Skip to content

node:http2: keep frames whole and sent once over a TLS socket that wraps a Duplex - #43529

Closed
robobun wants to merge 4 commits into
mainfrom
robobun/4673a854/http2-tls-duplex-nested-frame
Closed

robobun wants to merge 4 commits into
mainfrom
robobun/4673a854/http2-tls-duplex-nested-frame

Conversation

@robobun

@robobun robobun commented Sep 19, 2026 •

Copy link
Copy Markdown
Collaborator

Problem

  • A node:http2 session over tls.connect({ socket: duplex }) corrupts its byte stream when the Duplex's _write issues a frame (ping(), settings(), request()). The peer gets the nested frame inside the outer frame's payload, or the connection preface twice. Node v26.3.0 sends every frame once and whole.
  • Cause: the native write paths in src/runtime/api/bun/h2_frame_parser.rs assume that a socket write runs no JS. This socket runs _write inside the write. write() (:3190) flushes the cork mid-frame. generic_flush and generic_write (:2513, :2551) keep the pending bytes until the write returns, so a nested flush sends them again.

Fix

  • write() sends every transport whose write runs JS (transport_write_runs_js()) through write_to_js_transport (from node:http2: never split a frame around a JS transport's write callback #36918). It writes only at a frame boundary outside a header block.
  • For these transports, generic_flush and generic_write take the pending bytes out of write_buffer before the socket write. A nested write finds nothing pending and lands behind them, because SSL_write consumes the whole buffer before _write runs. Other sockets keep the old paths.
  • Verified: 15 new cases in test/js/node/http2/node-http2.test.js, 12 fail on bun 1.4.3-canary.1. Also test/js/node/http2/ and the upstream test-http2-*.js tests.
  • Self-reviewed: 8 concerns raised, 6 addressed, 2 explained in Notes.

Background

  • H2FrameParser is the native engine behind an Http2Session. write() collects its frames in a thread-local 16 KiB cork.
  • write_buffer holds bytes that the socket did not take yet. A client fills it before the connect and flushes it on connect.
  • tls.connect({ socket: duplex }) makes a native TLS socket (uSockets UpgradedDuplex). It passes each TLS record to duplex.write(), which runs _write synchronously.
Notes

Repro (needs a key.pem and a cert.pem next to it, run with bun and with node):

import fs from "node:fs";
import http2 from "node:http2";
import net from "node:net";
import { Duplex } from "node:stream";
import tls from "node:tls";
const key = fs.readFileSync(new URL("./key.pem", import.meta.url));
const cert = fs.readFileSync(new URL("./cert.pem", import.meta.url));
const server = http2.createSecureServer({ key, cert });
const result = Promise.withResolvers();
server.on("sessionError", err => result.resolve({ sessionError: String(err) }));
server.on("stream", stream => {
  const chunks = [];
  stream.on("data", c => chunks.push(c));
  stream.on("end", () => {
    const body = Buffer.concat(chunks);
    result.resolve({ bodyLength: body.length, bodyIntact: body.equals(Buffer.alloc(16374, 0x41)) });
    stream.respond({ ":status": 200 });
    stream.end();
  });
});
await new Promise(resolve => server.listen(0, "127.0.0.1", resolve));
const raw = net.connect(server.address().port, "127.0.0.1");
await new Promise(resolve => raw.once("connect", resolve));
let armed = false, issued = false, session;
const transport = new Duplex({
  read() {},
  write(chunk, enc, cb) {
    if (armed && !issued) {
      issued = true;
      session.ping(Buffer.from("NESTPING"), () => {});
    }
    raw.write(chunk, cb);
  },
});
transport.on("error", () => {});
raw.on("data", d => transport.push(d));
raw.on("error", () => {});
const tlsSocket = tls.connect({ socket: transport, ALPNProtocols: ["h2"], rejectUnauthorized: false });
session = http2.connect("https://localhost", { createConnection: () => tlsSocket });
session.on("error", err => result.resolve({ clientSessionError: String(err) }));
await new Promise(resolve => session.once("connect", resolve));
const pad = Buffer.alloc(15000, 0x70).toString(); // about 11 KiB of HPACK, stays corked
const req = session.request({ ":method": "POST", ":path": "/", "x-pad": pad }, { endStream: false });
req.on("error", () => {});
armed = true;
req.end(Buffer.alloc(16374, 0x41)); // the DATA frame overflows the cork behind the HEADERS
console.log(JSON.stringify({ issued, ...(await result.promise) }));
process.exit(0);
  • node v26.3.0: {"issued":true,"bodyLength":16374,"bodyIntact":true}
  • bun 1.4.3-canary.1+367d939d9: {"issued":true,"bodyLength":16374,"bodyIntact":false}
  • this branch: {"issued":true,"bodyLength":16374,"bodyIntact":true}

How the splice happens. The ~11 KiB HEADERS frame is in the cork. write() receives the DATA frame header, then the 16374-byte payload. The payload does not fit, so write() copies its first bytes up to the 16 KiB boundary and calls flush_cork_buffer(). That goes through generic_write to the TLS socket. SSL_write seals the record and the socket passes it to duplex.write(), which runs the user's _write before it returns. session.ping() there enters write() again. The cork is empty, so the PING frame goes to offset 0. The outer call then appends the rest of the DATA payload behind the PING frame.

The second face: the connect-time flush. A client serializes its connection preface and SETTINGS before the socket connects, and they wait in write_buffer. On secureConnect the session attaches the native socket and calls flush(), which hands write_buffer to the socket in generic_flush. That write runs the Duplex's _write. A session.settings() there flushes at once, and a request with a header block larger than the cork goes straight to generic_write. Both found the same bytes still pending and sent them again. Measured with a plain tls.createServer peer that records what it decrypts, and a _write that is armed from a secureConnect listener registered before http2.connect():

  • node v26.3.0, nested settings(): one preface, SETTINGS:0 SETTINGS:6
  • bun 1.4.3-canary.1+367d939d9, nested settings(): two prefaces, the stream no longer parses
  • bun 1.4.3-canary.1+367d939d9, nested request with a 22 KiB header block: two prefaces
  • this branch: one preface in both cases, and the same frame sequence as node

The same change also removes a borrow hazard: generic_flush and generic_write passed a slice of write_buffer (a JsCell<Vec<u8>>) to a socket write that re-enters code which appends to that Vec. The taken-out Vec is local to the call.

More probes. An end-to-end matrix against a real http2.createSecureServer peer: nested ping(), request() and settings(), outer DATA write and outer HEADERS+CONTINUATION write, and a Duplex that calls cb() synchronously or from raw.write(chunk, cb). That is 12 combinations. On bun 1.4.3-canary.1 the body arrives corrupt in the six DATA combinations, and the server reports ERR_HTTP2_ERROR: Protocol error in the six CONTINUATION combinations. The nested ping is cancelled, the nested request fails with New streams cannot be created after receiving a GOAWAY, and the nested settings never get an ACK. On this branch all 12 match node: the body is intact, the ping and the settings get their ACK, and the nested request gets its response.

