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… a Duplex
A session whose socket is tls.connect({ socket: duplex }) writes through a
native TLS socket, but each socket write hands a TLS record to the Duplex
and runs its _write synchronously. H2FrameParser::write() sent such a
session down the native path, which fills the 16 KiB cork to the boundary
and flushes in the middle of a frame. A frame issued from inside _write
(ping, settings, goaway, request) was corked first, and the rest of the
outer frame followed it, so the peer received the nested frame inside the
outer frame's payload.
write() now routes every transport whose write runs JS
(transport_write_runs_js) through write_to_js_transport, which hands bytes
over only at a frame boundary outside a header block.
…er a Duplex
generic_flush and generic_write handed write_buffer to the socket and
cleared it only after the write returned. Over tls.connect({ socket: duplex })
that write runs the Duplex's _write, and a frame or a flush issued there
(settings(), a large request) found the same bytes still pending and sent
them again. A client hits this window once: the connection preface and
SETTINGS wait in write_buffer until the session attaches the socket.
For a transport whose write runs JS, the pending bytes now leave in one
socket write and are taken out of write_buffer first. The unwritten rest
goes back in front of whatever a re-entrant write buffered.
The tests cover the connect-time flush, wait with events.once so that a
failed connect reports its error, and destroy the TLS socket and the Duplex
on teardown.
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Comment |
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Status Reproduced on bun 1.4.3-canary.1+367d939d9 with the two scripts in the PR notes (a
The 15 new cases in CI The diff is green. No test that this PR touches failed in either build, and the
All review threads are resolved. This PR needs a maintainer to review and merge it. PR: #43529 |
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Nothing blocking. The comments below are optional suggestions. There is no need to push a fix for them before merging.
Beyond the inline finding, I also checked the partial-write path in write_pending_through_js (the unwritten remainder is restored ahead of anything a re-entrant write buffered, and the offset is rebased to offset + written, matching the existing generic_flush accounting) and the new usize::try_from(result).expect("int cast") (guarded by the result < 0 branch, same shape as the surrounding arms) — neither introduces a new problem.
Extended reasoning...
The inline finding is pre-existing and concerns cork slot contention across sessions, which this change does not alter. Of the rest of the Rust diff, the two spots most likely to hide a bug were the partial-write reorder in write_pending_through_js (src/runtime/api/bun/h2_frame_parser.rs) and the expect cast; both were read against the existing generic_flush/generic_write arms and behave consistently with them. The transport_write_runs_js predicate widening to UpgradedDuplex TLS/TCP sockets is the intended scope change and the test matrix in test/js/node/http2/node-http2.test.js exercises it over a real tls.connect({ socket }) peer. The change is still a re-entrancy fix in a hot native path, so a human look at the broader design (per the ruled-out candidates on stall and re-entrant flush) remains worthwhile.
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Updated 4:42 PM PT - Sep 19th, 2026
✅ @robobun, your commit b66be9f9fcfb6db726739d1d346d24aca916e1a9 passed in 🧪 To try this PR locally: bunx bun-pr 43529That installs a local version of the PR into your bun-43529 --bun |
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I re-reviewed the current head of this PR and found no bugs; since it changes re-entrancy handling in the native h2 write path, a human look at write_pending_through_js and the write() routing change is still worthwhile.
What was reviewed:
write_pending_through_jsin src/runtime/api/bun/h2_frame_parser.rs: the pending Vec is moved out before the socket write, so noJsCellborrow is live across the JS re-entry; both callers (_write,flush) holdkeepalive(); the short-write re-queue puts the remainder ahead of re-entrant bytes, and a short write cannot actually occur here becauseSSL_writetargets an unbounded memory BIO (no partial-write mode) andraw_writereports the full length.- Ordering of nested frames: a nested
_writefindswrite_bufferempty and callsSSL_writedirectly; the re-enteredhandle_trafficdrains the write BIO FIFO before deferring, so nested records land behind the outer unit's records. - Test refactor: the non-TLS matrix keeps its previous (un-awaited)
req.writebehavior; the TLS matrix uses port 0, a localtls.createServer, awaits a sentinel PING rather than sleeping, and rejects on session close.
Extended reasoning...
Overview
The PR touches two files: src/runtime/api/bun/h2_frame_parser.rs (+50 lines) and test/js/node/http2/node-http2.test.js (+200/-50). The native change adds write_pending_through_js, which takes write_buffer/write_buffer_offset out of self before calling socket.write_maybe_corked, and routes generic_flush/generic_write through it when transport_write_runs_js() is true. write() switches its early guard from native_socket == None to transport_write_runs_js(), so a TLSSocket over a user Duplex now goes through the frame-boundary-aware write_to_js_transport path introduced in an earlier PR. Comments on the cork paths were reworded to describe the narrower remaining case (a close inside the write). The test refactor extracts sendOuterRequest and expectNestedAfterOuterUnit from the existing Duplex matrix and adds a 15-case TLS matrix (5 nested kinds x data/continuation/connect).
Security risks
None specific to this change: no new parsing of peer data, no auth/crypto configuration changes. The write path handles bytes the session itself serialized. The usize::try_from(result).expect(...) is guarded by the result < 0 branch, so it cannot panic. The only adversarial surface is user JS re-entering during _write, which is exactly what the change hardens.
