prefix. - `BUN_CONFIG_WS_CLOSE_TIMEOUT` (default 30 s): how long a `WebSocket` client waits for the server to close the connection after the closing handshake. #### Worth a look in review 1. **#44529**: the kernel-refused remainder of a TLS write moves from the loop's one slot onto the connection (in the existing rare struct), so the write BIO never refuses a sealed record. Nothing is allocated on an unstalled path (200 writes: 0 appends, same `send()` count as `main`), memory with 16 stalled writers is lower than on `main` (276 KB vs 340 KB, which `main` holds inside BoringSSL's buffers), `us_socket_t` stays 80 bytes. It needs a bound on how long a deferred close waits, or a peer that stops reading pins the fd past `destroy()`: `US_SSL_CLOSE_AFTER_SPILL_TIMEOUT` is a fixed 10 s, not re-armed on progress. Separate commits, but the fix that keeps the client certificate off the wire beside a stalled socket builds on them. 2. **The default name check of node:tls also runs inside the handshake**, so a wrong-name server gets no client certificate on TLS 1.2 either. JS still runs it after every successful handshake, so a difference between the two matchers can only refuse. Error objects are byte-identical. 3. **#44441** widens trust by design: a self-issued leaf whose `keyUsage` lacks `keyCertSign` (`dotnet dev-certs`) is its own anchor when the store holds a byte-identical copy. No BoringSSL change. Expired pin, same subject with another key, wrong EKU and a pinned intermediate are tested to fail. 4. **#32235** only adds Ed25519 and ECDSA P-521 to the verify list. A captured ClientHello shows `main`'s list with the two inserted; `rsa_pkcs1_sha1` stays. 5. **A stream that a TLS socket wraps, when that TLS socket closes.** An earlier state of this branch lost data here while CI was green (found by #44709's report): with the peer closing first, 4 of 8 MiB arrived with TLS in TLS, 4 of 32 MiB on the http2 `emit("connection")` path, and a `write()` with no `'error'` listener ended the process. Three Node-parity changes only hold together: destroying the wrapped stream at the close (#38028 + #38122 + #38076, #38154) is safe only if every write has really completed (#43877), which in turn needs Node's handling of the peer's close_notify, which needs half-open sockets that the GC can collect. So: - #43877 + #44394 are reverted and reopened. A write over a stream completes once the stream has taken the ciphertext, as on `main`. - Until the verdict on the peer lets the session through, the application cannot have written over it. There the wrapped stream is destroyed as in Node, with the sessions below it. That keeps the release of the connection after a failed handshake, a rejected certificate and an early `destroy()`. The same for an http2 socket the application never got, and for `resetAndDestroy()`. - After that it is `main`'s teardown: a `net.Socket` only gets the engine's `end()`, closes at its peer's FIN, keeps its own timeout and reports its own errors. Any other stream is destroyed with the TLS socket. The regular suites cannot see any of this (999 files were green on every broken variant), so it was steered by eleven seeded differential fuzzers run on this build, `main`, Node v26.3.0 and the earlier state: close, `end()`, `destroy()`, `destroySoon()`, resets, hung and half-open peers, paused writers, timeouts, two and three sessions deep, over TCP and over Duplexes, before, at and after the handshake, and http2 requests. See "How did you verify". #### Known limits - `fetch` with a `checkServerIdentity` function still sends the client certificate (not the request) to a server the function refuses. On TLS 1.2 any verdict a JS callback gives is too late, as in Node. - `addContext()` / `SNICallback` still do not apply to a server-side socket on the stream engine (`emit("connection", duplex)`, TLS in TLS, unflushed writes, named pipes), as on `main`. - A CA bundled in a pfx extends an explicit `ca` only, for `ws` / node-fetch / `WebSocket`: the native `ca` can only replace the default store, and that store keeps `SSL_CERT_FILE` / `SSL_CERT_DIR`. - P-521 leaves work on TLS 1.3 only. TLS 1.2 needs secp521r1 in every ClientHello (`it.todo`). - Once `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS` is assigned, `fetch(url, { protocol: "http3" })` is `HTTP3Unsupported`, as with an explicit `ciphers`. - `addCACert()` by hand does not extend the chains of a context with several identities. - A throwing `ALPNCallback` sends `no_application_protocol` on both engines. Node sends nothing and its client sees `ECONNRESET`. - TLS in TLS, peer FIN while the outer handshake runs: the inner socket gets one `write EPIPE`, where Node gives `ECONNRESET` (`main` gives it no error at all). - `@SECLEVEL` in `ciphers` is dropped by the `ws` / node-fetch shims, which used to ignore `ciphers`. node:tls keeps throwing `ERR_SSL_INVALID_COMMAND`. - Beside a stalled TLS socket only the first record (16 KiB) of the first write leaves with the handshake flight. The rest goes record by record, which is what bounds the memory of stalled writers. - After a fatal error on an established session the socket emits `'error'` and then `'close'`. Node emits `'error'` and leaves the socket open. - A paused reader whose own write the kernel rejects loses what it had not read yet, with an `EPIPE`, as on Node. `main` reports no error there and delivers it. - On `main` too: a `Bun.listen` socket without `allowHalfOpen` that has unsent ciphertext when the client's `shutdown()` arrives loses that ciphertext (32 KiB), and over plain TCP `end()` with the peer still sending is a close over unread input, so a reset. - Differences from both `main` and Node that the differential