A second probe runs an https HTTP/2 session through an h2c CONNECT tunnel (tls.connect({ socket: outerStream })), with request bodies from 1 byte to 300000 bytes. This is the common real use of this socket kind. The bodies echo back intact on node, on bun 1.4.3-canary.1 and on this branch.

The new tests. The existing describe frames issued from inside a user-supplied Duplex transport's _write covered a session whose createConnection returns the Duplex. The new cases put the same Duplex under tls.connect({ socket }). A plain tls.createServer peer decrypts and records the bytes, and the same frame parser runs on them. There are 15 cases: nested ping(), settings(), goaway(), request() and a request with a multi-frame body, each issued during the outer DATA write, during the outer HEADERS+CONTINUATION write, and during the connect-time flush. The first two groups share the assertions of the existing matrix: every byte belongs to one complete frame, header blocks are contiguous, the DATA frame carries exactly the body, and the nested frames come after the unit that they were issued from. The connect group asserts one connection preface, complete frames, and one copy of each nested frame. For that group the Duplex is armed for one tick only, from a secureConnect listener registered before the session's own, so the case fails if the nested call does not run inside the flush.

On bun 1.4.3-canary.1, 12 of the 15 fail. The other 3 (ping(), goaway() and the multi-frame body during the connect-time flush) pass on both builds: the small frames stay in the cork, and the DATA frames are queued because the session sees the pending bytes as backpressure.

The session sends a PING with a known payload as its last frame. The test sends it after the body's write callback, when every other frame is serialized, and waits until the server has that payload. It does not wait for time. Nothing is held back before it, because this transport reports no backpressure and the bodies fit the default flow-control windows. The waits use events.once, so a failed connect reports its error. The request code and the assertions moved into helpers that both matrices share. The 20 existing cases are unchanged in behavior.

Node guards the same layer. Http2Session::SendPendingData (src/node_http2.cc:1951 at v26.3.0) collects whole frames from nghttp2 and returns early when a send is in progress ("SendPendingData should not be called recursively"). A frame issued from the transport's _write goes out with the next send.

Why the TLS layer needs no change. SSL_write is not re-entered. The Duplex's write() runs from handle_traffic, after SSL_write returned. A nested socket write calls SSL_write again, which appends its record to the same FIFO BIO, so ciphertext order equals the order of the SSL_write calls. A handle_traffic that is re-entered only drains the BIO and asks the outer pass to run again.

Self-review. Two independent read-only reviews of the diff, one of the Rust change and one of the tests. Eight concerns. Addressed:

  1. generic_flush and generic_write could send write_buffer twice on re-entry, and every TLS-over-Duplex client passes through that window at connect. This became the second half of the fix, with its own cases.
  2. The comments on flush_cork_buffer and on the second self.cork() in write() named JS-backed sockets as the reason for re-entry. No such transport reaches that loop now. A socket that closes inside a write still runs JS there, and the comments say that.
  3. The new test waits had no failure path, so a failed connect was a bare timeout. They use events.once now, and the end-of-stream wait rejects when the session closes.
  4. The teardown left the TLS socket and the Duplex open. It destroys them now.
  5. The comment on the last PING did not say why nothing can follow it. It states the two conditions now.
  6. Nothing proved that the connect-time nested call runs inside the flush. The one-tick arming does.

Explained:

  1. The Tcp arms of transport_write_runs_js() cannot match today, because only a TLS socket is ever built over a Duplex. They are existing code and they are harmless.
  2. No server-side case. A server session over a TLS socket that wraps a Duplex takes the same write(), generic_flush and generic_write, so the client cases cover the changed code.

Left alone. A different bug exists in cork(): when a session takes the cork slot from another session, and that session's transport _write writes a frame to the first session, the frame is lost. It also happens with plain Duplex transports and without TLS, so it is not part of this PR. It is tracked in #43538.

Suites run with the debug build. With the final code: test/js/node/http2/node-http2.test.js (408 tests: 402 pass, 6 skip), the 35 nested-frame cases 6 more times (35 of 35 each time), the other ten test files in test/js/node/http2/, and the 40 upstream test-http2-*.js tests that use TLS, createConnection or a Duplex (all exit 0). With the first commit only: all 261 upstream test/js/node/test/{parallel,sequential}/test-http2-*.js tests (all exit 0). h2-conformance.test.ts passes as a whole file (3 of 4 runs, one run had one GC-count case over its limit). Its describe stream release after a queued END_STREAM, run alone with -t, fails one case with 7 live streams on the debug build. A debug build of main fails the same case the same way (2 of 3 runs), and these are plain h2c sessions that the change does not reach.


[human-review] gate passed · iteration 1 · 2 files touched

fails on main (without fix)
ASAN without fix: 12 failed, 6 skipped
$ BUN_DEBUG_QUIET_LOGS=1 bun scripts/build.ts --profile=debug --quiet test "--reporter=junit" "--reporter-outfile=/tmp/pr_gate.xml" "test/js/node/http2/node-http2.test.js"
bun test v1.4.3 (367d939d9)

test/js/node/http2/node-http2.test.js:
(pass) node none > Client Basics > should be able to send a GET request [936.25ms]
(pass) node none > Client Basics > should be able to send a POST request [672.41ms]
(pass) node none > Client Basics > constants [25.90ms]
(pass) node none > Client Basics > getDefaultSettings [10.67ms]
(pass) node none > Client Basics > getPackedSettings/getUnpackedSettings [25.50ms]
(pass) node none > Client Basics > getUnpackedSettings should throw if buffer is too small [9.78ms]
(pass) node none > Client Basics > getUnpackedSettings should throw if buffer is not a multiple of 6 bytes [5.18ms]
(pass) node none > Client Basics > getUnpackedSettings should throw if buffer is not a buffer [7.65ms]
(pass) node none > Client Basics > should be able to send data using end [737.12ms]
(pass) node none > Client Basics > should be able to mutiplex GET requests [737.63ms]
(pass) node none > Client Basics > http2 should receive remoteSettings when receiving 
... (truncated)

release without fix: 6 skipped
bun test v1.4.3-canary.1 (4d1ff5086)

test/js/node/http2/node-http2.test.js:
(pass) node none > Client Basics > constants [2.79ms]
(pass) node none > Client Basics > getDefaultSettings [0.29ms]
(pass) node none > Client Basics > getPackedSettings/getUnpackedSettings [0.43ms]
(pass) node none > Client Basics > getUnpackedSettings should throw if buffer is too small [0.22ms]
(pass) node none > Client Basics > getUnpackedSettings should throw if buffer is not a multiple of 6 bytes [0.06ms]
(pass) node none > Client Basics > getUnpackedSettings should throw if buffer is not a buffer [0.10ms]
(pass) node none > Client Basics > is possible to abort request [2.34ms]
(pass) node none > Client Basics > aborted event should work with abortController [1.11ms]
(pass) node none > Client Basics > aborted event should work with aborted signal [0.89ms]
(pass) node none > Client Basics > signal validation matches node: non-signal objects throw, duck-typed { aborted } is accepted [2.71ms]
(pass) node none > Client Basics > headers cannot be bigger than 65536 bytes [61.29ms]
(skip) node none > Client Basics > should not leak memory
(pass) node none > Client Basics > should fail to con
... (truncated)
passes on PR (with fix)
ASAN with fix: 6 skipped
$ BUN_DEBUG_QUIET_LOGS=1 bun scripts/build.ts --profile=debug --quiet test "--reporter=junit" "--reporter-outfile=/tmp/pr_gate.xml" "test/js/node/http2/node-http2.test.js"
bun test v1.4.3 (367d939d9)

