tls: report a rejected send() as a write error instead of a clean close by robobun · Pull Request #42336 · oven-sh/bun

robobun · 2026-09-11T16:11:00Z

Problem

A node:tls socket whose write is the first to see the peer's reset ends as a clean close: no write error, 'end', hadError false. Node fails the write with write ECONNRESET.
The cause is us_socket_write_check_error (packages/bun-usockets/src/socket.c:548). For an SSL socket it never set *fatal_write_error. TLS ciphertext goes out through us_socket_raw_write, which folds a rejected send() to 0. On Linux that send() also consumes the pending socket error, so the next recv() returns 0 and the reset is lost.

Fix

The raw sends of a TLS write classify a failed send(). The code travels up through per-loop scratch (loop_ssl_data, no socket state) and out of the fatal_write_error channel that plain TCP already uses.
The records SSL_write sealed for the failed write are discarded, so a retry cannot send the same plaintext twice.
Bun.connect write()/end() return the documented -1 for a fatal send (TCP leaked -104). HTTP/2 over TLS is unchanged: it already ends as in Node.
Verified: four test files on linux-x64 and Windows x64, the Node-compatible fixtures also on node v26.3.0. Self-reviewed: 10 concerns raised, 9 addressed (Notes).

Background

SSL_write seals records into a custom write BIO, which sends them in one batch. A short send parks the rest in a per-loop spill slot.
socket_body.rs writes node:net and node:tls data through us_socket_write_check_error. Its fatal_write_error out-parameter carries a peer-gone send() up to net.ts failWrite, which fails the write like Node.
The classification existed for TCP. The first commit only moves it into us_internal_classify_failed_send.

Notes

How it was found. By inspection during work on #42182, not from a tracker report.

Reach. tls.connect({ socket }), https.request and Bun.connect({ tls }) go through the same write path and change with it, as the table shows.

Repro (the peer resets while the client's loop is blocked, then the client writes. The peer runs under node in every row):

node:tls socket
  node v26.3.0, linux + windows:  write()->false | writecb:ECONNRESET | error:ECONNRESET:write | close(hadError=true)
  bun 1.4.3, linux:               write()->true  | writecb:ok | end | close(hadError=false)
  bun canary, windows:            write()->true  | writecb:ok | error:ECONNRESET:read | close(hadError=true)
  this branch, linux + windows:   write()->true  | writecb:ECONNRESET | error:ECONNRESET:write | close(hadError=true)
tls.connect({ socket }): the same three results.
https.request (100-continue, then the reset, then req.write)
  node, linux + windows:          req.writecb:ECONNRESET | req.error: write ECONNRESET
  bun 1.4.3, linux:               req.writecb:ok | req.error: socket hang up
  bun canary, windows:            req.writecb:ok | req.error: read ECONNRESET
  this branch, linux + windows:   req.writecb:ECONNRESET | req.error: write ECONNRESET
Bun.connect({ tls }) write(), twice
  bun 1.4.3 / canary:             4, 0
  this branch:                    -1, -1      (TCP: -104, -32 before, -1, -1 now)

write() returning true is pre-existing and shared with the TCP path.

Why HTTP/2 over TLS is left alone. The report that started this said an https h2 session ends clean where Node reports ECONNRESET. Node's answer depends on the kernel. With #42182's own fixture, node v26.3.0 on linux-x64 ends the request clean, 6 of 6 runs (stream.end, rstCode 8, session.close, no 'error'), because the failed send() consumed the socket error and Node's Http2Session::OnStreamAfterWrite does not act on the write status. On Windows the reset stays readable and Node reports ECONNRESET on the stream and the session. bun over TLS already gives exactly those two results, through the read side, and it also delivers a response that arrived before the reset, as Node does. The parser's reaction to a fatal write is close_transport_after_fatal_write on its deferred tick. Over TLS that close discards the unread response and the session gets EBADF from the write that follows (what plain TCP does on main). So NativeSocketWrite for &TLSSocket calls write_maybe_corked_without_fatal_report, and h2 over TLS is byte for byte what it was. The new h2 test pins that. #42182 owns what the parser does with a fatal write over TCP.

Why the sealed records are discarded. When the raw send fails, SSL_write has already taken the plaintext and the sealed records sit in the batch or the spill. node:net keeps the failed chunk for internal_flush, and a Bun.connect user can call write() again. If the wire came back (the classification also reports an unclassified errno after 32 consecutive failures), the spill would drain and the retry would put the same plaintext on the stream again. Without the records the stream has a gap, which the peer rejects (bad record MAC), so the connection fails instead of being corrupted. A close that follows also no longer waits behind bytes that cannot drain. ssl_fatal_error is not set: it would stop the read side.

Relation to other open PRs.

usockets: close a TLS socket whose send() keeps failing instead of spinning the writable dispatch #34510 (Jarred asked there whether a send errno has to be stored on the socket): nothing is stored here. The code lives in loop_ssl_data for one us_internal_ssl_write_check_error call, with an owner, like ssl_last_fatal_error_owner. That PR also extracts the classifier. The extraction is the first commit here and can be taken alone. It is not a separate PR because it has no failing test to show. The writable spin (100% cpu if use sslmode on mysql #24845) is that PR's and is unchanged.
tls: close the connection when a post-handshake SSL_write fails instead of leaving it open #38176 reports EPROTO through the same out-parameter when SSL_write itself fails. The two conditions do not overlap. The if (s->ssl) block in socket.c is one call now, so that PR's check goes after it, or into us_internal_ssl_write_check_error as the else.
Bun.connect: native write() returns -1 (not raw -errno) on a peer RST and close carries ECONNRESET #36422 clamps write()/end() with the same line and goes further (the close reports the errno).

Self-review. Ten concerns came out of it and nine are addressed: no socket field, the false size comment is gone with it, the Bun.connect return value, the h2 decision and its test, Windows verified on a Windows x64 machine, tests that run on release lanes, on Windows and on Node, the stale comments in socket_body.rs, socket.rs and libusockets.h, the retry hazard above (found while doing this), and this section. Not done: a stack of separate PRs, for the reason given under #34510.

Review follow-ups. The send-error owner in loop_ssl_data follows a socket relocation like the other owner slots. The two child fixtures that report from their close handler also report on a 20 s deadline. The new comments under src/ are one line each.

Tests.

test/js/node/tls/tls-syscall-fault.test.ts: fault injection, send fails with ECONNRESET. Times out on stock bun.
test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts: real reset, tls.connect({ port }) and tls.connect({ socket }). The child blocks its loop until the parent confirms the reset. Fails on stock bun on Linux and on the Windows canary. Passes on node v26.3.0 on both.
test/js/bun/net/socket.test.ts: Bun.connect write() returns -1, TCP and TLS. Stock bun returns -104, -32 and 4, 0.
test/js/node/http2/node-http2.test.js: h2 over TLS, real reset. Passes before and after by design. Passes on node v26.3.0 on both platforms.

Suites, linux-x64 debug+ASAN: test/js/node/tls/ 316 pass, test/js/node/http2/ 521 pass, test/js/bun/net/ 143 pass, test/js/node/net/ 266 pass, bun-serve-ssl + serve.test.ts 315 pass, test/js/node/http/ 372 pass, node's parallel test-tls-* 185/186, test-https-* 58/59, test-net-* 139/139, test-http2-* 256/256. Every failure is also there without this change in the same container (tests that need localhost name resolution or the public internet, test-https-timeout on a debug build, a 5 s limit around a 5.09 s debug run). Windows x64 debug: test/js/node/tls/ 315 pass (2 named-pipe timeouts that fail identically without the change), test/js/node/http2/ 511 pass, test/js/node/net/ 252 pass, test/js/bun/net/ 120 pass.

no test proof · iteration 0 · platform-specific test(s) that do not run on this machine, deferring to CI, which covers all platforms: test/js/node/tls/tls-syscall-fault.test.ts, test/js/bun/net/socket.test.ts

us_socket_write_check_error decided inline whether a failed send() is retried from a writable event or reported as fatal. Move that decision into us_internal_classify_failed_send. No behaviour change: the TCP path calls it and acts on the result exactly as before.