Level of scrutiny
High. This is re-entrancy logic in native code where a JS callback runs under a socket write. I traced: (1) JsCell::take/replace leave no live borrow across the JS call; (2) both callers of generic_flush/generic_write hold _keepalive, so self.global() after the write is safe; (3) the re-queue on short write puts the unsent remainder in front of re-entrant bytes, which would reorder against re-entrant bytes already sent directly, but SSLWrapper::write_data calls SSL_write against a memory BIO with no SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE and UpgradedDuplex::raw_write returns the full length, so short writes reduce to 0 (nothing sent, nothing to reorder); (4) nested SSL_write inside the outer handle_traffic appends to the FIFO write BIO and the re-entered handle_traffic drains it in order before deferring, so nested frames land after the outer unit's records; (5) tx_tracker is now advanced for these sessions, consistent with the flush() boundary check. I could not run the tests in this environment (no debug build present), so test pass/fail claims rest on the PR author's description.
Other factors
My prior run's inline note about cork() dropping re-entrantly corked bytes when force-uncorking another parser is pre-existing, unchanged by this PR, and was replied to and self-resolved by the author; it is not blocking. Since that review, only a comment-wording commit and a CI retrigger landed. The tests are hermetic (local TLS server, port 0), await observable conditions (sentinel PING, write callback, secureConnect) rather than sleeping, and reject on session close. The existing matrix's behavior is preserved by the refactor. Given the subtlety of the write-path interaction with uSockets' TLS wrapper, a human maintainer familiar with the h2 cork/write machinery should still sign off.
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Superseded by #44618, which consolidates the open TLS pull requests. This fix and its tests are in there, either as written, rewritten smaller, or merged with the other PRs that patched the same cause (see the "By area" list in that PR). Closing in favor of it. |
… Duplex (#43529) tls.connect({ socket: duplex }) is a native socket to the session, but each write to it runs the Duplex's _write. A frame issued there (ping(), settings(), request()) landed inside the outer frame's payload or between HEADERS and CONTINUATION, and a flush issued there sent the connection preface again. write() sends every transport whose write runs JS through write_to_js_transport, which only writes at a frame boundary. generic_flush and generic_write take the pending bytes out of write_buffer before such a write.
… Duplex (#43529) tls.connect({ socket: duplex }) is a native socket to the session, but each write to it runs the Duplex's _write. A frame issued there (ping(), settings(), request()) landed inside the outer frame's payload or between HEADERS and CONTINUATION, and a flush issued there sent the connection preface again. write() sends every transport whose write runs JS through write_to_js_transport, which only writes at a frame boundary. generic_flush and generic_write take the pending bytes out of write_buffer before such a write.
… Duplex (#43529) tls.connect({ socket: duplex }) is a native socket to the session, but each write to it runs the Duplex's _write. A frame issued there (ping(), settings(), request()) landed inside the outer frame's payload or between HEADERS and CONTINUATION, and a flush issued there sent the connection preface again. write() sends every transport whose write runs JS through write_to_js_transport, which only writes at a frame boundary. generic_flush and generic_write take the pending bytes out of write_buffer before such a write.
… Duplex (#43529) tls.connect({ socket: duplex }) is a native socket to the session, but each write to it runs the Duplex's _write. A frame issued there (ping(), settings(), request()) landed inside the outer frame's payload or between HEADERS and CONTINUATION, and a flush issued there sent the connection preface again. write() sends every transport whose write runs JS through write_to_js_transport, which only writes at a frame boundary. generic_flush and generic_write take the pending bytes out of write_buffer before such a write.
…ps, WebSocket, SQL) (#44618) ### What does this PR do? Consolidates the open TLS pull requests into one. Each was reproduced on `main` and, for `node:*` behavior, on Node v26.3.0 first. About a third are ported as written, the rest are rewritten smaller or merged into one fix where several PRs patched the same cause. One commit per fix, so it can be read commit by commit. Fixes #43520, fixes #31396, fixes #43635, fixes #37193, fixes #43846, fixes #17932, fixes #41061, fixes #36887, fixes #31810, fixes #35240, fixes #32234, fixes #44365, fixes #43807, fixes #42280, fixes #44517. Addresses #41856 (SNI and `servername`; not `checkServerIdentity` for SQL), #24845 (the spin is gone, shown with fault injection on Linux; not run on macOS), #19754 (node-fetch forwards the agent's TLS options; the Kubernetes client itself was not run). #### The ones that matter most | | On `main` | PRs | |---|---|---| | Client certificate disclosure | `https.request()` with a client certificate sends it to a server it then refuses (wrong name, `checkServerIdentity`, `destroy()` in `'secureConnect'`, `terminate()` in `handshake`). A server can force it with a junk record behind its Finished | #43946 | | False `authorized` | Over a Duplex, `secureConnect` with `authorized === true` for a peer that failed the key proof; `secureConnect` for a plaintext peer with `rejectUnauthorized: false` | #44422, #32929 | | Cleartext https | `https.createServer()` without a usable key/cert answers plain HTTP | #41672, #33539 | | Revoked client certificates | An https mTLS server never sees `crl`, so a revoked client is `authorized` | #41641 | | Pooled sockets | Requests with different client certificates or CAs share an `https.Agent` socket and session | #42498 | | Silent plaintext | `tls: [...]