test/js/node/http2/node-http2.test.js:
(pass) node none > Client Basics > should be able to send a GET request [1005.10ms]
(pass) node none > Client Basics > should be able to send a POST request [714.83ms]
(pass) node none > Client Basics > constants [20.94ms]
(pass) node none > Client Basics > getDefaultSettings [7.09ms]
(pass) node none > Client Basics > getPackedSettings/getUnpackedSettings [20.27ms]
(pass) node none > Client Basics > getUnpackedSettings should throw if buffer is too small [6.34ms]
(pass) node none > Client Basics > getUnpackedSettings should throw if buffer is not a multiple of 6 bytes [3.55ms]
(pass) node none > Client Basics > getUnpackedSettings should throw if buffer is not a buffer [5.52ms]
(pass) node none > Client Basics > should be able to send data using end [727.14ms]
(pass) node none > Client Basics > should be able to mutiplex GET requests [699.62ms]
(pass) node none > Client Basics > http2 should receive remoteSettings when receiving 
... (truncated)

release with fix: 6 skipped
$ bun scripts/build.ts --profile=release
[configured] bun-profile → bun (stripped) in 1012ms (unchanged)
ninja: Entering directory `/workspace/bun/build/release'
[1/128] gen ErrorCode+*.h
[2/128] gen generated_host_exports.rs
generated_host_exports.rs: 121 exports (host=5, lazy=10, generic=106, rust=0); 245 extern-C blocks audited
[3/128] gen cpp.rs (cppbind)
[4/128] gen JS modules (bundle-modules)
Preprocess modules (13637ms)
Bundle modules (91ms)
Postprocesss modules (157ms)
Bundle Functions (638ms)
Generate Code (37ms)

[14.57s] Bundled "src/js" for production
  2607 kb
  197 internal modules
  13 native modules
  50 internal functions across 16 files
[4/12] cargo bun_runtime → libbun_runtime.a
�[1m�[33mwarning�[0m�[1m: binary `bun_shim_impl` should have a kebab-case name�[0m
   �[1m�[94m|�[0m
�[1m�[94m 1�[0m �[1m�[94m|�[0m /workspace/bun/build/release/rust-target/.../bun_shim_impl
   �[1m�[94m|�[0m                                              �[1m�[33m^^^^^^^^^^^^^�[0m
   �[1m�[94m|�[0m
   �[1m�[94m= �[0m�[1mnote�[0m: `cargo::non_kebab_case_bins` is set to `warn` by default
�[1m�[96mhelp�[0m: to change the binary name to `bun-shim-impl`, convert `bin.name`
 
... (truncated)
diff hotspot
src/runtime/api/bun/h2_frame_parser.rs |  50 +++++++-
 test/js/node/http2/node-http2.test.js  | 204 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 2 files changed, 204 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-)

gate history · 2 passed · 0 rejected · iteration 1

evidence per changed file
file                                    reads  edits  tests
src/runtime/api/bun/h2_frame_parser.rs     12      7     33
test/js/node/http2/node-http2.test.js       8      9     33

… a Duplex

A session whose socket is tls.connect({ socket: duplex }) writes through a
native TLS socket, but each socket write hands a TLS record to the Duplex
and runs its _write synchronously. H2FrameParser::write() sent such a
session down the native path, which fills the 16 KiB cork to the boundary
and flushes in the middle of a frame. A frame issued from inside _write
(ping, settings, goaway, request) was corked first, and the rest of the
outer frame followed it, so the peer received the nested frame inside the
outer frame's payload.

write() now routes every transport whose write runs JS
(transport_write_runs_js) through write_to_js_transport, which hands bytes
over only at a frame boundary outside a header block.
…er a Duplex

generic_flush and generic_write handed write_buffer to the socket and
cleared it only after the write returned. Over tls.connect({ socket: duplex })
that write runs the Duplex's _write, and a frame or a flush issued there
(settings(), a large request) found the same bytes still pending and sent
them again. A client hits this window once: the connection preface and
SETTINGS wait in write_buffer until the session attaches the socket.

For a transport whose write runs JS, the pending bytes now leave in one
socket write and are taken out of write_buffer first. The unwritten rest
goes back in front of whatever a re-entrant write buffered.

The tests cover the connect-time flush, wait with events.once so that a
failed connect reports its error, and destroy the TLS socket and the Duplex
on teardown.
@coderabbitai

coderabbitai Bot commented Sep 19, 2026 •

Copy link
Copy Markdown
Contributor

Warning

Review paused — included plan limit reached

Keep your review moving with free on-demand reviews.

  • Run this review for free

On-demand reviews are free for one more day.

  • Ask an admin to make reviews automatic

Open in CodeRabbit

Reviews can continue after your included limit without a manual trigger. An admin must approve usage-based billing.

Promotion and pricing details

On-demand reviews are free for one more day. After that, they cost $0.25 per reviewed file.

Review limit details

Or wait 8 minutes for your next included review.

Check out review usage here.

Limit details: You’ve used all 10 included reviews currently available.

Learn how review limits work.

Review configuration:

⚙️ Run configuration

Configuration used: Repository: oven-sh/bun/.coderabbit.yaml

Review profile: ASSERTIVE

Plan: Essentials

Run ID: d58aefeb-30f9-44ca-ae98-60ce6b6eab4c

📥 Commits

Reviewing files that changed from the base of the PR and between 9b7c982 and b66be9f.

📒 Files selected for processing (2)
  • src/runtime/api/bun/h2_frame_parser.rs
  • test/js/node/http2/node-http2.test.js

Comment @coderabbitai help to get the list of available commands.

@robobun

robobun commented Sep 19, 2026 •

Copy link
Copy Markdown
Collaborator Author

Status

Reproduced on bun 1.4.3-canary.1+367d939d9 with the two scripts in the PR notes (a node:http2 client over tls.connect({ socket: duplex }) whose _write issues a frame):

  • A session.ping() from _write during a 16374-byte body write: the server receives a corrupt body (bodyIntact:false). Node v26.3.0 and this branch deliver it intact.
  • A session.settings() from _write during the connect-time flush: the peer receives the connection preface twice. Node v26.3.0 and this branch send it once.

The 15 new cases in test/js/node/http2/node-http2.test.js cover both. 12 of them fail on that bun build, and all 15 pass with the debug build of this branch.

CI

The diff is green. No test that this PR touches failed in either build, and the robobun/evidence check passes (the test file fails without the fix and passes with it, on the ASAN and the release build).