…ing clean A TLS write reaches the wire from inside the write BIO and from the batch and spill flushes. All of them fold a rejected send() into "the wire blocked", so us_socket_write_check_error never reported a fatal send for an SSL socket. The writer counted the bytes as written, nothing reported the peer's reset (on Linux the failed send() consumes the socket's pending error, so the read side sees a plain EOF), and the connection ended as a clean close. Node fails the write with ECONNRESET. The raw sends of the write in progress now classify a failed send() and hand the code to us_internal_ssl_write_check_error through per-loop scratch, so no socket state is added. The SSL branch of us_socket_write_check_error reports it through the channel plain TCP already uses. The records SSL_write sealed for the failed write are discarded, so a writer that retries cannot put the same plaintext on the stream twice. node:tls, https and tls.connect({ socket }) now fail the write like Node (write callback, 'error' with syscall write, 'close' with hadError). Bun.connect's write() and end() return the documented -1 for a fatal send instead of the raw negative errno, for TCP as well. The HTTP/2 frame parser keeps a rejected send on a TLS transport as backpressure: its only reaction to a fatal write is to close the transport at once, which would drop what the peer sent before it went away, and the session already ends the way it does in Node.

- node:tls under fault injection: send() fails with ECONNRESET. - node:tls with a real reset, for tls.connect({ port }) and tls.connect({ socket }). The child blocks its event loop until the parent confirms the reset, then writes. - Bun.connect write() returns -1, over TCP and over TLS. - node:http2 over TLS: the session and the stream both close, no response appears, and any error is the reset.

robobun · 2026-09-11T16:11:32Z

Status: open, waiting for CI and review.

How it was reproduced. Two processes. The peer is a tls.createServer that writes to the client and then resets the raw TCP socket it captured from the server's 'connection' event (resetAndDestroy()), so no TLS alert precedes the RST. The client blocks its event loop inside its 'data' handler until the reset is done, then calls socket.write(), so that write is the first operation that observes the reset.

bun 1.4.3, linux-x64: the write callback reports success, then 'end' and 'close' with hadError false.
node v26.3.0 and this branch: write ECONNRESET on the write callback and on 'error', then 'close' with hadError true.

test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts ("a write that is the first to observe the peer's reset fails with a write error") runs exactly this. Run it with USE_SYSTEM_BUN=1 bun test to see the failure, and with bun bd test to see it pass.

coderabbitai · 2026-09-11T16:21:08Z

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Walkthrough

TLS and raw socket writes now classify fatal send errors, preserve write results, and discard failed ciphertext. Runtime APIs expose consistent error values. Regression tests cover TCP, TLS, and HTTP/2 peer resets.

Changes

Send error handling

Layer / File(s)	Summary
Native send classification and APIs `packages/bun-usockets/src/internal/internal.h`, `packages/bun-usockets/src/socket.c`, `packages/bun-usockets/src/libusockets.h`, `src/uws_sys/socket.rs`	Native writes classify failed sends and expose optional fatal platform errors while preserving existing return values.
TLS raw send tracking `packages/bun-usockets/src/crypto/openssl.c`	TLS ciphertext writes capture raw send failures across records, batches, and spill buffers. Failed ciphertext is discarded.
Runtime write integration `src/runtime/api/bun/h2_frame_parser.rs`, `src/runtime/socket/socket_body.rs`	Runtime write paths select fatal-error reporting, clamp negative results to `-1`, and avoid deferred fatal closure for selected TLS writes.
Reset and syscall regression coverage `test/js/bun/net/socket.test.ts`, `test/js/node/http2/node-http2.test.js`, `test/js/node/tls/*`	Regression tests cover TCP, TLS, and HTTP/2 peer resets, write errors, closure state, and syscall metadata.

Suggested reviewers: cirospaciari

Priority: ➖ Normal

Merge Risk: 🟡 Moderate · up to 3fed9

A reset observed only during a TLS write may still leave an HTTP/2 session without its expected close path. Resolve or explicitly accept this runtime behavior before merge.

🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4

✅ Passed checks (4 passed)

Check name	Status	Explanation
Title check	✅ Passed	The title clearly and concisely describes the main change: reporting rejected TLS send() calls as write errors instead of clean closes.
Description check	✅ Passed	The description provides detailed problem, fix, verification, regression-test, platform, and compatibility information. It does not use the exact template headings, but it covers the required content …
Linked Issues check	✅ Passed	Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request.
Out of Scope Changes check	✅ Passed	Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request.

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Actionable comments posted: 3

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Inline comments:
In `@packages/bun-usockets/src/crypto/openssl.c`:
- Around line 127-128: Update us_internal_ssl_socket_relocated to replace
ssl_send_error_owner when it points to old_s, assigning new_s so
us_internal_ssl_write and ssl_raw_write retain fatal send-error reporting after
socket relocation.

In `@src/runtime/api/bun/h2_frame_parser.rs`:
- Line 3302: Update the TLSSocket write path around
write_maybe_corked_without_fatal_report and NativeSocketWrite so a zero result
from us_internal_ssl_write on a rejected raw send is propagated as a terminal
transport failure instead of re-buffering the bytes. Set or forward
transport_write_fatal and ensure us_internal_ssl_on_writable closes an
undrainable spill even without ssl_end_delivered, while preserving
read-before-close behavior for already received data.

In `@test/js/bun/net/socket.test.ts`:
- Around line 4764-4767: The subprocess fixtures at
test/js/bun/net/socket.test.ts lines 4764-4767 and
test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts lines 2042-2045 both need guarded
reporting: introduce a reported-aware report() function containing the existing
JSON output and process exit, invoke it from each close handler, and schedule
setTimeout(report, 20000) so the child always terminates even if close does not
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…reset fixtures us_internal_ssl_socket_relocated moves every owner slot of the per-loop SSL data to the new block. The send-error owner follows it too, and the reporting wrapper continues on the live block after the write. The two child fixtures that report from their close handler also report on a 20 s deadline, so a missing close shows the recorded state instead of a bare test timeout (CI runs with a 90 s per-test limit).

The reasons they gave are in the commit that added the code and in the PR description.

robobun · 2026-09-11T16:37:13Z

Review findings so far, and what happened to each:

ssl_send_error_owner across a relocation (coderabbit): fixed in 7e742ef. us_internal_ssl_socket_relocated moves it like the other owner slots, and the reporting wrapper continues on the live block after the write.
Fixtures that report only from close (coderabbit): fixed in 7e742ef. Both child fixtures also report on a 20 s deadline. CI runs with a 90 s limit for each test, so a missing close now shows the recorded state and not a bare timeout.
h2 over TLS should propagate the failed send and close a spill that cannot drain (coderabbit): declined, with the reasons in the thread. That path is unchanged from main by design. A real reset always reaches the read side, which is what closes the session, and that is measured on Linux and Windows and pinned by the new h2 test. The spin with a live peer is 100% cpu if use sslmode on mysql #24845, which usockets: close a TLS socket whose send() keeps failing instead of spinning the writable dispatch #34510 owns.
Four comments of more than one line under src/ (comment lint): each is one line now, in 6dd9136.

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Inline comments:
In `@src/runtime/api/bun/h2_frame_parser.rs`:
- Around line 3294-3295: In the parser write path, replace the call to
TLSSocket::write_maybe_corked_without_fatal_report with
TLSSocket::write_maybe_corked so fatal send errors propagate as the negative
errno and activate the deferred close path. Keep the surrounding frame-writing
behavior unchanged.

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claude

Nothing blocking. The comments below are optional suggestions. There is no need to push a fix for them before merging.

The three reset tests read stdout to the end before they started to read stderr. A child that writes more than the pipe buffer to stderr would block, and the test would hang with no output to explain it.

robobun · 2026-09-11T16:55:46Z

Took the optional suggestion from the last review in e344105: the three reset tests now drain the child's stderr while they read its stdout. All review threads are resolved.

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⚠️ Outside diff range comments (1)

src/runtime/api/bun/h2_frame_parser.rs (1)
3302-3302: 🩺 Stability & Availability | 🟠 Major | ⚡ Quick win

Use fatal-reporting TLS writes for the HTTP/2 adapter. The BunSocket::Tls* path passes &TLSSocket to generic_write and generic_flush, but the adapter calls write_maybe_corked_without_fatal_report. A peer-reset errno is then treated as ordinary backpressure, so transport_write_fatal is not latched and the deferred close does not run. Call TLSSocket::write_maybe_corked(*self, buf) at this boundary.
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In `@src/runtime/api/bun/h2_frame_parser.rs` at line 3302, Update the HTTP/2
adapter’s TLS write path to call TLSSocket::write_maybe_corked(*self, buf)
instead of write_maybe_corked_without_fatal_report, ensuring peer-reset errors
latch transport_write_fatal and trigger deferred close.

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Outside diff comments:
In `@src/runtime/api/bun/h2_frame_parser.rs`:
- Line 3302: Update the HTTP/2 adapter’s TLS write path to call
TLSSocket::write_maybe_corked(*self, buf) instead of
write_maybe_corked_without_fatal_report, ensuring peer-reset errors latch
transport_write_fatal and trigger deferred close.