runs below found and that stay, all with a peer that aborts: `ECONNRESET` instead of a clean `'end'` after the socket's own `'finish'` when the peer destroyed with unread data; under TLS 1.2, a zero-length `write()` followed by `destroy()` in `'secureConnection'` leaves the client without `'secureConnect'` (a plain `destroy()` there matches Node); a TLS 1.2 client that destroys in `'secureConnect'` gets no `'session'`; a `ClientRequest` whose handshake fails with an alert emits `'error'` and `'close'` but no `'finish'` (`writableFinished` is true). - Once `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS` is assigned, `fetch.preconnect()` opens nothing: `fetch()` then uses a context of its own, and a socket warmed under the default one would never be picked up. - A TLS `send()` that the kernel refuses outside a `write()` call (the drain of unsent ciphertext) is reported with the close, as `read EPIPE` / `read ECONNRESET`. Node says `write EPIPE`. `main` does not report it at all. - Once the application has a session over a `net.Socket` (TLS in TLS, http2 `emit("connection")`), a peer that never sends its FIN holds that socket after the TLS socket closed, as on `main`. Node destroys it. Two tests of #38154 are `todo` for this. Closing it any earlier (at its `'finish'`, say) makes the kernel drop what it has not sent yet as soon as the peer's close_notify arrives. - Plaintext that was queued on a socket before it was wrapped (STARTTLS with a backlog) is dropped when the TLS socket is destroyed, or its handshake fails, before the session is accepted. Node drops it too, except on `destroySoon()`. `main` sends it. - Over a stream that is no `net.Socket`, `end()` can still cut what that stream has buffered, and there is no backpressure, both as on `main` (#43877). - `tls.secureContext` (the undocumented door node:tls uses) is not read by a Windows named pipe listener, which builds its context from the options. On `upgradeTLS({ isServer: true })` the options next to it are the policy, as with Node's `SetVerifyMode`. - `selectServerName()` rebuilds the name tree per ClientHello for injected sockets of a server with `addContext()` entries: 0.4 µs for 1 entry, 3.7 µs for 10, 41 µs for 100, against 631–1111 µs for a handshake. #### Not included Left open, because they need a decision or are not TLS: #43877 + #44394 (see "Worth a look" 5; #43874 stays open with them), #38548, #38591 (both shrink who is trusted), #41589 (`verify-full` vs `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0`), #37197, #41706, #43216, #33487, #33545, #36707, #32435, #37255, #28691, #40275, #30314 (features), #38120 (needs the BoringSSL fork, as did #33517, which the stale bot has closed since), #38529 (needs a Windows measurement), #34342, #38232, #43089, #44454, #40451, #42710, #44527, #38088, #38093, #41898. #37896, #42054 and #37013 stay open for the halves not taken. `http.createServer({ key, cert })` keeps serving TLS on purpose. One open question: `tls: {}` (an object that names no TLS option) is plain TCP on `Bun.listen` / `Bun.connect`, here and on `main`. It is the same trap as `tls: []`, but changing it changes a Bun default, so it is left alone. ### How did you verify your code works? - Every new test fails on `main` for the stated reason and passes here, except guards that pin existing behavior, each shown to fail when its clause is removed. `node:*` tests also pass on Node v26.3.0; the few that cannot say which Node version has the behavior. - 212 test files that touch TLS, sockets, http, http2, fetch, WebSocket, SQL, Valkey and workers: 6154 pass, 2 fail. Both are seen on `main` too: `serve.test.ts` "root range port" (the box runs as root), and `worker_threads.test.ts` "terminate(): nothing of the worker's runs after the request", which is flaky there and passed in the run below. - 58 of those files the way the ASAN lane runs them (LeakSanitizer + `BUN_JSC_validateExceptionChecks`): 58 files, 48 of them with leak checking, 4132 pass, 3 fail. All three also fail on `main`: `serve.test.ts` "root range port", `node-net.test.ts` "should not leak when connect({path}) fails synchronously on a reused handle" (times out under this environment), `worker_threads.test.ts` "process.exit() with a shell cp in flight" (a `ShellCpTask` leak). - 647 vendored `test-tls-*`, `test-https-*`, `test-net-*`, `test-http2-*`: the only two failures also fail on `main`. - The SNI matcher was diffed against both old matchers: 3 seeds × 1.23 M lookups × 3 registration flavours, every difference in one of the intended classes, TCP and HTTP/3 identical on every lookup. - The headline rows were also driven by hand with scripts against this build, `main` and Node v26.3.0: cleartext https, `crl`, `tls: []` / `{ secureContext }`, the `ca` / `requestCert` matrix, the client certificate on a wrong-name server, late `setSession()`, `destroy()` in `ALPNCallback`, `[rsa, ec]` identities with an intermediate from `ca`, `WebSocket` `checkServerIdentity`, a corrupted record, the Duplex read above, `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS`. - The `setSession()` guard was checked against the real `abort()` at 43 handshake states. - `bun run rust:check-all`: 12 of 12 targets. `tsc`, oxlint, source lints, prettier, rustfmt, mordant clean. - usockets' `_Nonnull` is compiled out of debug builds, so 105 of those files were also run on a local release ASAN build with the CI runner's environment (92 with leak checking): 4595 pass, 1 fail, `child_process.test.ts` "spawn reports EPERM after dropping privileges", which cannot pass as root and fails on `main` too. - The close of a TLS socket over another stream ("Worth a look" 5): eleven seeded differential fuzzers, 8,424 scenarios compared, each run on a release ASAN build of this branch, on `main`, on Node v26.3.0 and on the earlier state of the branch. Against `main`: - Data that `main` delivers in full is cut in 5 scenarios, and about 150 that `main` cuts arrive in full. Of the 5, in 2 `main` never notices the peer's close and keeps the socket for good, 2 call `end()` on the middle one of three sessions over an in-memory Duplex, and 1 does the same on Node. - No dead timeout, no silent reset and no uncaught error that `main` does not have (4 uncaught errors fewer). - A socket stays open where `main` closes it in 109, and closes where `main` keeps it in 295. 