  • #118452: 180 of 181 jobs passed. The one red job is darwin any x64 - test-bun, where test/js/node/net/server.spec.ts failed with listen EADDRINUSE: address already in use 127.0.0.1:1234 (a fixed port in a node:net test). I reported it as a failure on main.
  • #118576 (current head): 179 of 181 jobs passed. The two darwin any x64 - test-bun jobs expired without an agent and are scheduled again. Every test failure in that build passed on its retry, and none of them is an HTTP/2 test (no-orphans, bun-lock, in-process-cron, bun-install-registry, serve-stream-body-error).

All review threads are resolved. This PR needs a maintainer to review and merge it.

PR: #43529

@claude claude Bot left a comment

Copy link
Copy Markdown
Contributor

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.

Nothing blocking. The comments below are optional suggestions. There is no need to push a fix for them before merging.

Beyond the inline finding, I also checked the partial-write path in write_pending_through_js (the unwritten remainder is restored ahead of anything a re-entrant write buffered, and the offset is rebased to offset + written, matching the existing generic_flush accounting) and the new usize::try_from(result).expect("int cast") (guarded by the result < 0 branch, same shape as the surrounding arms) — neither introduces a new problem.

Extended reasoning...

The inline finding is pre-existing and concerns cork slot contention across sessions, which this change does not alter. Of the rest of the Rust diff, the two spots most likely to hide a bug were the partial-write reorder in write_pending_through_js (src/runtime/api/bun/h2_frame_parser.rs) and the expect cast; both were read against the existing generic_flush/generic_write arms and behave consistently with them. The transport_write_runs_js predicate widening to UpgradedDuplex TLS/TCP sockets is the intended scope change and the test matrix in test/js/node/http2/node-http2.test.js exercises it over a real tls.connect({ socket }) peer. The change is still a re-entrancy fix in a hot native path, so a human look at the broader design (per the ruled-out candidates on stall and re-entrant flush) remains worthwhile.

Comment thread src/runtime/api/bun/h2_frame_parser.rs
Comment thread src/runtime/api/bun/h2_frame_parser.rs Outdated
Comment thread src/runtime/api/bun/h2_frame_parser.rs Outdated
@robobun

robobun commented Sep 19, 2026 •

Copy link
Copy Markdown
Collaborator Author
Updated 4:42 PM PT - Sep 19th, 2026

✅ @robobun, your commit b66be9f9fcfb6db726739d1d346d24aca916e1a9 passed in Build #118576! 🎉


🧪   To try this PR locally:

bunx bun-pr 43529

That installs a local version of the PR into your bun-43529 executable, so you can run:

bun-43529 --bun

Comment thread src/runtime/api/bun/h2_frame_parser.rs Outdated
Comment thread src/runtime/api/bun/h2_frame_parser.rs Outdated
Comment thread src/runtime/api/bun/h2_frame_parser.rs Outdated

@claude claude Bot left a comment

Copy link
Copy Markdown
Contributor

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.

I re-reviewed the current head of this PR and found no bugs; since it changes re-entrancy handling in the native h2 write path, a human look at write_pending_through_js and the write() routing change is still worthwhile.

What was reviewed:

  • write_pending_through_js in src/runtime/api/bun/h2_frame_parser.rs: the pending Vec is moved out before the socket write, so no JsCell borrow is live across the JS re-entry; both callers (_write, flush) hold keepalive(); the short-write re-queue puts the remainder ahead of re-entrant bytes, and a short write cannot actually occur here because SSL_write targets an unbounded memory BIO (no partial-write mode) and raw_write reports the full length.
  • Ordering of nested frames: a nested _write finds write_buffer empty and calls SSL_write directly; the re-entered handle_traffic drains the write BIO FIFO before deferring, so nested records land behind the outer unit's records.
  • Test refactor: the non-TLS matrix keeps its previous (un-awaited) req.write behavior; the TLS matrix uses port 0, a local tls.createServer, awaits a sentinel PING rather than sleeping, and rejects on session close.
Extended reasoning...

Overview

The PR touches two files: src/runtime/api/bun/h2_frame_parser.rs (+50 lines) and test/js/node/http2/node-http2.test.js (+200/-50). The native change adds write_pending_through_js, which takes write_buffer/write_buffer_offset out of self before calling socket.write_maybe_corked, and routes generic_flush/generic_write through it when transport_write_runs_js() is true. write() switches its early guard from native_socket == None to transport_write_runs_js(), so a TLSSocket over a user Duplex now goes through the frame-boundary-aware write_to_js_transport path introduced in an earlier PR. Comments on the cork paths were reworded to describe the narrower remaining case (a close inside the write). The test refactor extracts sendOuterRequest and expectNestedAfterOuterUnit from the existing Duplex matrix and adds a 15-case TLS matrix (5 nested kinds x data/continuation/connect).

Security risks

None specific to this change: no new parsing of peer data, no auth/crypto configuration changes. The write path handles bytes the session itself serialized. The usize::try_from(result).expect(...) is guarded by the result < 0 branch, so it cannot panic. The only adversarial surface is user JS re-entering during _write, which is exactly what the change hardens.

Level of scrutiny

High. This is re-entrancy logic in native code where a JS callback runs under a socket write. I traced: (1) JsCell::take/replace leave no live borrow across the JS call; (2) both callers of generic_flush/generic_write hold _keepalive, so self.global() after the write is safe; (3) the re-queue on short write puts the unsent remainder in front of re-entrant bytes, which would reorder against re-entrant bytes already sent directly, but SSLWrapper::write_data calls SSL_write against a memory BIO with no SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE and UpgradedDuplex::raw_write returns the full length, so short writes reduce to 0 (nothing sent, nothing to reorder); (4) nested SSL_write inside the outer handle_traffic appends to the FIFO write BIO and the re-entered handle_traffic drains it in order before deferring, so nested frames land after the outer unit's records; (5) tx_tracker is now advanced for these sessions, consistent with the flush() boundary check. I could not run the tests in this environment (no debug build present), so test pass/fail claims rest on the PR author's description.

Other factors

My prior run's inline note about cork() dropping re-entrantly corked bytes when force-uncorking another parser is pre-existing, unchanged by this PR, and was replied to and self-resolved by the author; it is not blocking. Since that review, only a comment-wording commit and a CI retrigger landed. The tests are hermetic (local TLS server, port 0), await observable conditions (sentinel PING, write callback, secureConnect) rather than sleeping, and reject on session close. The existing matrix's behavior is preserved by the refactor. Given the subtlety of the write-path interaction with uSockets' TLS wrapper, a human maintainer familiar with the h2 cork/write machinery should still sign off.

@Jarred-Sumner

Copy link
Copy Markdown
Collaborator

Superseded by #44618, which consolidates the open TLS pull requests. This fix and its tests are in there, either as written, rewritten smaller, or merged with the other PRs that patched the same cause (see the "By area" list in that PR). Closing in favor of it.