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robobun · 2026-09-11T17:03:49Z

For readers of the latest bot review: its "outside diff range" note and its merge-risk line ask again for TLSSocket::write_maybe_corked in the HTTP/2 adapter. That is the same finding the bot raised twice before and withdrew both times, after the evidence in the threads:

tls: report a rejected send() as a write error instead of a clean close #42336 (comment)
tls: report a rejected send() as a write error instead of a clean close #42336 (comment)

Nothing changed in that code since. The call stays as it is: with the suggested call, a real reset over TLS gives the session EBADF and drops a response that already arrived, where stock bun and node v26.3.0 end the request the same way this branch does. test/js/node/http2/node-http2.test.js pins it.

claude

Nothing blocking. The comments below are optional suggestions. There is no need to push a fix for them before merging.

The comment still described an earlier shape of the change, where the frame parser was told about the failed send. Over TLS it is not, and the reset reaches JS through the read side.

claude

Code review found no issues

No high-confidence issues detected in this change.

… parked (#43698) ### Problem - An accepted `node:tls` socket whose write is the first to see the peer's RST emits `'end'` and nothing else: no write callback, no `'error'`, no `'close'`. The server counts it forever, so `server.close()` never completes. On main, 16 of 30 connections end this way. Node: 0 of 30. - The last block of `SocketEmitEndNT` (`src/js/node/net.ts:875`) fails a parked write only when the native close carries an error or the socket is destroyed. Here the failed `send()` consumed the socket error, so the close carries none. ### Fix - A half-open `'end'` runs the same function, and its write can still drain. Tell the two apart by `kclosed`, which only the native close handlers set. A parked write on a closed handle fails with `ERR_SOCKET_CLOSED`, as the client-side close handler already does. `'error'` and `'close'` follow. - #42336 fixes the cause in the TLS write path, and alone it also removes this state (0 of 30, measured). #38176 alone does not (18 and 26 of 30). This change is the JS-side guarantee for any clean close that leaves a write parked. - Verified: new test in `test/js/node/tls/node-tls-server.test.ts` (fails on main with `events: []` and 2 connections, passes here). `test/js/node/tls/`, `test/js/node/net/` and Node's 325 `test-net-*`/`test-tls-*` files: same failures as main. ### Background - A write the kernel does not take whole is parked: the native socket buffers the rest, and `net.ts` keeps the callback in `kwriteCallback` until the drain. - Accepted sockets are half-open natively, so a peer FIN dispatches only `'end'`. - After a native close the fd is gone, and nothing parked can drain. <details><summary>Notes</summary> #### The ledger's repro (30 connections, the peer resets on the first byte of a 1 MiB write, node peer, linux-x64) | build | never closed | the other connections | |---|---|---| | node v26.3.0 | 0 of 30 | `error:ECONNRESET`, `close:true` | | main (release 367d939) | 16 of 30 (8 to 25 over other runs) | `error:ECONNRESET`, `close:true` | | main + #38176 | 18 and 26 of 30 | same | | main + #42336 | 0 and 0 of 30 | `cb:ECONNRESET`, `error:ECONNRESET`, `close:true` | | this branch | 0 of 30 | 16 took `end`, `cb:ERR_SOCKET_CLOSED`, `error:ERR_SOCKET_CLOSED`, `close:true` | For the two PR rows I merged each PR's head into main @a2b69f7b. #38176 merges cleanly. #42336 conflicts in two test files only, which I resolved to main's side. `src/` and `packages/` merged without conflicts. #### Mechanism, traced with the `Socket` debug scope ``` [socket] write(1048576) = 393216 the write takes many send() calls; one of them meets the RST [socket] onEnd S recv() returns 0: the failed send() consumed the error [socket] onClose S hangup, close code 0 ``` The TLS write path folds a rejected `send()` to "wire blocked" and keeps no errno (that is #42336). A plain `net.createServer` does not reach this state, because `us_socket_write_check_error` reports the errno and `failWrite` fails the write. #### What still differs from Node after this change The sockets that took this path report `'end'`, then `ERR_SOCKET_CLOSED`. Node reports `write ECONNRESET` and no `'end'`. The errno is gone by the time the close reaches JS, so only the native fix can restore it. With #42336 the write fails at write time and nothing is parked at the close, so the two changes do not overlap. If #42336 lands first, the new test here passes without this change, and this becomes a guard with no known trigger on Linux. #### The test The server runs in a child process so that it can stop polling. It reports the accepted socket, then blocks in `fs.readSync(0)` until the test has reset the connection, and only then writes. The write is therefore the first operation to see the reset on every run, with no timing involved: ``` node v26.3.0: write()=false | cb:ECONNRESET | error:ECONNRESET | close:true connections 0 main: write()=false | end (nothing more, 3 of 3) this branch: write()=false | end | cb:ERR_SOCKET_CLOSED | error:ERR_SOCKET_CLOSED | close:true connections 0 ``` A socket that never closes gives no event to wait for, so the server reports when a second connection arrives. That handshake takes several turns of the server's loop, and the reset socket closes in the first of them or not at all. The server then destroys both sockets, so the child exits in both outcomes and the test fails with the recorded state, not with a timeout (about 2 s on a debug build of main). The test asserts what holds in Node and on every platform: `'error'`, then `'close'` with `hadError` true, then a `getConnections()` of 1, which is the second connection. It also asserts that the child exited on its own. It does not pin the error code or the write callback. On main the read-error path never calls a parked write's callback, which is #43250. If the reset were seen by a read first, a fixed build would still pass. #### Overlap with open PRs #43392 rewrites the same block into a helper and keeps the same `destroyed || _err` condition, so it does not cover this case. The two conflict textually in that one hunk. The resolution is to keep its helper and call it when `kclosed` is set. </details>  --- **no test proof** · iteration 4 · platform-specific test(s) that do not run on this machine, deferring to CI, which covers all platforms: test/js/node/tls/node-tls-server.test.ts