` given to `Bun.listen` / `Bun.connect` is plain TCP | #41490 | | Server weakened by a client knob | `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0` turns off a server's client-certificate enforcement | #35245 | | Pins never checked | `WebSocket` never calls `tls.checkServerIdentity` and ignores `tls.serverName` | #41648 | | `verify-full` dropped | `PGSSLMODE=verify-*` is lost next to a `TLS_*` URL variable; `tls: true` sends no SNI | #44498 | | Crashes | use-after-free from `destroy()` in `ALPNCallback` over a Duplex; `abort()` on a late `setSession()`; SIGABRT in `fetch` with an https proxy from the environment and a `Bun.file()` body | #44462, #41671, #44458 | | Stream corruption | A TLS `write()` can lose 16 KiB it reported as written while another socket on the loop is stalled | #44529 | | Hangs and spins | 100% CPU on a failing `send()`; a fatal `SSL_write` leaves the socket open forever; `idleTimeout` never sheds a TLS client that ignores `close_notify` | #34510, #38176, #42336 | | Wrong certificate (regression since 1.3.14) | Connections accepted before `stop()` / `close()` get the default certificate and skip their entry's `requestCert` / `ca` | #42355 | | Quadratic Duplex / proxy tunnel | Reading one chunk over a Duplex, CPU: 8 MB 0.88 s → 0.14 s, 16 MB 3.18 s → 0.23 s, 32 MB 11.75 s → 0.39 s; `fetch` upload through CONNECT: 1.7 s → 0.18 s (debug build) | #44464 | #### By area - **fd engine, write path** (`openssl.c`, `socket.c`): #42352, #34510 + #38176 + #42336 as one change, #44529, #44458, #44192. A rejected `send()` ends the write side only and closes at the next writable event unless the peer's bytes are still queued (a 413 sent before a reset is still read). No new per-socket state. Also, on kqueue, **a FIN no longer ends a socket that waits in the low-priority queue** (`loop.c`): with more than 5 TLS handshakes at once, a client that ended right after its handshake could be reset and its server socket report `socket hang up`, because the eof that the sentinel read knote reports was acted on ahead of the unread Finished. That is on `main` too (the macOS entry for `node-tls-server.test.ts` in `test/flaky-tests.txt`: 7 of 48 recent builds of other branches), and this branch made it likelier (6 of 8 builds), since Finished now leaves in one segment with the close_notify. - **Error reporting, both engines**: #44422, #32929, #44516, #37094, #41272 + #42324 + #44223 as one change, #44021, #37472, #43946, #33630. One channel: a fatal error on an established session is reported, then **the engine closes the connection itself**, whatever the owner does with the report. `test/js/bun/net/tls-fatal-error-closes.test.ts` asserts closed-and-nothing-delivered for every owner (node:tls, `Bun.connect`, `Bun.listen`, `fetch` direct and through CONNECT, `Bun.serve`, `WebSocket` direct and through a proxy, Postgres, MySQL, Valkey, Duplex). - **Duplex engine** (`SSLWrapper`, `UpgradedDuplex`): #44462, #43529, #42332, #44464. #43877 + #44394 were in and are **out again**, see "Worth a look" 5. - **node:tls wrap lifecycle** (`net.ts`, `tls.ts`): #38007, #38058, #38028 + #38122 + #38076 as one change (six copies of the attach code become two helpers), #38311, #39008, #38154, #42340 + #42343 + #42339 + #42453 as one change, #43791, #42425, #44085, #42683, #39088, #39040, #40375, and what was still real of #36534. - **SNI, ALPN, server contexts**: #43080, #42050, #37195 + #43849 as one change (**one** SNI matcher for TCP and HTTP/3), #42355, #42285, #33253, part of #37896, part of #37013. A `tls.Server` has one `SSL_CTX`. - **Verification and options**: #44738, #41490, #37005 + the cwd pin of #40984, #31811, #43982, #33483 + #35245, #41810, #32235, #44441, #38092. - **node:tls API and CA store**: #41671, #38145, #32824, #43594, #39997, #41696, #33534, #34748, #42991, #42996, #42970. - **node:https, Agent, `ws`, node-fetch**: #41672 (https half), #41641, #38261, #42498, #44346, #35609, #31397, #42325. - **WebSocket client**: #41648, #37487 + #43048 as one change. - **SQL, Redis**: #33666, #41711, #44498, part of #42054. - **Tests only**: #41426, #40040, #44395, #44016, #37860, #40591, #44440, #41424. Found on the way and fixed here: an upload that a TLS 1.2 server interrupts with a renegotiation never completes on `main` (0 of 32 runs over `https.request`, `fetch`, `node:tls` and `Bun.connect`: the renegotiation ClientHello lands inside an application record that is still unsent, or the socket gets no `drain` again) and completes here, with two tests from robobun; the fix for #40653 (final flight and first write in one segment) stopped working whenever another TLS socket on the loop was stalled, on `main` too; the `tls.Server` prototype pinned the last server constructed and every `SSL_CTX` it owned; `Object.create(process.env).NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED = "0"` turned verification off process-wide once a `SHARE_ENV` worker existed; two debug panics when wrapping a shut-down or still-connecting socket; a `fetch` POST through a proxy sent its headers twice when the origin renegotiated; `BlockList` ignored IPv6 zone ids; a test now ties `root_certs.der` to `certdata.txt`. #### Behavior changes - **A server's `ca` without `requestCert` no longer asks for a client certificate** (`Bun.serve`, `Bun.listen`, HTTP/3, node:tls). It matches the docs and Node. On `main` such a server refused clients with no certificate but served any unrelated self-signed one, so it was never authentication. **Set `requestCert: true` to require a certificate.