Jarred-Sumner added a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 6, 2026
… Duplex (#43529)

tls.connect({ socket: duplex }) is a native socket to the session, but each write
to it runs the Duplex's _write. A frame issued there (ping(), settings(),
request()) landed inside the outer frame's payload or between HEADERS and
CONTINUATION, and a flush issued there sent the connection preface again.

write() sends every transport whose write runs JS through write_to_js_transport,
which only writes at a frame boundary. generic_flush and generic_write take the
pending bytes out of write_buffer before such a write.
Jarred-Sumner added a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 7, 2026
… Duplex (#43529)

tls.connect({ socket: duplex }) is a native socket to the session, but each write
to it runs the Duplex's _write. A frame issued there (ping(), settings(),
request()) landed inside the outer frame's payload or between HEADERS and
CONTINUATION, and a flush issued there sent the connection preface again.

write() sends every transport whose write runs JS through write_to_js_transport,
which only writes at a frame boundary. generic_flush and generic_write take the
pending bytes out of write_buffer before such a write.
Jarred-Sumner added a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 8, 2026
… Duplex (#43529)

tls.connect({ socket: duplex }) is a native socket to the session, but each write
to it runs the Duplex's _write. A frame issued there (ping(), settings(),
request()) landed inside the outer frame's payload or between HEADERS and
CONTINUATION, and a flush issued there sent the connection preface again.

write() sends every transport whose write runs JS through write_to_js_transport,
which only writes at a frame boundary. generic_flush and generic_write take the
pending bytes out of write_buffer before such a write.
Jarred-Sumner added a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 10, 2026
… Duplex (#43529)

tls.connect({ socket: duplex }) is a native socket to the session, but each write
to it runs the Duplex's _write. A frame issued there (ping(), settings(),
request()) landed inside the outer frame's payload or between HEADERS and
CONTINUATION, and a flush issued there sent the connection preface again.

write() sends every transport whose write runs JS through write_to_js_transport,
which only writes at a frame boundary. generic_flush and generic_write take the
pending bytes out of write_buffer before such a write.
Jarred-Sumner added a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 10, 2026
…ps, WebSocket, SQL) (#44618)

### What does this PR do?

Consolidates the open TLS pull requests into one. Each was reproduced on
`main` and, for `node:*` behavior, on Node v26.3.0 first. About a third
are ported as written, the rest are rewritten smaller or merged into one
fix where several PRs patched the same cause. One commit per fix, so it
can be read commit by commit.

Fixes #43520, fixes #31396, fixes #43635, fixes #37193, fixes #43846,
fixes #17932, fixes #41061, fixes #36887, fixes #31810, fixes #35240,
fixes #32234, fixes #44365, fixes #43807, fixes #42280, fixes #44517.
Addresses #41856 (SNI and `servername`; not `checkServerIdentity` for
SQL), #24845 (the spin is gone, shown with fault injection on Linux; not
run on macOS), #19754 (node-fetch forwards the agent's TLS options; the
Kubernetes client itself was not run).

#### The ones that matter most

| | On `main` | PRs |
|---|---|---|
| Client certificate disclosure | `https.request()` with a client
certificate sends it to a server it then refuses (wrong name,
`checkServerIdentity`, `destroy()` in `'secureConnect'`, `terminate()`
in `handshake`). A server can force it with a junk record behind its
Finished | #43946 |
| False `authorized` | Over a Duplex, `secureConnect` with `authorized
=== true` for a peer that failed the key proof; `secureConnect` for a
plaintext peer with `rejectUnauthorized: false` | #44422, #32929 |
| Cleartext https | `https.createServer()` without a usable key/cert
answers plain HTTP | #41672, #33539 |
| Revoked client certificates | An https mTLS server never sees `crl`,
so a revoked client is `authorized` | #41641 |
| Pooled sockets | Requests with different client certificates or CAs
share an `https.Agent` socket and session | #42498 |
| Silent plaintext | `tls: [...]` given to `Bun.listen` / `Bun.connect`
is plain TCP | #41490 |
| Server weakened by a client knob | `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0`
turns off a server's client-certificate enforcement | #35245 |
| Pins never checked | `WebSocket` never calls `tls.checkServerIdentity`
and ignores `tls.serverName` | #41648 |
| `verify-full` dropped | `PGSSLMODE=verify-*` is lost next to a `TLS_*`
URL variable; `tls: true` sends no SNI | #44498 |
| Crashes | use-after-free from `destroy()` in `ALPNCallback` over a
Duplex; `abort()` on a late `setSession()`; SIGABRT in `fetch` with an
https proxy from the environment and a `Bun.file()` body | #44462,
#41671, #44458 |
| Stream corruption | A TLS `write()` can lose 16 KiB it reported as
written while another socket on the loop is stalled | #44529 |
| Hangs and spins | 100% CPU on a failing `send()`; a fatal `SSL_write`
leaves the socket open forever; `idleTimeout` never sheds a TLS client
that ignores `close_notify` | #34510, #38176, #42336 |
| Wrong certificate (regression since 1.3.14) | Connections accepted
before `stop()` / `close()` get the default certificate and skip their
entry's `requestCert` / `ca` | #42355 |
| Quadratic Duplex / proxy tunnel | Reading one chunk over a Duplex,
CPU: 8 MB 0.88 s → 0.14 s, 16 MB 3.18 s → 0.23 s, 32 MB 11.75 s → 0.39
s; `fetch` upload through CONNECT: 1.7 s → 0.18 s (debug build) | #44464
|

#### By area

- **fd engine, write path** (`openssl.c`, `socket.c`): #42352, #34510 +
#38176 + #42336 as one change, #44529, #44458, #44192. A rejected
`send()` ends the write side only and closes at the next writable event
unless the peer's bytes are still queued (a 413 sent before a reset is
still read). No new per-socket state. Also, on kqueue, **a FIN no longer
ends a socket that waits in the low-priority queue** (`loop.c`): with
more than 5 TLS handshakes at once, a client that ended right after its
handshake could be reset and its server socket report `socket hang up`,
because the eof that the sentinel read knote reports was acted on ahead
of the unread Finished. That is on `main` too (the macOS entry for
`node-tls-server.test.ts` in `test/flaky-tests.txt`: 7 of 48 recent
builds of other branches), and this branch made it likelier (6 of 8
builds), since Finished now leaves in one segment with the close_notify.
- **Error reporting, both engines**: #44422, #32929, #44516, #37094,
#41272 + #42324 + #44223 as one change, #44021, #37472, #43946, #33630.
One channel: a fatal error on an established session is reported, then
**the engine closes the connection itself**, whatever the owner does
with the report. `test/js/bun/net/tls-fatal-error-closes.test.ts`
asserts closed-and-nothing-delivered for every owner (node:tls,
`Bun.connect`, `Bun.listen`, `fetch` direct and through CONNECT,
`Bun.serve`, `WebSocket` direct and through a proxy, Postgres, MySQL,
Valkey, Duplex).
- **Duplex engine** (`SSLWrapper`, `UpgradedDuplex`): #44462, #43529,
#42332, #44464. #43877 + #44394 were in and are **out again**, see
"Worth a look" 5.
- **node:tls wrap lifecycle** (`net.ts`, `tls.ts`): #38007, #38058,
#38028 + #38122 + #38076 as one change (six copies of the attach code
become two helpers), #38311, #39008, #38154, #42340 + #42343 + #42339 +
#42453 as one change, #43791, #42425, #44085, #42683, #39088, #39040,
#40375, and what was still real of #36534.
- **SNI, ALPN, server contexts**: #43080, #42050, #37195 + #43849 as one
change (**one** SNI matcher for TCP and HTTP/3), #42355, #42285, #33253,
part of #37896, part of #37013. A `tls.Server` has one `SSL_CTX`.
- **Verification and options**: #44738, #41490, #37005 + the cwd pin of
#40984, #31811, #43982, #33483 + #35245, #41810, #32235, #44441, #38092.
- **node:tls API and CA store**: #41671, #38145, #32824, #43594, #39997,
#41696, #33534, #34748, #42991, #42996, #42970.
- **node:https, Agent, `ws`, node-fetch**: #41672 (https half), #41641,
#38261, #42498, #44346, #35609, #31397, #42325.
- **WebSocket client**: #41648, #37487 + #43048 as one change.
- **SQL, Redis**: #33666, #41711, #44498, part of #42054.
- **Tests only**: #41426, #40040, #44395, #44016, #37860, #40591,
#44440, #41424.