### Problem - `net.Socket#write()` returns `true` when the send fails inside the same call: the kernel rejects it (`ECONNRESET`, `EPIPE`) or the handle is already closed (`EBADF`). Node v26.3.0 returns `false` and sets `socket.errored` before `write()` returns. - The cause is `Socket.prototype._write` (`src/js/node/net.ts:2968` and `:2976`). It hands the error to the stream callback with `process.nextTick`. `Writable.write()` computes its return value before that tick. ### Fix - `_write` calls the stream callback with the error in the same call, in both branches, like Node's `afterWriteDispatched` ([stream_base_commons.js#L158-L159](https://github.com/nodejs/node/blob/v26.3.0/lib/internal/stream_base_commons.js#L158-L159)). - The stream still runs the write callbacks and destroys the socket on the next tick. The order of write callback, `'error'` and `'close'` does not change. - `_write` does not call `failWrite` there. `failWrite` destroys the socket at once, so a second write in the same tick would get `ERR_STREAM_DESTROYED`. Node gives both writes the original errno. - Verified: `test/js/node/net/node-net.test.ts` and `test/js/node/net/net-syscall-fault.test.ts` (8 new tests, all fail on main's `src/`). Also node's `test-net-*`, `test-http-*`, `test-tls-*` and `test-http2-*` files. ### Background - `Writable.write()` calls `_write(chunk, encoding, callback)`. If `callback(err)` runs before `_write` returns, the stream sets `errored` at once and `write()` returns `false`. The user callbacks and the destroy wait for the next tick. - The native `$write` returns a negative errno when `send()` fails because the peer is gone. ### Downsides - Code that reads `socket.errored` or `socket.writable` right after a failed `write()` sees the failure one tick earlier. Node reports the same values. - A TLS socket still returns `true`. The native TLS write does not report the errno to `_write` (#42336 adds that). <details><summary>Notes</summary> **Repro** (from a differential run of bun against node): ```js import net from "node:net"; let accepted, connected, client; const go = () => { if (!accepted || !connected) return; accepted.resetAndDestroy(); const ret = client.write("x", e => console.log("wcb", e ? e.code + " " + e.syscall : "ok")); console.log("write() returned", ret, "destroyed=" + client.destroyed, "errored=" + client.errored?.code, "writable=" + client.writable, "writableLength=" + client.writableLength); console.log("2nd write() returned", client.write("y", e => console.log("wcb2", e?.code, e?.syscall))); }; const server = net.createServer(s => { s.on("error", () => {}); accepted = s; go(); }); server.listen(0, "127.0.0.1", () => { client = net.connect(server.address().port, "127.0.0.1", () => { connected = true; go(); }); client.on("error", e => console.log("error", e.code, e.syscall)); client.on("close", hadError => { console.log("close", hadError); server.close(); }); }); ``` node v26.3.0 and this branch (Linux and Windows, line for line): ``` write() returned false destroyed=false errored=ECONNRESET writable=false writableLength=0 2nd write() returned false wcb ECONNRESET write wcb2 ECONNRESET write error ECONNRESET write close true ``` bun 1.4.3 and main: ``` write() returned true destroyed=false errored=undefined writable=true writableLength=1 2nd write() returned true wcb ECONNRESET write wcb2 ECONNRESET write error ECONNRESET write close true ``` The same comparison holds for a unix socket whose peer closed (`EPIPE`), for `socket._handle.close()` followed by `write()` (`EBADF`, `EPIPE` on Windows), for `cork()` / `uncork()`, and for `end(data)`. #43705 notes this bug as found on the way and leaves it alone. The two changes are independent. **Why the stream still destroys the socket.** The `Socket` constructor forces `autoDestroy: true`. `Writable`'s `onwrite` sees `state.sync`, so it queues `onwriteError` with `process.nextTick`. `onwriteError` runs the write callback, fails the buffered writes with the same error, and calls `destroy(err)`. This is the path the deferred `failWrite` call reached before, one tick later. **Tests** - `node-net.test.ts`: a unix socket whose peer closed (POSIX, the kernel reports it inside the peer's `close(2)`), a TCP socket whose peer reset the connection, a handle that was closed directly, and a corked batch that `uncork()` sends through `_writev`. The TCP test takes a fresh connection until the kernel rejects the send, because loopback does not promise that the RST is processed before the next `send(2)`. On Linux and Windows the first connection hit in 500 of 500 runs (release builds), so the loop is a guard for other kernels. - `net-syscall-fault.test.ts`: an injected `ECONNRESET` / `EPIPE` on the first `send()`, for the connecting socket and for the accepted socket. These run on ASAN builds only, where the fault hooks exist. - With only one of the two branches of the fix applied, the tests of the other branch fail. - Windows debug build of this branch: the TCP, closed-handle and corked tests pass, and `node-net.test.ts` is 114 pass, 0 fail. **Suites run on the Linux debug build**: `test/js/node/net/*.test.ts`, `test/js/node/tls/node-tls-{connect,server,upgrade}.test.ts`, `tls-syscall-fault.test.ts`, and the `test-net-*`, `test-http-*`, `test-https-*`, `test-tls-*`, `test-http2-*`, `test-child-process-*`, `test-cluster-*` files of `test/js/node/test`. Every failure there also fails without this change: the container resolves `localhost` to `127.0.0.1` only while `Bun.listen("localhost")` binds `::1`, and a few tests exceed their timeout on a debug build. On Windows, `test-net-pingpong.js` fails with and without this change (#39723, with #39727 open for it). **TLS.** After the peer's raw socket resets, node's `tlsSocket.write()` also returns `false` with `ECONNRESET`. Bun returns `true`, reports the write as done and closes without an error, with and without this change. The native TLS write never returns the errno, so `_write` cannot see the failure. #42336 makes the native side report it. With both changes the TLS path reaches the same `res < 0` branch. **Not changed**: `tlsSocketWrite` in `src/js/node/_http2_upgrade.ts` treats any truthy `$write` result as success. A TLS handle never returns a negative errno today, so that path is unaffected. </details>

…ed records dropped, http2 unchanged A TLS write now learns of a rejected send() through us_internal_classify_failed_send, the classification plain TCP already uses, on every platform. The records SSL_write sealed for the failed write are discarded, so a retry cannot send the same plaintext twice and a close that follows has nothing undeliverable to wait for. The HTTP/2 frame parser does not take the report over TLS. Its reaction to a fatal write is to close the transport, which dropped a response that had arrived before the reset and gave the session EBADF. Bun.connect write() and end() return the documented -1 for a fatal send. This replaces this branch's own variant of the report.

robobun · 2026-10-01T01:00:53Z

Correction: #43705 no longer carries this change (head 3c6598b416).

For a few hours #43705 included the code of this PR, because it deferred a peer reset for TLS sockets too, and such a socket learns of the reset only from its next write. A review of #43705 said that this send report is its own change and must land on its own. #43705 now defers the reset for plain TCP node:net sockets only, whose write already reports a rejected send() on main. A TLS socket keeps the behavior of main there.

The TLS half of #43705 waits for this PR. It is on the branch robobun/1d28c412/defer-reset-with-tls (d8b0408109): this PR's code merged with main at ad60a9b7bb, the same report for a write to the net.Socket under a TLS socket (us_socket_raw_write_check_error), and a second HTTP/2 test for a response that arrived before the reset. On that branch the four tests of this PR passed on every CI lane, Windows x64 and aarch64 included (build 122105).

This branch conflicts with main and needs a rebase.

… goes back to #42336 A TLS write does not report a rejected send() on main, so a TLS socket that left the reset in the kernel would never learn of it. That report is #42336 and lands on its own. Until it does, a TLS socket keeps the terminal error of main, and this branch no longer carries that report, the HTTP/2 exemption or the Bun.connect write() return value. The opt-out for Windows is by OS: the receive queue is gone after a reset there, whatever the poll backend is.