** A matrix test pins that `requestCert: true` still refuses no certificate and an untrusted one on 8 kinds of server, TLS 1.2 and 1.3, with `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED` unset and `0`. - `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0` no longer relaxes a server. - `Bun.connect` / `Bun.listen` hear of a fatal TLS error after the handshake through `error(socket, err)`. With no `error` handler the socket just closes. - HTTP/3 server names match like TCP: `*.` covers exactly one label, case is ignored, a trailing dot is ignored, the last registration of a name wins. - `requestCert` on node:https is `=== true`, as in Node. - An array where a generated options dictionary is expected throws (`tls: []`, `jest.useFakeTimers([])`). - `key` / `cert` arrays serve every identity. A client that can use both gets ECDSA, where `main` served whichever pair came last. - `ecdhCurve` is forwarded by node:https, `ws` and node-fetch now, so a group BoringSSL lacks (`X448`) throws there as it already does in `tls.createServer`. - A wrapped socket's error is re-emitted on the TLS socket as in Node, so `raw.destroy(err)` with a listener on `raw` only is uncaught, as in Node. - `sql.options.tls` is always an object, never `true`. `RedisClient` sends SNI. - `tls: { secureContext }` alone asks for TLS on `Bun.listen` / `Bun.connect` (it was plain TCP), and a value that is not a `SecureContext` throws. The context is served as it is: the `requestCert` / `rejectUnauthorized` it was created with hold whatever the options next to it say, and `requestCert` in the options over a context that does not ask throws at `listen()`. - `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS` reaches every client once assigned (`fetch`, `WebSocket`, `Bun.connect`, `RedisClient`, `Bun.SQL`, `S3Client`, proxy tunnels) and servers again. A list that selects no cipher throws `ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_MATCH` at the assignment. `fetch.preconnect()` dials nothing after an assignment. - The warning for an unreadable `NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS` is Node's one line, without the `warn:` prefix. - `BUN_CONFIG_WS_CLOSE_TIMEOUT` (default 30 s): how long a `WebSocket` client waits for the server to close the connection after the closing handshake. #### Worth a look in review 1. **#44529**: the kernel-refused remainder of a TLS write moves from the loop's one slot onto the connection (in the existing rare struct), so the write BIO never refuses a sealed record. Nothing is allocated on an unstalled path (200 writes: 0 appends, same `send()` count as `main`), memory with 16 stalled writers is lower than on `main` (276 KB vs 340 KB, which `main` holds inside BoringSSL's buffers), `us_socket_t` stays 80 bytes. It needs a bound on how long a deferred close waits, or a peer that stops reading pins the fd past `destroy()`: `US_SSL_CLOSE_AFTER_SPILL_TIMEOUT` is a fixed 10 s, not re-armed on progress. Separate commits, but the fix that keeps the client certificate off the wire beside a stalled socket builds on them. 2. **The default name check of node:tls also runs inside the handshake**, so a wrong-name server gets no client certificate on TLS 1.2 either. JS still runs it after every successful handshake, so a difference between the two matchers can only refuse. Error objects are byte-identical. 3. **#44441** widens trust by design: a self-issued leaf whose `keyUsage` lacks `keyCertSign` (`dotnet dev-certs`) is its own anchor when the store holds a byte-identical copy. No BoringSSL change. Expired pin, same subject with another key, wrong EKU and a pinned intermediate are tested to fail. 4. **#32235** only adds Ed25519 and ECDSA P-521 to the verify list. A captured ClientHello shows `main`'s list with the two inserted; `rsa_pkcs1_sha1` stays. 5. **A stream that a TLS socket wraps, when that TLS socket closes.** An earlier state of this branch lost data here while CI was green (found by #44709's report): with the peer closing first, 4 of 8 MiB arrived with TLS in TLS, 4 of 32 MiB on the http2 `emit("connection")` path, and a `write()` with no `'error'` listener ended the process. Three Node-parity changes only hold together: destroying the wrapped stream at the close (#38028 + #38122 + #38076, #38154) is safe only if every write has really completed (#43877), which in turn needs Node's handling of the peer's close_notify, which needs half-open sockets that the GC can collect. So: - #43877 + #44394 are reverted and reopened. A write over a stream completes once the stream has taken the ciphertext, as on `main`. - Until the verdict on the peer lets the session through, the application cannot have written over it. There the wrapped stream is destroyed as in Node, with the sessions below it. That