92 of the 109 do the same on Node or on the earlier state (a `destroy()` that an in-memory Duplex does not show its peer, half-open peers). 14 wait for a peer that paused reading and so does not read the FIN (#42332's backpressure, as in Node); the socket's own timeout fires there. 3 are left: one on a 5 ms timer, two with three sessions over an in-memory Duplex. - The earlier state of the branch cut data in 173 of the 400 scenarios of one of them, where `main` cuts none and this cuts none. - 23 new tests pin what they found. Each earlier attempt at this fix fails the ones that describe it, the earlier state of the branch fails 7, and all pass on Node. - After that change: 999 test files on the release ASAN build (20,246 pass; the 11 files that fail need a database, Docker, DNS or a non-root user, or share a temp directory with a parallel run and pass alone), 61 on the debug build. - TLS over a file descriptor (`openssl.c`, the path of `fetch`, `Bun.serve`, `tls.connect`, `Bun.connect`) got the same treatment after the rebase: seeded differential fuzzers on CI's release build of this branch, on `main` and, for `node:*`, on Node v26.3.0. Every runtime also against itself for the noise floor, injected faults and known bugs of `main` as positive controls, and a difference counts only if it shows in 5 of 5 fresh processes. - `node:tls` over TCP: 11,500 scenarios (one connection with Node as the oracle line by line; 2 to 60 connections beside stalled neighbours; raw peers that break the handshake). HTTPS: about 136,000 runs over `Bun.serve` + `fetch`, `node:https`, `node:http2` and `wss://`, also with the two ends in different runtimes. `Bun.connect` / `Bun.listen` / `upgradeTLS`: 11,500 scenarios and 720 slow connections, with writers driven by what `write()` returns, beside up to 6 stalled, dripping, closing or resetting neighbours, and plain TCP as a second oracle. No crash, hang, duplication, reordering or silent truncation, and no change in time or in connection reuse. - They found six things that `main` does better, none of which any test showed. All are fixed, each with a test that fails on the build before: what the peer sent lost behind a rejected `send()` (23 scenarios, and an early HTTPS response lost with only `EPIPE`), the same silently for a paused reader, `server.close()` never calling back on a half-open server after a ClientHello and a reset (17), `closeAllConnections()` taking 12 s with a stalled client, `end()` losing up to 1.3 of 4 MiB that `write()` had reported while the peer still uploads, and `end()` a little after a stall never closing beside other stalled TLS sockets. The last two fixes also deliver the 1 to 2 MiB that `main` loses there, and close the socket that `main` keeps for good without such neighbours. - All of them again after every fix, on CI's release build of it. That caught one regression of a fix itself (a reader stopped for backpressure lost 86,385 bytes, 1 of 6,000 scenarios), fixed too. On the last build: scenarios that lose data where `main` does not 23 → 2, and Node loses it in both, with the same `EPIPE`; `server.close()` that never calls back 17 → 0; connections held 4 → 0; requests that end in an error only where `main` has a response 6 → 0. With a Node server in another process, a request ends in an error only in 8 and 10 of 1,500 scenarios here, 5 and 3 on `main`, 10 with Node as the client. - `Bun.connect` / `Bun.listen` on the last build against `main`, in scenarios: hangs 0 against 1,031, sockets and fds never released 0 against 965, corrupted data 0 against 345, `abort()` 0 against 26 (`setSession()` after the handshake), writers that never close 0 against 101 of 720 connections. No kind of failure shows here and not on `main`. About a third of the slow connections close later than on `main`, in 1 to 16 s instead of at once, waiting for unsent ciphertext or for the peer's close_notify, and 79 more of them deliver all that `write()` reported. RSS and time with 16 to 256 stalled writers are the same. - What they found that `main` does worse: a `WebSocket` that calls `close()` with sends pending loses messages in 81 of 999 scenarios (0 here), 37 server sockets left open, 10 `server.close()` that never call back, 20 write callbacks that never run. - The kqueue fix cannot be run on Linux. The `connectionListener` count test now says what became of a missing connection, which is how the cause was found (`'tlsClientError'` "socket hang up", then `read ECONNRESET` at the client of the same port, after its `'secureConnect'`). On macOS x64 it failed every attempt of the three builds before the fix and passed at the first attempt of the build with it. - Windows and macOS were only run by CI. Four new tests asserted what only the Linux kernel does (a FIN read ahead of a reset, unread bytes surviving a reset, loopback buffer sizes, `fstat()` on a socket) and now say so per platform. --------- Co-authored-by: autofix-ci[bot] <114827586+autofix-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: robobun <117481402+robobun@users.noreply.github.com>