…3957) Follow-up to #43947, which is merged. Rebased on main. ### Problem - After `shutdown()` or `end()` during a handshake the socket still seals handshake records. `us_socket_raw_write` sends nothing after a FIN, so `ssl_flush_write_batch` (`packages/bun-usockets/src/crypto/openssl.c`) parks them as a spill that can never drain. - `us_internal_ssl_close` waits for that spill, so the socket never closes. The spill holds the loop's one spill slot, so the next half-closed handshake never finishes. - No report is linked. 1.4.2 reaches it through `socket.shutdown()`, node:tls since #42181 (not released). ### Fix - `ssl_flush_write_batch` and the unbatched path of `BIO_s_custom_write` drop records that the socket can never send. - One predicate, `us_internal_socket_can_raw_write`, gates the raw writes, the raw shutdown and both drops. - Correct because these records can never reach the peer. Node completes the same handshakes. - Verified: 12 new tests, 10 fail without this change when run alone. Node v26.3.0 passes 34 of 34. Self-reviewed: 16 concerns raised, 14 addressed. ### Background - A spill is the part of a batch that the kernel did not take. The loop has one spill slot. - While the slot is taken, every socket writes record by record. - Considered a close that ignores the spill, as #43946 does for a forceful close. The slot stays taken until the close. ### Downsides - A slow reader still takes the spill slot. This PR removes only the owner that never lets go. - The peer never gets the dropped records. Nor does it on the base or on Node. - Release `.text`: 58154908 to 58153884 B. Each flush costs 1 more direct call. <details><summary>Notes</summary> **Cases, each test run alone, on the head of #43947 before its merge (771b423) and with this change** Each socket calls `shutdown()` or `end()` while its handshake runs. The peer keeps the connection open. | Case | #43947 | This PR | |---|---|---| | `Bun.listen`, `requestCert`, `rejectUnauthorized: true`, TLS 1.2, untrusted client | `handshake(true, authorized=false, error)`, the socket never closes | same report, then close | | Same, trusted client (control) | stays open until the client ends the connection, then both close | same | | Both rows, while another socket waits for a slow reader | the handshake never reports | same as the two rows above | | Two `Bun.connect` clients, TLS 1.3 | `close` never fires | both report the handshake, both close | | `Bun.connect` client, TLS 1.2, ended after the server's first flight | `close` never fires | `handshake(false)`, close | | `Bun.connect` client that writes to a second TLS socket from its handshake callback | `close` never fires | the write arrives, close | | Two `tls.connect` clients, the first (TLS 1.3 or TLS 1.2) stays open | the second never emits `secureConnect` | it emits it, as on Node v26.3.0 | | `tls.createServer`, TLS 1.2, `end()` in the handshake, untrusted client (control) | both sockets close | same | | Four `tls.connect` sockets after one such handshake in the same process | flight and first write leave in 2 segments | 1 segment | Run in one process, more tests fail on #43947 than the table shows: a test that times out leaves the socket that holds the spill slot. That is also the only way in which `TLS 1.3 client sees 'end', not ECONNRESET, when the server tears down right after rejecting its certificate (#40653)` failed. No CI run has shown the lost batching. The two-client probe gives the same result on the released 1.4.2 (`1.4.2+744846f84`): the second client never reports its handshake. **Mechanism** - With batching the handshake records go into the batch, and `ssl_flush_write_batch` sends them. After a FIN `us_socket_raw_write` returns 0. The flush parked all of it as a spill and took the spill slot. A spill drains from the writable event, and a socket that sent its FIN gets none. - `us_internal_ssl_close` defers a close with code 0 or 2 while the socket has a spill. - Batching needs a free slot (`hs_batching` in `us_internal_ssl_on_data`, `batching` in `us_internal_ssl_write`). With the slot taken, `BIO_s_custom_write` writes each record at once. After a FIN that write returns 0, the BIO asks for a retry, and `SSL_do_handshake` answers `SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE` until the socket closes. - Three places turn a short raw write into a wait for a writable event: the unbatched write, the flush, and `ssl_drain_spill`. The first two now drop. `ssl_drain_spill` has no guard on purpose: `us_internal_ssl_shutdown` defers the FIN behind a spill, and a close releases the spill, so a socket that sent its FIN has no spill to drain. **Why a drop is correct** - SSL counts a sealed record as written. It cannot be sent again, and after the FIN it cannot be sent at all. - The base already reports a completed handshake for the first half-closed socket on a loop: the batch takes the records and the report runs before the flush. The drop makes the second socket, and a socket next to a slow reader, behave like the first. - `us_internal_ssl_write` refuses application data after a FIN, and `ssl_handle_shutdown` sends no close_notify after one. So only handshake records and alerts reach the new branches. **Not in this PR** - A slow reader takes the spill slot like before. The slot is state of the loop, and a spill per connection is a different design. - A close on an open socket whose peer never reads still waits for its spill. That spill can drain. - A `send` that the kernel refuses with `ECONNRESET` or `EPIPE` still parks a spill. That needs the error of the raw write (#42336, #34510), not the state of the socket. - An `allowHalfOpen` socket that shut down during its handshake stays open after the peer's close_notify until the peer's FIN (since 1.4.1, #40384). Main does the same, and it does not reach the new branches. - #43946 changes what a forceful close does with a batch that is still held. It does not cover records that are sealed after a FIN. - `end()` from the `'connect'` listener sends the FIN before the ClientHello. Node sends the ClientHello first. **Self-review** Rejected, with the reason: - Move the tests that fail by a timeout into child processes. With this change no test times out. `afterAll` now releases what a timed-out test left, so the tests after the block are not affected. - A test for the case with no relay. The peer has to keep the connection open after our FIN, and a relay is how a test decides that. **Measurements** Call counts are gdb breakpoint hit counts on debug builds with the debug info stripped. Sizes are from release builds of both trees. - Healthy handshake, 100 in-process `Bun.listen` / `Bun.connect` connections: `SSL_do_handshake` 600 and 600, `BIO_s_custom_write` 700 and 700, `ssl_flush_write_batch` 300 and 300, `bsd_send` 600 and 600, `bsd_recv` 600 and 600, `us_internal_socket_close_raw` 200 and 200. - Both new branches are behind a write that the wire did not take in full. A socket that can write pays one more compare there, and nothing on a full write. - Release `.text`: 58154908 to 58153884 B (`size -A`). Stripped `bun`: 80844320 B both. `ssl_flush_write_batch` grows from 214 to 254 B and is no longer inlined into its callers: `BIO_s_custom_write` 683 to 512 B, `us_internal_ssl_close` 1195 to 999 B, `us_internal_ssl_on_data` 2651 to 2240 B, `us_internal_ssl_shutdown` 608 to 412 B. So each flush is one direct call more in a release build, 3 per healthy connection pair. - The shared predicate changes no size: `us_socket_raw_write` 178 B, `us_socket_raw_writev` 356 B and `us_internal_socket_raw_shutdown` 85 B before and after. - Allocations: the change adds none, and a dropped flight saves the `us_malloc` of its spill. **Tests** - `test/js/bun/net/socket.test.ts`: 8 new tests, 17 with "while the handshake runs" in the name. Run alone on #43947, 7 of the 8 fail, and the trusted TLS 1.2 client is the control. - `test/js/node/tls/node-tls-duplex-end-verify.test.ts`: 3 new tests. Run alone on #43947, 2 fail, and the TLS 1.2 server is the control. Node v26.3.0 passes 34 of 34 (`node --test`). - `test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts`: 1 new test, the one-segment flight. It fails on #43947 with 3 chunks for each connection. - The block was run 5 times on this change: 5 passes. - `test/js/node/tls/` and `test/js/bun/net/` together (728 tests): no failure is only on this change. Failures on the base too: `SNICallback runs even when the requested servername matches the bind hostname`, `should not call drain before handshake`, and tests that wait for a garbage collection. - After the rebase on main (ecf3490, with #43947 merged) the two directories have 802 tests, and 6 fail: 4 tests that wait for a garbage collection or for workers, a cluster test, and `should not call drain before handshake`. Each of them fails on main on the test machine too. Before that rebase, on e375701, the two directories had 765 tests. 6 fail, the same 6 as on #43947 at that base. In one process, #43947 at that base fails 8 of the 17 tests with "while the handshake runs" in the name, and the one-segment test. - The vendored `test-tls-*`, `test-https-*`, `test-http2-*` and `test-net-*` files: 660 pass, and the 3 that fail do so on #43924 too. This is a check for regressions only: no vendored file changes its result with this PR. </details> --------- Co-authored-by: Dylan Conway <dylan.conway567@gmail.com>

Jarred-Sumner · 2026-10-06T06:18:35Z

Superseded by #44618, which consolidates the open TLS pull requests. This fix and its tests are in there, either as written, rewritten smaller, or merged with the other PRs that patched the same cause (see the "By area" list in that PR). Closing in favor of it.

…_check_error (#42336, #34510) Pure move. The TLS write path needs the same answer for its raw sends.

…essure (#34510, #38176, #42336) Every failed TLS write came back as "0 bytes, wait for writable": - send() rejected (EPIPE, ECONNRESET, ...): us_socket_raw_write folded -1 to 0 and re-armed writable. The kernel kept reporting writable, so the loop spun at 100% CPU (#24845), and a real reset ended as a clean close with the lost write reported as done. - SSL_write failed, or sealed records were lost to an allocation failure: the socket was marked fatal and nothing ever closed it. - SSL_write failed on a later 16 KiB record of one write: a plain partial write. A rejected send() of sealed records now ends the write side (the state our own FIN already has, so the BIO and the batch flush drop what can no longer leave) and asks for one writable event. There, outside any caller's write, the socket closes with an error, unless the peer's earlier bytes are still queued: then the read side delivers them first (a 413 sent before the server reset an upload). A fatal socket is closed at the same boundary. us_socket_write_check_error reports both: the errno of the send, or EPROTO, so node:tls fails the write like Node and Bun.connect's write()/end() return the documented -1. No new per-socket state: one int of loop scratch carries the errno from the raw send to the write that is still on the stack.

…_check_error (#42336, #34510) Pure move. The TLS write path needs the same answer for its raw sends.

…essure (#34510, #38176, #42336) Every failed TLS write came back as "0 bytes, wait for writable": - send() rejected (EPIPE, ECONNRESET, ...): us_socket_raw_write folded -1 to 0 and re-armed writable. The kernel kept reporting writable, so the loop spun at 100% CPU (#24845), and a real reset ended as a clean close with the lost write reported as done. - SSL_write failed, or sealed records were lost to an allocation failure: the socket was marked fatal and nothing ever closed it. - SSL_write failed on a later 16 KiB record of one write: a plain partial write. A rejected send() of sealed records now ends the write side (the state our own FIN already has, so the BIO and the batch flush drop what can no longer leave) and asks for one writable event. There, outside any caller's write, the socket closes with an error, unless the peer's earlier bytes are still queued: then the read side delivers them first (a 413 sent before the server reset an upload). A fatal socket is closed at the same boundary. us_socket_write_check_error reports both: the errno of the send, or EPROTO, so node:tls fails the write like Node and Bun.connect's write()/end() return the documented -1. No new per-socket state: one int of loop scratch carries the errno from the raw send to the write that is still on the stack.

…_check_error (#42336, #34510) Pure move. The TLS write path needs the same answer for its raw sends.

…essure (#34510, #38176, #42336) Every failed TLS write came back as "0 bytes, wait for writable": - send() rejected (EPIPE, ECONNRESET, ...): us_socket_raw_write folded -1 to 0 and re-armed writable. The kernel kept reporting writable, so the loop spun at 100% CPU (#24845), and a real reset ended as a clean close with the lost write reported as done. - SSL_write failed, or sealed records were lost to an allocation failure: the socket was marked fatal and nothing ever closed it. - SSL_write failed on a later 16 KiB record of one write: a plain partial write. A rejected send() of sealed records now ends the write side (the state our own FIN already has, so the BIO and the batch flush drop what can no longer leave) and asks for one writable event. There, outside any caller's write, the socket closes with an error, unless the peer's earlier bytes are still queued: then the read side delivers them first (a 413 sent before the server reset an upload). A fatal socket is closed at the same boundary. us_socket_write_check_error reports both: the errno of the send, or EPROTO, so node:tls fails the write like Node and Bun.connect's write()/end() return the documented -1. No new per-socket state: one int of loop scratch carries the errno from the raw send to the write that is still on the stack.