keeps the release of the connection after a failed handshake, a rejected certificate and an early `destroy()`. The same for an http2 socket the application never got, and for `resetAndDestroy()`. - After that it is `main`'s teardown: a `net.Socket` only gets the engine's `end()`, closes at its peer's FIN, keeps its own timeout and reports its own errors. Any other stream is destroyed with the TLS socket. The regular suites cannot see any of this (999 files were green on every broken variant), so it was steered by eleven seeded differential fuzzers run on this build, `main`, Node v26.3.0 and the earlier state: close, `end()`, `destroy()`, `destroySoon()`, resets, hung and half-open peers, paused writers, timeouts, two and three sessions deep, over TCP and over Duplexes, before, at and after the handshake, and http2 requests. See "How did you verify". #### Known limits - `fetch` with a `checkServerIdentity` function still sends the client certificate (not the request) to a server the function refuses. On TLS 1.2 any verdict a JS callback gives is too late, as in Node. - `addContext()` / `SNICallback` still do not apply to a server-side socket on the stream engine (`emit("connection", duplex)`, TLS in TLS, unflushed writes, named pipes), as on `main`. - A CA bundled in a pfx extends an explicit `ca` only, for `ws` / node-fetch / `WebSocket`: the native `ca` can only replace the default store, and that store keeps `SSL_CERT_FILE` / `SSL_CERT_DIR`. - P-521 leaves work on TLS 1.3 only. TLS 1.2 needs secp521r1 in every ClientHello (`it.todo`). - Once `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS` is assigned, `fetch(url, { protocol: "http3" })` is `HTTP3Unsupported`, as with an explicit `ciphers`. - `addCACert()` by hand does not extend the chains of a context with several identities. - A throwing `ALPNCallback` sends `no_application_protocol` on both engines. Node sends nothing and its client sees `ECONNRESET`. - TLS in TLS, peer FIN while the outer handshake runs: the inner socket gets one `write EPIPE`, where Node gives `ECONNRESET` (`main` gives it no error at all). - `@SECLEVEL` in `ciphers` is dropped by the `ws` / node-fetch shims, which used to ignore `ciphers`. node:tls keeps throwing `ERR_SSL_INVALID_COMMAND`. - Beside a stalled TLS socket only the first record (16 KiB) of the first write leaves with the handshake flight. The rest goes record by record, which is what bounds the memory of stalled writers. - After a fatal error on an established session the socket emits `'error'` and then `'close'`. Node emits `'error'` and leaves the socket open. - A paused reader whose own write the kernel rejects loses what it had not read yet, with an `EPIPE`, as on Node. `main` reports no error there and delivers it. - On `main` too: a `Bun.listen` socket without `allowHalfOpen` that has unsent ciphertext when the client's `shutdown()` arrives loses that ciphertext (32 KiB), and over plain TCP `end()` with the peer still sending is a close over unread input, so a reset. - Differences from both `main` and Node that the differential runs below found and that stay, all with a peer that aborts: `ECONNRESET` instead of a clean `'end'` after the socket's own `'finish'` when the peer destroyed with unread data; under TLS 1.2, a zero-length `write()` followed by `destroy()` in `'secureConnection'` leaves the client without `'secureConnect'` (a plain `destroy()` there matches Node); a TLS 1.2 client that destroys in `'secureConnect'` gets no `'session'`; a `ClientRequest` whose handshake fails with an alert emits `'error'` and `'close'` but no `'finish'` (`writableFinished` is true). - Once `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS` is assigned, `fetch.preconnect()` opens nothing: `fetch()` then uses a context of its own, and a socket warmed under the default one would never be picked up. - A TLS `send()` that the kernel refuses outside a `write()` call (the drain of unsent ciphertext) is reported with the close, as `read EPIPE` / `read ECONNRESET`. Node says `write EPIPE`. `main` does not report it at all. - Once the application has a session over a `net.Socket` (TLS in TLS, http2 `emit("connection")`), a peer that never sends its FIN holds that socket after the TLS socket closed, as on `main`. Node destroys it. Two tests of #38154 are `todo` for this. Closing it any earlier (at its `'finish'`, say) makes the kernel drop what it has not sent yet as soon as the peer's close_notify arrives. - Plaintext that was queued on a socket before it was wrapped (STARTTLS with a backlog) is dropped when the TLS socket is destroyed, or its handshake fails, before the session is accepted. Node drops it too, except on `destroySoon()`. `main` sends it. - Over a stream that is no `net.Socket`, `end()` can still cut what that stream has buffered, and there is no backpressure, both as on `main` (#43877). - `tls.secureContext` (the undocumented door node:tls uses) is not read by a Windows named pipe listener, which builds its context from the options. On `upgradeTLS({ isServer: true })` the options next to it are the policy, as with Node's `SetVerifyMode`. - `selectServerName()` rebuilds the name tree per ClientHello for injected sockets of a server with `addContext()` entries: 0.4 µs for 1 entry, 3.7 µs for 10, 41 µs for 100, against 631–1111 µs for a handshake. #### Not included Left open, because they need a decision or are not TLS: #43877 + #44394 (see "Worth a look" 5; #43874 stays open with