Found on the way and fixed here: an upload that a TLS 1.2 server
interrupts with a renegotiation never completes on `main` (0 of 32 runs
over `https.request`, `fetch`, `node:tls` and `Bun.connect`: the
renegotiation ClientHello lands inside an application record that is
still unsent, or the socket gets no `drain` again) and completes here,
with two tests from robobun; the fix for #40653 (final flight and first
write in one segment) stopped working whenever another TLS socket on the
loop was stalled, on `main` too; the `tls.Server` prototype pinned the
last server constructed and every `SSL_CTX` it owned;
`Object.create(process.env).NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED = "0"` turned
verification off process-wide once a `SHARE_ENV` worker existed; two
debug panics when wrapping a shut-down or still-connecting socket; a
`fetch` POST through a proxy sent its headers twice when the origin
renegotiated; `BlockList` ignored IPv6 zone ids; a test now ties
`root_certs.der` to `certdata.txt`.

#### Behavior changes

- **A server's `ca` without `requestCert` no longer asks for a client
certificate** (`Bun.serve`, `Bun.listen`, HTTP/3, node:tls). It matches
the docs and Node. On `main` such a server refused clients with no
certificate but served any unrelated self-signed one, so it was never
authentication. **Set `requestCert: true` to require a certificate.** A
matrix test pins that `requestCert: true` still refuses no certificate
and an untrusted one on 8 kinds of server, TLS 1.2 and 1.3, with
`NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED` unset and `0`.
- `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0` no longer relaxes a server.
- `Bun.connect` / `Bun.listen` hear of a fatal TLS error after the
handshake through `error(socket, err)`. With no `error` handler the
socket just closes.
- HTTP/3 server names match like TCP: `*.` covers exactly one label,
case is ignored, a trailing dot is ignored, the last registration of a
name wins.
- `requestCert` on node:https is `=== true`, as in Node.
- An array where a generated options dictionary is expected throws
(`tls: []`, `jest.useFakeTimers([])`).
- `key` / `cert` arrays serve every identity. A client that can use both
gets ECDSA, where `main` served whichever pair came last.
- `ecdhCurve` is forwarded by node:https, `ws` and node-fetch now, so a
group BoringSSL lacks (`X448`) throws there as it already does in
`tls.createServer`.
- A wrapped socket's error is re-emitted on the TLS socket as in Node,
so `raw.destroy(err)` with a listener on `raw` only is uncaught, as in
Node.
- `sql.options.tls` is always an object, never `true`. `RedisClient`
sends SNI.
- `tls: { secureContext }` alone asks for TLS on `Bun.listen` /
`Bun.connect` (it was plain TCP), and a value that is not a
`SecureContext` throws. The context is served as it is: the
`requestCert` / `rejectUnauthorized` it was created with hold whatever
the options next to it say, and `requestCert` in the options over a
context that does not ask throws at `listen()`.
- `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS` reaches every client once assigned (`fetch`,
`WebSocket`, `Bun.connect`, `RedisClient`, `Bun.SQL`, `S3Client`, proxy
tunnels) and servers again. A list that selects no cipher throws
`ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_MATCH` at the assignment. `fetch.preconnect()` dials
nothing after an assignment.
- The warning for an unreadable `NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS` is Node's one
line, without the `warn:` prefix.
- `BUN_CONFIG_WS_CLOSE_TIMEOUT` (default 30 s): how long a `WebSocket`
client waits for the server to close the connection after the closing
handshake.

#### Worth a look in review

1. **#44529**: the kernel-refused remainder of a TLS write moves from
the loop's one slot onto the connection (in the existing rare struct),
so the write BIO never refuses a sealed record. Nothing is allocated on
an unstalled path (200 writes: 0 appends, same `send()` count as
`main`), memory with 16 stalled writers is lower than on `main` (276 KB
vs 340 KB, which `main` holds inside BoringSSL's buffers), `us_socket_t`
stays 80 bytes. It needs a bound on how long a deferred close waits, or
a peer that stops reading pins the fd past `destroy()`:
`US_SSL_CLOSE_AFTER_SPILL_TIMEOUT` is a fixed 10 s, not re-armed on
progress. Separate commits, but the fix that keeps the client
certificate off the wire beside a stalled socket builds on them.
2. **The default name check of node:tls also runs inside the
handshake**, so a wrong-name server gets no client certificate on TLS
1.2 either. JS still runs it after every successful handshake, so a
difference between the two matchers can only refuse. Error objects are
byte-identical.
3. **#44441** widens trust by design: a self-issued leaf whose
`keyUsage` lacks `keyCertSign` (`dotnet dev-certs`) is its own anchor
when the store holds a byte-identical copy. No BoringSSL change. Expired
pin, same subject with another key, wrong EKU and a pinned intermediate
are tested to fail.
4. **#32235** only adds Ed25519 and ECDSA P-521 to the verify list. A
captured ClientHello shows `main`'s list with the two inserted;
`rsa_pkcs1_sha1` stays.

5. **A stream that a TLS socket wraps, when that TLS socket closes.** An
earlier state of this branch lost data here while CI was green (found by
#44709's report): with the peer closing first, 4 of 8 MiB arrived with
TLS in TLS, 4 of 32 MiB on the http2 `emit("connection")` path, and a
`write()` with no `'error'` listener ended the process. Three
Node-parity changes only hold together: destroying the wrapped stream at
the close (#38028 + #38122 + #38076, #38154) is safe only if every write
has really completed (#43877), which in turn needs Node's handling of
the peer's close_notify, which needs half-open sockets that the GC can
collect. So:
- #43877 + #44394 are reverted and reopened. A write over a stream
completes once the stream has taken the ciphertext, as on `main`.
- Until the verdict on the peer lets the session through, the
application cannot have written over it. There the wrapped stream is
destroyed as in Node, with the sessions below it. That keeps the release
of the connection after a failed handshake, a rejected certificate and
an early `destroy()`. The same for an http2 socket the application never
got, and for `resetAndDestroy()`.
- After that it is `main`'s teardown: a `net.Socket` only gets the
engine's `end()`, closes at its peer's FIN, keeps its own timeout and
reports its own errors. Any other stream is destroyed with the TLS
socket.