…_check_error (#42336, #34510) Pure move. The TLS write path needs the same answer for its raw sends.

…essure (#34510, #38176, #42336) Every failed TLS write came back as "0 bytes, wait for writable": - send() rejected (EPIPE, ECONNRESET, ...): us_socket_raw_write folded -1 to 0 and re-armed writable. The kernel kept reporting writable, so the loop spun at 100% CPU (#24845), and a real reset ended as a clean close with the lost write reported as done. - SSL_write failed, or sealed records were lost to an allocation failure: the socket was marked fatal and nothing ever closed it. - SSL_write failed on a later 16 KiB record of one write: a plain partial write. A rejected send() of sealed records now ends the write side (the state our own FIN already has, so the BIO and the batch flush drop what can no longer leave) and asks for one writable event. There, outside any caller's write, the socket closes with an error, unless the peer's earlier bytes are still queued: then the read side delivers them first (a 413 sent before the server reset an upload). A fatal socket is closed at the same boundary. us_socket_write_check_error reports both: the errno of the send, or EPROTO, so node:tls fails the write like Node and Bun.connect's write()/end() return the documented -1. No new per-socket state: one int of loop scratch carries the errno from the raw send to the write that is still on the stack.

…ps, WebSocket, SQL) (#44618) ### What does this PR do? Consolidates the open TLS pull requests into one. Each was reproduced on `main` and, for `node:*` behavior, on Node v26.3.0 first. About a third are ported as written, the rest are rewritten smaller or merged into one fix where several PRs patched the same cause. One commit per fix, so it can be read commit by commit. Fixes #43520, fixes #31396, fixes #43635, fixes #37193, fixes #43846, fixes #17932, fixes #41061, fixes #36887, fixes #31810, fixes #35240, fixes #32234, fixes #44365, fixes #43807, fixes #42280, fixes #44517. Addresses #41856 (SNI and `servername`; not `checkServerIdentity` for SQL), #24845 (the spin is gone, shown with fault injection on Linux; not run on macOS), #19754 (node-fetch forwards the agent's TLS options; the Kubernetes client itself was not run). #### The ones that matter most | | On `main` | PRs | |---|---|---| | Client certificate disclosure | `https.request()` with a client certificate sends it to a server it then refuses (wrong name, `checkServerIdentity`, `destroy()` in `'secureConnect'`, `terminate()` in `handshake`). A server can force it with a junk record behind its Finished | #43946 | | False `authorized` | Over a Duplex, `secureConnect` with `authorized === true` for a peer that failed the key proof; `secureConnect` for a plaintext peer with `rejectUnauthorized: false` | #44422, #32929 | | Cleartext https | `https.createServer()` without a usable key/cert answers plain HTTP | #41672, #33539 | | Revoked client certificates | An https mTLS server never sees `crl`, so a revoked client is `authorized` | #41641 | | Pooled sockets | Requests with different client certificates or CAs share an `https.Agent` socket and session | #42498 | | Silent plaintext | `tls: [...]` given to `Bun.listen` / `Bun.connect` is plain TCP | #41490 | | Server weakened by a client knob | `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0` turns off a server's client-certificate enforcement | #35245 | | Pins never checked | `WebSocket` never calls `tls.checkServerIdentity` and ignores `tls.serverName` | #41648 | | `verify-full` dropped | `PGSSLMODE=verify-*` is lost next to a `TLS_*` URL variable; `tls: true` sends no SNI | #44498 | | Crashes | use-after-free from `destroy()` in `ALPNCallback` over a Duplex; `abort()` on a late `setSession()`; SIGABRT in `fetch` with an https proxy from the environment and a `Bun.file()` body | #44462, #41671, #44458 | | Stream corruption | A TLS `write()` can lose 16 KiB it reported as written while another socket on the loop is stalled | #44529 | | Hangs and spins | 100% CPU on a failing `send()`; a fatal `SSL_write` leaves the socket open forever; `idleTimeout` never sheds a TLS client that ignores `close_notify` | #34510, #38176, #42336 | | Wrong certificate (regression since 1.3.14) | Connections accepted before `stop()` / `close()` get the default certificate and skip their entry's `requestCert` / `ca` | #42355 | | Quadratic Duplex / proxy tunnel | Reading one chunk over a Duplex, CPU: 8 MB 0.88 s → 0.14 s, 16 MB 3.18 s → 0.23 s, 32 MB 11.75 s → 0.39 s; `fetch` upload through CONNECT: 1.7 s → 0.18 s (debug build) | #44464 | #### By area - **fd engine, write path** (`openssl.c`, `socket.c`): #42352, #34510 + #38176 + #42336 as one change, #44529, #44458, #44192. A rejected `send()` ends the write side only and closes at the next writable event unless the peer's bytes are still queued (a 413 sent before a reset is still read). No new per-socket state. Also, on kqueue, **a FIN no longer ends a socket that waits in the low-priority queue** (`loop.c`): with more than 5 TLS handshakes at once, a client that ended right after its handshake could be reset and its server socket report `socket hang up`, because the eof that the sentinel read knote reports was acted on ahead of the unread Finished. That is on `main` too (the macOS entry for `node-tls-server.test.ts` in `test/flaky-tests.txt`: 7 of 48 recent builds of other branches), and this branch made it likelier (6 of 8 builds), since Finished now leaves in one segment with the close_notify. - **Error reporting, both engines**: #44422, #32929, #44516, #37094, #41272 + #42324 + #44223 as one change, #44021, #37472, #43946, #33630. One channel: a fatal error on an established session is reported, then **the engine closes the connection itself**, whatever the owner does with the report. `test/js/bun/net/tls-fatal-error-closes.test.ts` asserts closed-and-nothing-delivered for every owner (node:tls, `Bun.connect`, `Bun.listen`, `fetch` direct and through CONNECT, `Bun.serve`, `WebSocket` direct and through a proxy, Postgres, MySQL, Valkey, Duplex). - **Duplex engine** (`SSLWrapper`, `UpgradedDuplex`): #44462, #43529, #42332, #44464. #43877 + #44394 were in and are **out again**, see "Worth a look" 5. - **node:tls wrap lifecycle** (`net.ts`, `tls.ts`): #38007, #38058, #38028 + #38122 + #38076 as one change (six copies of the attach code become two helpers), #38311, #39008, #38154, #42340 + #42343 + #42339 + #42453 as one change, #43791, #42425, #44085, #42683, #39088, #39040, #40375, and what was still real of #36534. - **SNI, ALPN, server contexts**: #43080, #42050, #37195 + #43849 as one change (**one** SNI matcher for TCP and HTTP/3), #42355, #42285, #33253, part of #37896, part of #37013. A `tls.Server` has one `SSL_CTX`. - **Verification and options**: #44738, #41490, #37005 + the cwd pin of #40984, #31811, #43982, #33483 + #35245, #41810, #32235, #44441, #38092. - **node:tls API and CA store**: #41671, #38145, #32824, #43594, #39997, #41696, #33534, #34748, #42991, #42996, #42970. - **node:https, Agent, `ws`, node-fetch**: #41672 (https half), #41641, #38261, #42498, #44346, #35609, #31397, #42325. - **WebSocket client**: #41648, #37487 + #43048 as one change. - **SQL, Redis**: #33666, #41711, #44498, part of #42054. - **Tests only**: #41426, #40040, #44395, #44016, #37860, #40591, #44440, #41424. Found on the way and fixed here: an upload that a TLS 1.2 server interrupts with a renegotiation never completes on `main` (0 of 32 runs over `https.request`, `fetch`, `node:tls` and `Bun.connect`: the renegotiation ClientHello lands inside an application record that is still unsent, or the socket gets no `drain` again) and completes here, with two tests from robobun; the fix for #40653 (final flight and first write in one segment) stopped working whenever another TLS socket on the loop was stalled, on `main` too; the `tls.Server` prototype pinned the last server constructed and every `SSL_CTX` it owned; `Object.create(process.env).NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED = "0"` turned verification off process-wide once a `SHARE_ENV` worker existed; two debug panics when wrapping a shut-down or still-connecting socket; a `fetch` POST through a proxy sent its headers twice when the origin renegotiated; `BlockList` ignored IPv6 zone ids; a test now ties `root_certs.der` to `certdata.txt`. #### Behavior changes - **A server's `ca` without `requestCert` no longer asks for a client certificate** (`Bun.serve`, `Bun.listen`, HTTP/3, node:tls). It matches the docs and Node. On `main` such a server refused clients with no certificate but served any unrelated self-signed one, so it was never authentication. **Set `requestCert: true` to require a certificate.