them), #38548, #38591 (both shrink who is trusted), #41589 (`verify-full` vs `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0`), #37197, #41706, #43216, #33487, #33545, #36707, #32435, #37255, #28691, #40275, #30314 (features), #38120 (needs the BoringSSL fork, as did #33517, which the stale bot has closed since), #38529 (needs a Windows measurement), #34342, #38232, #43089, #44454, #40451, #42710, #44527, #38088, #38093, #41898. #37896, #42054 and #37013 stay open for the halves not taken. `http.createServer({ key, cert })` keeps serving TLS on purpose. One open question: `tls: {}` (an object that names no TLS option) is plain TCP on `Bun.listen` / `Bun.connect`, here and on `main`. It is the same trap as `tls: []`, but changing it changes a Bun default, so it is left alone. ### How did you verify your code works? - Every new test fails on `main` for the stated reason and passes here, except guards that pin existing behavior, each shown to fail when its clause is removed. `node:*` tests also pass on Node v26.3.0; the few that cannot say which Node version has the behavior. - 212 test files that touch TLS, sockets, http, http2, fetch, WebSocket, SQL, Valkey and workers: 6154 pass, 2 fail. Both are seen on `main` too: `serve.test.ts` "root range port" (the box runs as root), and `worker_threads.test.ts` "terminate(): nothing of the worker's runs after the request", which is flaky there and passed in the run below. - 58 of those files the way the ASAN lane runs them (LeakSanitizer + `BUN_JSC_validateExceptionChecks`): 58 files, 48 of them with leak checking, 4132 pass, 3 fail. All three also fail on `main`: `serve.test.ts` "root range port", `node-net.test.ts` "should not leak when connect({path}) fails synchronously on a reused handle" (times out under this environment), `worker_threads.test.ts` "process.exit() with a shell cp in flight" (a `ShellCpTask` leak). - 647 vendored `test-tls-*`, `test-https-*`, `test-net-*`, `test-http2-*`: the only two failures also fail on `main`. - The SNI matcher was diffed against both old matchers: 3 seeds × 1.23 M lookups × 3 registration flavours, every difference in one of the intended classes, TCP and HTTP/3 identical on every lookup. - The headline rows were also driven by hand with scripts against this build, `main` and Node v26.3.0: cleartext https, `crl`, `tls: []` / `{ secureContext }`, the `ca` / `requestCert` matrix, the client certificate on a wrong-name server, late `setSession()`, `destroy()` in `ALPNCallback`, `[rsa, ec]` identities with an intermediate from `ca`, `WebSocket` `checkServerIdentity`, a corrupted record, the Duplex read above, `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS`. - The `setSession()` guard was checked against the real `abort()` at 43 handshake states. - `bun run rust:check-all`: 12 of 12 targets. `tsc`, oxlint, source lints, prettier, rustfmt, mordant clean. - usockets' `_Nonnull` is compiled out of debug builds, so 105 of those files were also run on a local release ASAN build with the CI runner's environment (92 with leak checking): 4595 pass, 1 fail, `child_process.test.ts` "spawn reports EPERM after dropping privileges", which cannot pass as root and fails on `main` too. - The close of a TLS socket over another stream ("Worth a look" 5): eleven seeded differential fuzzers, 8,424 scenarios compared, each run on a release ASAN build of this branch, on `main`, on Node v26.3.0 and on the earlier state of the branch. Against `main`: - Data that `main` delivers in full is cut in 5 scenarios, and about 150 that `main` cuts arrive in full. Of the 5, in 2 `main` never notices the peer's close and keeps the socket for good, 2 call `end()` on the middle one of three sessions over an in-memory Duplex, and 1 does the same on Node. - No dead timeout, no silent reset and no uncaught error that `main` does not have (4 uncaught errors fewer). - A socket stays open where `main` closes it in 109, and closes where `main` keeps it in 295. 92 of the 109 do the same on Node or on the earlier state (a `destroy()` that an in-memory Duplex does not show its peer, half-open peers). 14 wait for a peer that paused reading and so does not read the FIN (#42332's backpressure, as in Node); the socket's own timeout fires there. 3 are left: one on a 5 ms timer, two with three sessions over an in-memory Duplex. - The earlier state of the branch cut data in 173 of the 400 scenarios of one of them, where `main` cuts none and this cuts none. - 23 new tests pin what they found. Each earlier attempt at this fix fails the ones that describe it, the earlier state of the branch fails 7, and all pass on Node. - After that change: 999 test files on the release ASAN build (20,246 pass; the 11 files that fail need a database, Docker, DNS or a non-root user, or share a temp directory with a parallel run and pass alone), 61 on the debug build. - TLS over a file descriptor (`openssl.c`, the path of `fetch`, `Bun.serve`, `tls.connect`, `Bun.connect`) got the same treatment after the rebase: seeded differential fuzzers on CI's release build of this branch, on `main` and, for `node:*`, on Node v26.3.0. Every runtime also against itself for the noise floor, injected faults and known bugs of `main` as positive controls, and a difference counts only if it shows in 5 of 5 fresh processes. - `node:tls` over TCP: 11,500 scenarios (one connection with Node as the oracle line by line; 2 to 60 connections beside stalled neighbours; raw peers that break the