The regular suites cannot see any of this (999 files were green on every
broken variant), so it was steered by eleven seeded differential fuzzers
run on this build, `main`, Node v26.3.0 and the earlier state: close,
`end()`, `destroy()`, `destroySoon()`, resets, hung and half-open peers,
paused writers, timeouts, two and three sessions deep, over TCP and over
Duplexes, before, at and after the handshake, and http2 requests. See
"How did you verify".

#### Known limits

- `fetch` with a `checkServerIdentity` function still sends the client
certificate (not the request) to a server the function refuses. On TLS
1.2 any verdict a JS callback gives is too late, as in Node.
- `addContext()` / `SNICallback` still do not apply to a server-side
socket on the stream engine (`emit("connection", duplex)`, TLS in TLS,
unflushed writes, named pipes), as on `main`.
- A CA bundled in a pfx extends an explicit `ca` only, for `ws` /
node-fetch / `WebSocket`: the native `ca` can only replace the default
store, and that store keeps `SSL_CERT_FILE` / `SSL_CERT_DIR`.
- P-521 leaves work on TLS 1.3 only. TLS 1.2 needs secp521r1 in every
ClientHello (`it.todo`).
- Once `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS` is assigned, `fetch(url, { protocol:
"http3" })` is `HTTP3Unsupported`, as with an explicit `ciphers`.
- `addCACert()` by hand does not extend the chains of a context with
several identities.
- A throwing `ALPNCallback` sends `no_application_protocol` on both
engines. Node sends nothing and its client sees `ECONNRESET`.
- TLS in TLS, peer FIN while the outer handshake runs: the inner socket
gets one `write EPIPE`, where Node gives `ECONNRESET` (`main` gives it
no error at all).
- `@SECLEVEL` in `ciphers` is dropped by the `ws` / node-fetch shims,
which used to ignore `ciphers`. node:tls keeps throwing
`ERR_SSL_INVALID_COMMAND`.
- Beside a stalled TLS socket only the first record (16 KiB) of the
first write leaves with the handshake flight. The rest goes record by
record, which is what bounds the memory of stalled writers.
- After a fatal error on an established session the socket emits
`'error'` and then `'close'`. Node emits `'error'` and leaves the socket
open.
- A paused reader whose own write the kernel rejects loses what it had
not read yet, with an `EPIPE`, as on Node. `main` reports no error there
and delivers it.
- On `main` too: a `Bun.listen` socket without `allowHalfOpen` that has
unsent ciphertext when the client's `shutdown()` arrives loses that
ciphertext (32 KiB), and over plain TCP `end()` with the peer still
sending is a close over unread input, so a reset.
- Differences from both `main` and Node that the differential runs below
found and that stay, all with a peer that aborts: `ECONNRESET` instead
of a clean `'end'` after the socket's own `'finish'` when the peer
destroyed with unread data; under TLS 1.2, a zero-length `write()`
followed by `destroy()` in `'secureConnection'` leaves the client
without `'secureConnect'` (a plain `destroy()` there matches Node); a
TLS 1.2 client that destroys in `'secureConnect'` gets no `'session'`; a
`ClientRequest` whose handshake fails with an alert emits `'error'` and
`'close'` but no `'finish'` (`writableFinished` is true).
- Once `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS` is assigned, `fetch.preconnect()` opens
nothing: `fetch()` then uses a context of its own, and a socket warmed
under the default one would never be picked up.
- A TLS `send()` that the kernel refuses outside a `write()` call (the
drain of unsent ciphertext) is reported with the close, as `read EPIPE`
/ `read ECONNRESET`. Node says `write EPIPE`. `main` does not report it
at all.
- Once the application has a session over a `net.Socket` (TLS in TLS,
http2 `emit("connection")`), a peer that never sends its FIN holds that
socket after the TLS socket closed, as on `main`. Node destroys it. Two
tests of #38154 are `todo` for this. Closing it any earlier (at its
`'finish'`, say) makes the kernel drop what it has not sent yet as soon
as the peer's close_notify arrives.
- Plaintext that was queued on a socket before it was wrapped (STARTTLS
with a backlog) is dropped when the TLS socket is destroyed, or its
handshake fails, before the session is accepted. Node drops it too,
except on `destroySoon()`. `main` sends it.
- Over a stream that is no `net.Socket`, `end()` can still cut what that
stream has buffered, and there is no backpressure, both as on `main`
(#43877).
- `tls.secureContext` (the undocumented door node:tls uses) is not read
by a Windows named pipe listener, which builds its context from the
options. On `upgradeTLS({ isServer: true })` the options next to it are
the policy, as with Node's `SetVerifyMode`.
- `selectServerName()` rebuilds the name tree per ClientHello for
injected sockets of a server with `addContext()` entries: 0.4 µs for 1
entry, 3.7 µs for 10, 41 µs for 100, against 631–1111 µs for a
handshake.

#### Not included

Left open, because they need a decision or are not TLS: #43877 + #44394
(see "Worth a look" 5; #43874 stays open with them), #38548, #38591
(both shrink who is trusted), #41589 (`verify-full` vs
`NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0`), #37197, #41706, #43216, #33487,
#33545, #36707, #32435, #37255, #28691, #40275, #30314 (features),
#38120 (needs the BoringSSL fork, as did #33517, which the stale bot has
closed since), #38529 (needs a Windows measurement), #34342, #38232,
#43089, #44454, #40451, #42710, #44527, #38088, #38093, #41898. #37896,
#42054 and #37013 stay open for the halves not taken.
`http.createServer({ key, cert })` keeps serving TLS on purpose.

One open question: `tls: {}` (an object that names no TLS option) is
plain TCP on `Bun.listen` / `Bun.connect`, here and on `main`. It is the
same trap as `tls: []`, but changing it changes a Bun default, so it is
left alone.