** A matrix test pins that `requestCert: true` still refuses no certificate and an untrusted one on 8 kinds of server, TLS 1.2 and 1.3, with `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED` unset and `0`. - `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0` no longer relaxes a server. - `Bun.connect` / `Bun.listen` hear of a fatal TLS error after the handshake through `error(socket, err)`. With no `error` handler the socket just closes. - HTTP/3 server names match like TCP: `*.` covers exactly one label, case is ignored, a trailing dot is ignored, the last registration of a name wins. - `requestCert` on node:https is `=== true`, as in Node. - An array where a generated options dictionary is expected throws (`tls: []`, `jest.useFakeTimers([])`). - `key` / `cert` arrays serve every identity. A client that can use both gets ECDSA, where `main` served whichever pair came last. - `ecdhCurve` is forwarded by node:https, `ws` and node-fetch now, so a group BoringSSL lacks (`X448`) throws there as it already does in `tls.createServer`. - A wrapped socket's error is re-emitted on the TLS socket as in Node, so `raw.destroy(err)` with a listener on `raw` only is uncaught, as in Node. - `sql.options.tls` is always an object, never `true`. `RedisClient` sends SNI. - `tls: { secureContext }` alone asks for TLS on `Bun.listen` / `Bun.connect` (it was plain TCP), and a value that is not a `SecureContext` throws. The context is served as it is: the `requestCert` / `rejectUnauthorized` it was created with hold whatever the options next to it say, and `requestCert` in the options over a context that does not ask throws at `listen()`. - `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS` reaches every client once assigned (`fetch`, `WebSocket`, `Bun.connect`, `RedisClient`, `Bun.SQL`, `S3Client`, proxy tunnels) and servers again. A list that selects no cipher throws `ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_MATCH` at the assignment. `fetch.preconnect()` dials nothing after an assignment. - The warning for an unreadable `NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS` is Node's one line, without the `warn:` prefix. - `BUN_CONFIG_WS_CLOSE_TIMEOUT` (default 30 s): how long a `WebSocket` client waits for the server to close the connection after the closing handshake. #### Worth a look in review 1. **#44529**: the kernel-refused remainder of a TLS write moves from the loop's one slot onto the connection (in the existing rare struct), so the write BIO never refuses a sealed record. Nothing is allocated on an unstalled path (200 writes: 0 appends, same `send()` count as `main`), memory with 16 stalled writers is lower than on `main` (276 KB vs 340 KB, which `main` holds inside BoringSSL's buffers), `us_socket_t` stays 80 bytes. It needs a bound on how long a deferred close waits, or a peer that stops reading pins the fd past `destroy()`: `US_SSL_CLOSE_AFTER_SPILL_TIMEOUT` is a fixed 10 s, not re-armed on progress. Separate commits, but the fix that keeps the client certificate off the wire beside a stalled socket builds on them. 2. **The default name check of node:tls also runs inside the handshake**, so a wrong-name server gets no client certificate on TLS 1.2 either. JS still runs it after every successful handshake, so a difference between the two matchers can only refuse. Error objects are byte-identical. 3. **#44441** widens trust by design: a self-issued leaf whose `keyUsage` lacks `keyCertSign` (`dotnet dev-certs`) is its own anchor when the store holds a byte-identical copy. No BoringSSL change. Expired pin, same subject with another key, wrong EKU and a pinned intermediate are tested to fail. 4. **#32235** only adds Ed25519 and ECDSA P-521 to the verify list. A captured ClientHello shows `main`'s list with the two inserted; `rsa_pkcs1_sha1` stays. 5. **A stream that a TLS socket wraps, when that TLS socket closes.** An earlier state of this branch lost data here while CI was green (found by #44709's report): with the peer closing first, 4 of 8 MiB arrived with TLS in TLS, 4 of 32 MiB on the http2 `emit("connection")` path, and a `write()` with no `'error'` listener ended the process. Three Node-parity changes only hold together: destroying the wrapped stream at the close (#38028 + #38122 + #38076, #38154) is safe only if every write has really completed (#43877), which in turn needs Node's handling of the peer's close_notify, which needs half-open sockets that the GC can collect. So: - #43877 + #44394 are reverted and reopened. A write over a stream completes once the stream has taken the ciphertext, as on `main`. - Until the verdict on the peer lets the session through, the application cannot have written over it. There the wrapped stream is destroyed as in Node, with the sessions below it. That keeps the release of the connection after a failed handshake, a rejected certificate and an early `destroy()`. The same for an http2 socket the application never got, and for `resetAndDestroy()`. - After that it is `main`'s teardown: a `net.Socket` only gets the engine's `end()`, closes at its peer's FIN, keeps its own timeout and reports its own errors. Any other stream is destroyed with the TLS socket. The regular suites cannot see any of this (999 files were green on every broken variant), so it was steered by eleven seeded differential fuzzers run on this build, `main`, Node v26.3.0 and the earlier state: close, `end()`, `destroy()`, `destroySoon()`, resets, hung and half-open peers, paused writers, timeouts, two and three sessions deep, over TCP and over Duplexes, before, at and after the handshake, and http2 requests. See "How did you verify". #### Known limits - `fetch` with a `checkServerIdentity` function still sends the client certificate (not the request) to a server the function refuses. On TLS 1.2 any verdict a JS callback gives is too late, as in Node. - `addContext()` / `SNICallback` still do not apply to a server-side socket on the stream engine (`emit("connection", duplex)`, TLS in TLS, unflushed writes, named pipes), as on `main`. - A CA bundled in a pfx extends an explicit `ca` only, for `ws` / node-fetch / `WebSocket`: the native `ca` can only replace the default store, and that store keeps `SSL_CERT_FILE` / `SSL_CERT_DIR`. - P-521 leaves work on TLS 1.3 only. TLS 1.2 needs secp521r1 in every ClientHello (`it.todo`). - Once `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS` is assigned, `fetch(url, { protocol: "http3" })` is `HTTP3Unsupported`, as with an explicit `ciphers`. - `addCACert()` by hand does not extend the chains of a context with several identities. - A throwing `ALPNCallback` sends `no_application_protocol` on both engines. Node sends nothing and its client sees `ECONNRESET`. - TLS in TLS, peer FIN while the outer handshake runs: the inner socket gets one `write EPIPE`, where Node gives `ECONNRESET` (`main` gives it no error at all). - `@SECLEVEL` in `ciphers` is dropped by the `ws` / node-fetch shims, which used to ignore `ciphers`. node:tls keeps throwing `ERR_SSL_INVALID_COMMAND`. - Beside a stalled TLS socket only the first record (16 KiB) of the first write leaves with the handshake flight. The rest goes record by record, which is what bounds the memory of stalled writers. - After a fatal error on an established session the socket emits `'error'` and then `'close'`. Node emits `'error'` and leaves the socket open. - A paused reader whose own write the kernel rejects loses what it had not read yet, with an `EPIPE`, as on Node. `main` reports no error there and delivers it. - On `main` too: a `Bun.listen` socket without `allowHalfOpen` that has unsent ciphertext when the client's `shutdown()` arrives loses that ciphertext (32 KiB), and over plain TCP `end()` with the peer still sending is a close over unread input, so a reset. - Differences from both `main` and Node that the differential runs below found and that stay, all with a peer that aborts: `ECONNRESET` instead of a clean `'end'` after the socket's own `'finish'` when the peer destroyed with unread data; under TLS 1.2, a zero-length `write()` followed by `destroy()` in `'secureConnection'` leaves the client without `'secureConnect'` (a plain `destroy()` there matches Node); a TLS 1.2 client that destroys in `'secureConnect'` gets no `'session'`; a `ClientRequest` whose handshake fails with an alert emits `'error'` and `'close'` but no `'finish'` (`writableFinished` is true). - Once `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS` is assigned, `fetch.preconnect()` opens nothing: `fetch()` then uses a context of its own, and a socket warmed under the default one would never be picked up. - A TLS `send()` that the kernel refuses outside a `write()` call (the drain of unsent ciphertext) is reported with the close, as `read EPIPE` / `read ECONNRESET`. Node says `write EPIPE`. `main` does not report it at all. - Once the application has a session over a `net.Socket` (TLS in TLS, http2 `emit("connection")`), a peer that never sends its FIN holds that socket after the TLS socket closed, as on `main`. Node destroys it. Two tests of #38154 