handshake). HTTPS: about 136,000 runs over `Bun.serve` + `fetch`, `node:https`, `node:http2` and `wss://`, also with the two ends in different runtimes. `Bun.connect` / `Bun.listen` / `upgradeTLS`: 11,500 scenarios and 720 slow connections, with writers driven by what `write()` returns, beside up to 6 stalled, dripping, closing or resetting neighbours, and plain TCP as a second oracle. No crash, hang, duplication, reordering or silent truncation, and no change in time or in connection reuse. - They found six things that `main` does better, none of which any test showed. All are fixed, each with a test that fails on the build before: what the peer sent lost behind a rejected `send()` (23 scenarios, and an early HTTPS response lost with only `EPIPE`), the same silently for a paused reader, `server.close()` never calling back on a half-open server after a ClientHello and a reset (17), `closeAllConnections()` taking 12 s with a stalled client, `end()` losing up to 1.3 of 4 MiB that `write()` had reported while the peer still uploads, and `end()` a little after a stall never closing beside other stalled TLS sockets. The last two fixes also deliver the 1 to 2 MiB that `main` loses there, and close the socket that `main` keeps for good without such neighbours. - All of them again after every fix, on CI's release build of it. That caught one regression of a fix itself (a reader stopped for backpressure lost 86,385 bytes, 1 of 6,000 scenarios), fixed too. On the last build: scenarios that lose data where `main` does not 23 → 2, and Node loses it in both, with the same `EPIPE`; `server.close()` that never calls back 17 → 0; connections held 4 → 0; requests that end in an error only where `main` has a response 6 → 0. With a Node server in another process, a request ends in an error only in 8 and 10 of 1,500 scenarios here, 5 and 3 on `main`, 10 with Node as the client. - `Bun.connect` / `Bun.listen` on the last build against `main`, in scenarios: hangs 0 against 1,031, sockets and fds never released 0 against 965, corrupted data 0 against 345, `abort()` 0 against 26 (`setSession()` after the handshake), writers that never close 0 against 101 of 720 connections. No kind of failure shows here and not on `main`. About a third of the slow connections close later than on `main`, in 1 to 16 s instead of at once, waiting for unsent ciphertext or for the peer's close_notify, and 79 more of them deliver all that `write()` reported. RSS and time with 16 to 256 stalled writers are the same. - What they found that `main` does worse: a `WebSocket` that calls `close()` with sends pending loses messages in 81 of 999 scenarios (0 here), 37 server sockets left open, 10 `server.close()` that never call back, 20 write callbacks that never run. - The kqueue fix cannot be run on Linux. The `connectionListener` count test now says what became of a missing connection, which is how the cause was found (`'tlsClientError'` "socket hang up", then `read ECONNRESET` at the client of the same port, after its `'secureConnect'`). On macOS x64 it failed every attempt of the three builds before the fix and passed at the first attempt of the build with it. - Windows and macOS were only run by CI. Four new tests asserted what only the Linux kernel does (a FIN read ahead of a reset, unread bytes surviving a reset, loopback buffer sizes, `fstat()` on a socket) and now say so per platform. --------- Co-authored-by: autofix-ci[bot] <114827586+autofix-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: robobun <117481402+robobun@users.noreply.github.com>
Problem
node:http2session overtls.connect({ socket: duplex })corrupts its byte stream when the Duplex's_writeissues a frame (ping(),settings(),request()). The peer gets the nested frame inside the outer frame's payload, or the connection preface twice. Node v26.3.0 sends every frame once and whole.src/runtime/api/bun/h2_frame_parser.rsassume that a socket write runs no JS. This socket runs_writeinside the write.write()(:3190) flushes the cork mid-frame.generic_flushandgeneric_write(:2513,:2551) keep the pending bytes until the write returns, so a nested flush sends them again.Fix
write()sends every transport whose write runs JS (transport_write_runs_js()) throughwrite_to_js_transport(from node:http2: never split a frame around a JS transport's write callback #36918). It writes only at a frame boundary outside a header block.generic_flushandgeneric_writetake the pending bytes out ofwrite_bufferbefore the socket write. A nested write finds nothing pending and lands behind them, becauseSSL_writeconsumes the whole buffer before_writeruns. Other sockets keep the old paths.test/js/node/http2/node-http2.test.js, 12 fail on bun 1.4.3-canary.1. Alsotest/js/node/http2/and the upstreamtest-http2-*.jstests.Background
H2FrameParseris the native engine behind anHttp2Session.write()collects its frames in a thread-local 16 KiB cork.write_bufferholds bytes that the socket did not take yet. A client fills it before the connect and flushes it on connect.tls.connect({ socket: duplex })makes a native TLS socket (uSocketsUpgradedDuplex). It passes each TLS record toduplex.write(), which runs_writesynchronously.Notes
Repro (needs a
key.pemand acert.pemnext to it, run withbunand withnode):{"issued":true,"bodyLength":16374,"bodyIntact":true}{"issued":true,"bodyLength":16374,"bodyIntact":false}{"issued":true,"bodyLength":16374,"bodyIntact":true}How the splice happens. The ~11 KiB HEADERS frame is in the cork.