### How did you verify your code works?

- Every new test fails on `main` for the stated reason and passes here,
except guards that pin existing behavior, each shown to fail when its
clause is removed. `node:*` tests also pass on Node v26.3.0; the few
that cannot say which Node version has the behavior.
- 212 test files that touch TLS, sockets, http, http2, fetch, WebSocket,
SQL, Valkey and workers: 6154 pass, 2 fail. Both are seen on `main` too:
`serve.test.ts` "root range port" (the box runs as root), and
`worker_threads.test.ts` "terminate(): nothing of the worker's runs
after the request", which is flaky there and passed in the run below.
- 58 of those files the way the ASAN lane runs them (LeakSanitizer +
`BUN_JSC_validateExceptionChecks`): 58 files, 48 of them with leak
checking, 4132 pass, 3 fail. All three also fail on `main`:
`serve.test.ts` "root range port", `node-net.test.ts` "should not leak
when connect({path}) fails synchronously on a reused handle" (times out
under this environment), `worker_threads.test.ts` "process.exit() with a
shell cp in flight" (a `ShellCpTask` leak).
- 647 vendored `test-tls-*`, `test-https-*`, `test-net-*`,
`test-http2-*`: the only two failures also fail on `main`.
- The SNI matcher was diffed against both old matchers: 3 seeds × 1.23 M
lookups × 3 registration flavours, every difference in one of the
intended classes, TCP and HTTP/3 identical on every lookup.
- The headline rows were also driven by hand with scripts against this
build, `main` and Node v26.3.0: cleartext https, `crl`, `tls: []` / `{
secureContext }`, the `ca` / `requestCert` matrix, the client
certificate on a wrong-name server, late `setSession()`, `destroy()` in
`ALPNCallback`, `[rsa, ec]` identities with an intermediate from `ca`,
`WebSocket` `checkServerIdentity`, a corrupted record, the Duplex read
above, `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS`.
- The `setSession()` guard was checked against the real `abort()` at 43
handshake states.
- `bun run rust:check-all`: 12 of 12 targets. `tsc`, oxlint, source
lints, prettier, rustfmt, mordant clean.
- usockets' `_Nonnull` is compiled out of debug builds, so 105 of those
files were also run on a local release ASAN build with the CI runner's
environment (92 with leak checking): 4595 pass, 1 fail,
`child_process.test.ts` "spawn reports EPERM after dropping privileges",
which cannot pass as root and fails on `main` too.
- The close of a TLS socket over another stream ("Worth a look" 5):
eleven seeded differential fuzzers, 8,424 scenarios compared, each run
on a release ASAN build of this branch, on `main`, on Node v26.3.0 and
on the earlier state of the branch. Against `main`:
- Data that `main` delivers in full is cut in 5 scenarios, and about 150
that `main` cuts arrive in full. Of the 5, in 2 `main` never notices the
peer's close and keeps the socket for good, 2 call `end()` on the middle
one of three sessions over an in-memory Duplex, and 1 does the same on
Node.
- No dead timeout, no silent reset and no uncaught error that `main`
does not have (4 uncaught errors fewer).
- A socket stays open where `main` closes it in 109, and closes where
`main` keeps it in 295. 92 of the 109 do the same on Node or on the
earlier state (a `destroy()` that an in-memory Duplex does not show its
peer, half-open peers). 14 wait for a peer that paused reading and so
does not read the FIN (#42332's backpressure, as in Node); the socket's
own timeout fires there. 3 are left: one on a 5 ms timer, two with three
sessions over an in-memory Duplex.
- The earlier state of the branch cut data in 173 of the 400 scenarios
of one of them, where `main` cuts none and this cuts none.
- 23 new tests pin what they found. Each earlier attempt at this fix
fails the ones that describe it, the earlier state of the branch fails
7, and all pass on Node.
- After that change: 999 test files on the release ASAN build (20,246
pass; the 11 files that fail need a database, Docker, DNS or a non-root
user, or share a temp directory with a parallel run and pass alone), 61
on the debug build.
- TLS over a file descriptor (`openssl.c`, the path of `fetch`,
`Bun.serve`, `tls.connect`, `Bun.connect`) got the same treatment after
the rebase: seeded differential fuzzers on CI's release build of this
branch, on `main` and, for `node:*`, on Node v26.3.0. Every runtime also
against itself for the noise floor, injected faults and known bugs of
`main` as positive controls, and a difference counts only if it shows in
5 of 5 fresh processes.
- `node:tls` over TCP: 11,500 scenarios (one connection with Node as the
oracle line by line; 2 to 60 connections beside stalled neighbours; raw
peers that break the handshake). HTTPS: about 136,000 runs over
`Bun.serve` + `fetch`, `node:https`, `node:http2` and `wss://`, also
with the two ends in different runtimes. `Bun.connect` / `Bun.listen` /
`upgradeTLS`: 11,500 scenarios and 720 slow connections, with writers
driven by what `write()` returns, beside up to 6 stalled, dripping,
closing or resetting neighbours, and plain TCP as a second oracle. No
crash, hang, duplication, reordering or silent truncation, and no change
in time or in connection reuse.
- They found six things that `main` does better, none of which any test
showed. All are fixed, each with a test that fails on the build before:
what the peer sent lost behind a rejected `send()` (23 scenarios, and an
early HTTPS response lost with only `EPIPE`), the same silently for a
paused reader, `server.close()` never calling back on a half-open server
after a ClientHello and a reset (17), `closeAllConnections()` taking 12
s with a stalled client, `end()` losing up to 1.3 of 4 MiB that
`write()` had reported while the peer still uploads, and `end()` a
little after a stall never closing beside other stalled TLS sockets. The
last two fixes also deliver the 1 to 2 MiB that `main` loses there, and
close the socket that `main` keeps for good without such neighbours.
- All of them again after every fix, on CI's release build of it. That
caught one regression of a fix itself (a reader stopped for backpressure
lost 86,385 bytes, 1 of 6,000 scenarios), fixed too. On the last build:
scenarios that lose data where `main` does not 23 → 2, and Node loses it
in both, with the same `EPIPE`; `server.close()` that never calls back
17 → 0; connections held 4 → 0; requests that end in an error only where
`main` has a response 6 → 0. With a Node server in another process, a
request ends in an error only in 8 and 10 of 1,500 scenarios here, 5 and
3 on `main`, 10 with Node as the client.
- `Bun.connect` / `Bun.listen` on the last build against `main`, in
scenarios: hangs 0 against 1,031, sockets and fds never released 0
against 965, corrupted data 0 against 345, `abort()` 0 against 26
(`setSession()` after the handshake), writers that never close 0 against
101 of 720 connections. No kind of failure shows here and not on `main`.
About a third of the slow connections close later than on `main`, in 1
to 16 s instead of at once, waiting for unsent ciphertext or for the
peer's close_notify, and 79 more of them deliver all that `write()`
reported. RSS and time with 16 to 256 stalled writers are the same.
- What they found that `main` does worse: a `WebSocket` that calls
`close()` with sends pending loses messages in 81 of 999 scenarios (0
here), 37 server sockets left open, 10 `server.close()` that never call
back, 20 write callbacks that never run.
- The kqueue fix cannot be run on Linux. The `connectionListener` count
test now says what became of a missing connection, which is how the
cause was found (`'tlsClientError'` "socket hang up", then `read
ECONNRESET` at the client of the same port, after its
`'secureConnect'`). On macOS x64 it failed every attempt of the three
builds before the fix and passed at the first attempt of the build with
it.
- Windows and macOS were only run by CI. Four new tests asserted what
only the Linux kernel does (a FIN read ahead of a reset, unread bytes
surviving a reset, loopback buffer sizes, `fstat()` on a socket) and now
say so per platform.

---------

Co-authored-by: autofix-ci[bot] <114827586+autofix-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: robobun <117481402+robobun@users.noreply.github.com>
Sign up for free to join this conversation on GitHub. Already have an account? Sign in to comment

Labels

Projects

None yet

Development

Successfully merging this pull request may close these issues.

2 participants