…or' (oven-sh#29029) Recent builds have been showing flaky `annotation error on <target>` entries (e.g. builds oven-sh#44422, oven-sh#44397). These come from `reportAnnotationToBuildKite` in `scripts/utils.mjs`, which spawns `buildkite-agent annotate` with a 5-second `spawnSync` timeout. When the agent doesn't finish in 5s, Node SIGTERMs it, `status` comes back `null`, and the old fallback posted a second annotation titled "annotation error" whose body was whatever stderr had been captured so far — in every observed case just `INFO Reading annotation body from STDIN`, which is useless. The Buildkite status page being green doesn't protect against this: `buildkite-agent`'s HTTP client has its own retry loop with exponential backoff, so a single transient failure on one request (TCP reset, TLS hiccup, a lone 5xx, or per-build rate limiting when many parallel test jobs append to the shared `flaky` context at once) makes the agent sleep several seconds before retrying internally — already past our 5s kill. None of that registers as a service outage. This change raises the timeout to 30s (enough for one internal agent retry cycle), retries the original annotation once on failure instead of posting a content-free "annotation error", and logs-and-continues rather than `throw`ing if the retry also fails — the throw path could abort `runner.node.mjs` mid-suite over what is ultimately a cosmetic reporting step.

robobun · 2026-10-17T01:46:50Z

Checked on main (f0c6cbc, debug build).

The six tests of this PR are in node-tls-duplex-end-verify.test.ts and pass (115 of 115 in the file). The tests of tls: consolidate the open TLS fixes (both engines, node:tls, node:https, WebSocket, SQL) #44618 for a renegotiation that the client refuses pass too.
The follow-up to the self-review that I announced above is not needed, so no push follows here. The two cases it was for report an error on main: a fatal alert after end() over a Duplex gives error ERR_SSL_SSLV3_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, and a handshake that the peer gives up after end() gives error ECONNRESET.

robobun added 7 commits October 1, 2026 13:08

node:tls: say in the flag's doc that the native name check does not run

efc98e0

The doc of `DEFERS_SERVER_IDENTITY` still said that a name mismatch is reported natively. The comment that moved with `let flags` repeated it, so it is removed.

node:tls: test the name check for end() before the handshake starts a…

3923e9a

…nd for a resumed session - end() and end("") in the turn of tls.connect(), over a socket that is still connecting and over a Duplex. - end() while a resumed handshake runs over a Duplex.

robobun assigned Jarred-Sumner Oct 2, 2026

github-actions Bot added the claude label Oct 2, 2026

robobun mentioned this pull request Oct 1, 2026

node:tls: check the server's name for a handshake that completes after end() #44290

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Base automatically changed from robobun/9af60fcc/tls-name-check-after-end to main October 2, 2026 23:40

Jarred-Sumner mentioned this pull request Oct 6, 2026

tls: consolidate the open TLS fixes (both engines, node:tls, node:https, WebSocket, SQL) #44618

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Jarred-Sumner closed this Oct 6, 2026

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node:tls: a handshake that did not complete is never an established session - #44422

node:tls: a handshake that did not complete is never an established session#44422
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robobun/9af60fcc/tls-failed-handshake-not-established

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