write()receives the DATA frame header, then the 16374-byte payload. The payload does not fit, sowrite()copies its first bytes up to the 16 KiB boundary and callsflush_cork_buffer(). That goes throughgeneric_writeto the TLS socket.SSL_writeseals the record and the socket passes it toduplex.write(), which runs the user's_writebefore it returns.session.ping()there enterswrite()again. The cork is empty, so the PING frame goes to offset 0. The outer call then appends the rest of the DATA payload behind the PING frame.The second face: the connect-time flush. A client serializes its connection preface and SETTINGS before the socket connects, and they wait in
write_buffer. OnsecureConnectthe session attaches the native socket and callsflush(), which handswrite_bufferto the socket ingeneric_flush. That write runs the Duplex's_write. Asession.settings()there flushes at once, and a request with a header block larger than the cork goes straight togeneric_write. Both found the same bytes still pending and sent them again. Measured with a plaintls.createServerpeer that records what it decrypts, and a_writethat is armed from asecureConnectlistener registered beforehttp2.connect():settings(): one preface,SETTINGS:0 SETTINGS:6settings(): two prefaces, the stream no longer parsesThe same change also removes a borrow hazard:
generic_flushandgeneric_writepassed a slice ofwrite_buffer(aJsCell<Vec<u8>>) to a socket write that re-enters code which appends to that Vec. The taken-out Vec is local to the call.More probes. An end-to-end matrix against a real
http2.createSecureServerpeer: nestedping(),request()andsettings(), outer DATA write and outer HEADERS+CONTINUATION write, and a Duplex that callscb()synchronously or fromraw.write(chunk, cb). That is 12 combinations. On bun 1.4.3-canary.1 the body arrives corrupt in the six DATA combinations, and the server reportsERR_HTTP2_ERROR: Protocol errorin the six CONTINUATION combinations. The nested ping is cancelled, the nested request fails withNew streams cannot be created after receiving a GOAWAY, and the nested settings never get an ACK. On this branch all 12 match node: the body is intact, the ping and the settings get their ACK, and the nested request gets its response.A second probe runs an
httpsHTTP/2 session through an h2c CONNECT tunnel (tls.connect({ socket: outerStream })), with request bodies from 1 byte to 300000 bytes. This is the common real use of this socket kind. The bodies echo back intact on node, on bun 1.4.3-canary.1 and on this branch.The new tests. The existing describe
frames issued from inside a user-supplied Duplex transport's _writecovered a session whosecreateConnectionreturns the Duplex. The new cases put the same Duplex undertls.connect({ socket }). A plaintls.createServerpeer decrypts and records the bytes, and the same frame parser runs on them. There are 15 cases: nestedping(),settings(),goaway(),request()and a request with a multi-frame body, each issued during the outer DATA write, during the outer HEADERS+CONTINUATION write, and during the connect-time flush. The first two groups share the assertions of the existing matrix: every byte belongs to one complete frame, header blocks are contiguous, the DATA frame carries exactly the body, and the nested frames come after the unit that they were issued from. The connect group asserts one connection preface, complete frames, and one copy of each nested frame. For that group the Duplex is armed for one tick only, from asecureConnectlistener registered before the session's own, so the case fails if the nested call does not run inside the flush.On bun 1.4.3-canary.1, 12 of the 15 fail. The other 3 (
ping(),goaway()and the multi-frame body during the connect-time flush) pass on both builds: the small frames stay in the cork, and the DATA frames are queued because the session sees the pending bytes as backpressure.The session sends a PING with a known payload as its last frame. The test sends it after the body's write callback, when every other frame is serialized, and waits until the server has that payload. It does not wait for time. Nothing is held back before it, because this transport reports no backpressure and the bodies fit the default flow-control windows. The waits use
events.once, so a failed connect reports its error. The request code and the assertions moved into helpers that both matrices share. The 20 existing cases are unchanged in behavior.Node guards the same layer.
Http2Session::SendPendingData(src/node_http2.cc:1951at v26.3.0) collects whole frames from nghttp2 and returns early when a send is in progress ("SendPendingData should not be called recursively"). A frame issued from the transport's_writegoes out with the next send.Why the TLS layer needs no change.
SSL_writeis not re-entered. The Duplex'swrite()runs fromhandle_traffic, afterSSL_writereturned. A nested socket write callsSSL_writeagain, which appends its record to the same FIFO BIO, so ciphertext order equals the order of theSSL_writecalls. Ahandle_trafficthat is re-entered only drains the BIO and asks the outer pass to run again.Self-review. Two independent read-only reviews of the diff, one of the Rust change and one of the tests. Eight concerns. Addressed:
generic_flushandgeneric_writecould sendwrite_buffertwice on re-entry, and every TLS-over-Duplex client passes through that window at connect. This became the second half of the fix, with its own cases.flush_cork_bufferand on the secondself.cork()inwrite()named JS-backed sockets as the reason for re-entry. No such transport reaches that loop now. A socket that closes inside a write still runs JS there, and the comments say that.events.oncenow, and the end-of-stream wait rejects when the session closes.Explained:
Tcparms oftransport_write_runs_js()cannot match today, because only a TLS socket is ever built over a Duplex. They are existing code and they are harmless.write(),generic_flushandgeneric_write, so the client cases cover the changed code.Left alone. A different bug exists in
cork(): when a session takes the cork slot from another session, and that session's transport_writewrites a frame to the first session, the frame is lost. It also happens with plain Duplex transports and without TLS, so it is not part of this PR. It is tracked in #43538.Suites run with the debug build. With the final code:
test/js/node/http2/node-http2.test.js(408 tests: 402 pass, 6 skip), the 35 nested-frame cases 6 more times (35 of 35 each time), the other ten test files intest/js/node/http2/, and the 40 upstreamtest-http2-*.jstests that use TLS,createConnectionor a Duplex (all exit 0). With the first commit only: all 261 upstreamtest/js/node/test/{parallel,sequential}/test-http2-*.jstests (all exit 0).h2-conformance.test.tspasses as a whole file (3 of 4 runs, one run had one GC-count case over its limit). Its describestream release after a queued END_STREAM, run alone with-t, fails one case with 7 live streams on the debug build. A debug build of main fails the same case the same way (2 of 3 runs), and these are plain h2c sessions that the change does not reach.[human-review] gate passed · iteration 1 · 2 files touched
fails on main (without fix)
passes on PR (with fix)
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gate history · 2 passed · 0 rejected · iteration 1
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