are `todo` for this. Closing it any earlier (at its `'finish'`, say) makes the kernel drop what it has not sent yet as soon as the peer's close_notify arrives. - Plaintext that was queued on a socket before it was wrapped (STARTTLS with a backlog) is dropped when the TLS socket is destroyed, or its handshake fails, before the session is accepted. Node drops it too, except on `destroySoon()`. `main` sends it. - Over a stream that is no `net.Socket`, `end()` can still cut what that stream has buffered, and there is no backpressure, both as on `main` (#43877). - `tls.secureContext` (the undocumented door node:tls uses) is not read by a Windows named pipe listener, which builds its context from the options. On `upgradeTLS({ isServer: true })` the options next to it are the policy, as with Node's `SetVerifyMode`. - `selectServerName()` rebuilds the name tree per ClientHello for injected sockets of a server with `addContext()` entries: 0.4 µs for 1 entry, 3.7 µs for 10, 41 µs for 100, against 631–1111 µs for a handshake. #### Not included Left open, because they need a decision or are not TLS: #43877 + #44394 (see "Worth a look" 5; #43874 stays open with them), #38548, #38591 (both shrink who is trusted), #41589 (`verify-full` vs `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0`), #37197, #41706, #43216, #33487, #33545, #36707, #32435, #37255, #28691, #40275, #30314 (features), #38120 (needs the BoringSSL fork, as did #33517, which the stale bot has closed since), #38529 (needs a Windows measurement), #34342, #38232, #43089, #44454, #40451, #42710, #44527, #38088, #38093, #41898. #37896, #42054 and #37013 stay open for the halves not taken. `http.createServer({ key, cert })` keeps serving TLS on purpose. One open question: `tls: {}` (an object that names no TLS option) is plain TCP on `Bun.listen` / `Bun.connect`, here and on `main`. It is the same trap as `tls: []`, but changing it changes a Bun default, so it is left alone. ### How did you verify your code works? - Every new test fails on `main` for the stated reason and passes here, except guards that pin existing behavior, each shown to fail when its clause is removed. `node:*` tests also pass on Node v26.3.0; the few that cannot say which Node version has the behavior. - 212 test files that touch TLS, sockets, http, http2, fetch, WebSocket, SQL, Valkey and workers: 6154 pass, 2 fail. Both are seen on `main` too: `serve.test.ts` "root range port" (the box runs as root), and `worker_threads.test.ts` "terminate(): nothing of the worker's runs after the request", which is flaky there and passed in the run below. - 58 of those files the way the ASAN lane runs them (LeakSanitizer + `BUN_JSC_validateExceptionChecks`): 58 files, 48 of them with leak checking, 4132 pass, 3 fail. All three also fail on `main`: `serve.test.ts` "root range port", `node-net.test.ts` "should not leak when connect({path}) fails synchronously on a reused handle" (times out under this environment), `worker_threads.test.ts` "process.exit() with a shell cp in flight" (a `ShellCpTask` leak). - 647 vendored `test-tls-*`, `test-https-*`, `test-net-*`, `test-http2-*`: the only two failures also fail on `main`. - The SNI matcher was diffed against both old matchers: 3 seeds × 1.23 M lookups × 3 registration flavours, every difference in one of the intended classes, TCP and HTTP/3 identical on every lookup. - The headline rows were also driven by hand with scripts against this build, `main` and Node v26.3.0: cleartext https, `crl`, `tls: []` / `{ secureContext }`, the `ca` / `requestCert` matrix, the client certificate on a wrong-name server, late `setSession()`, `destroy()` in `ALPNCallback`, `[rsa, ec]` identities with an intermediate from `ca`, `WebSocket` `checkServerIdentity`, a corrupted record, the Duplex read above, `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS`. - The `setSession()` guard was checked against the real `abort()` at 43 handshake states. - `bun run rust:check-all`: 12 of 12 targets. `tsc`, oxlint, source lints, prettier, rustfmt, mordant clean. - usockets' `_Nonnull` is compiled out of debug builds, so 105 of those files were also run on a local release ASAN build with the CI runner's environment (92 with leak checking): 4595 pass, 1 fail, `child_process.test.ts` "spawn reports EPERM after dropping privileges", which cannot pass as root and fails on `main` too. - The close of a TLS socket over another stream ("Worth a look" 5): eleven seeded differential fuzzers, 8,424 scenarios compared, each run on a release ASAN build of this branch, on `main`, on Node v26.3.0 and on the earlier state of the branch. Against `main`: - Data that `main` delivers in full is cut in 5 scenarios, and about 150 that `main` cuts arrive in full. Of the 5, in 2 `main` never notices the peer's close and keeps the socket for good, 2 call `end()` on the middle one of three sessions over an in-memory Duplex, and 1 does the same on Node. - No dead timeout, no silent reset and no uncaught error that `main` does not have (4 uncaught errors fewer). - A socket stays open where `main` closes it in 109, and closes where `main` keeps it in 295. 92 of the 109 do the same on Node or on the earlier state (a `destroy()` that an in-memory Duplex does not show its peer, half-open peers). 14 wait for a peer that paused reading and so does not read the FIN (#42332's backpressure, as in Node); the socket's own timeout fires there. 3 are left: one on a 5 ms timer, two with three sessions over an in-memory Duplex. - The earlier state of the branch cut data in 173 of the 400 scenarios of one of them, where `main` cuts none and this cuts none. - 23 new tests pin what they found. Each earlier attempt at this fix fails the ones that describe it, the earlier state of the branch fails 7, and all pass on Node. - After that change: 999 test files on the release ASAN build (20,246 pass; the 11 files that fail need a database, Docker, DNS or a non-root user, or share a temp directory with a parallel run and pass alone), 61 on the debug build. - TLS over a file descriptor (`openssl.c`, the path of `fetch`, `Bun.serve`, `tls.connect`, `Bun.connect`) got the same treatment after the rebase: seeded differential fuzzers on CI's release build of this branch, on `main` and, for `node:*`, on Node v26.3.0. Every runtime also against itself for the noise floor, injected faults and known bugs of `main` as positive controls, and a difference counts only if it shows in 5 of 5 fresh processes. - `node:tls` over TCP: 11,500 scenarios (one connection with Node as the oracle line by line; 2 to 60 connections beside stalled neighbours; raw peers that break the handshake). HTTPS: about 136,000 runs over `Bun.serve` + `fetch`, `node:https`, `node:http2` and `wss://`, also with the two ends in different runtimes. `Bun.connect` / `Bun.listen` / `upgradeTLS`: 11,500 scenarios and 720 slow connections, with writers driven by what `write()` returns, beside up to 6 stalled, dripping, closing or resetting neighbours, and plain TCP as a second oracle. No crash, hang, duplication, reordering or silent truncation, and no change in time or in connection reuse. - They found six things that `main` does better, none of which any test showed. All are fixed, each with a test that fails on the build before: what the peer sent lost behind a rejected `send()` (23 scenarios, and an early HTTPS response lost with only `EPIPE`), the same silently for a paused reader, `server.close()` never calling back on a half-open server after a ClientHello and a reset (17), `closeAllConnections()` taking 12 s with a stalled client, `end()` losing up to 1.3 of 4 MiB that `write()` had reported while the peer still uploads, and `end()` a little after a stall never closing beside other stalled TLS sockets. The last two fixes also deliver the 1 to 2 MiB that `main` loses there, and close the socket that `main` keeps for good without such neighbours. - All of them again after every fix, on CI's release build of it. That caught one regression of a fix itself (a reader stopped for backpressure lost 86,385 bytes, 1 of 6,000 scenarios), fixed too. On the last build: scenarios that lose data where `main` does not 23 → 2, and Node loses it in both, with the same `EPIPE`; `server.close()` that never calls back 17 → 0; connections held 4 → 0; requests that end in an error only where `main` has a response 6 → 0. With a Node server in another process, a request ends in an error only in 8 and 10 of 1,500 scenarios here, 5 and 3 on `main`, 10 with Node as the client. - `Bun.connect` / `Bun.listen` on the last build against `main`, in scenarios: hangs 0 against 1,031, sockets and fds never released 0 against 965, corrupted data 0 against 345, `abort()` 0 against 26 (`setSession()` after the handshake), writers that never close 0 against 101 of 720 connections. No kind of failure shows here and not on `main`. About a third of the slow connections close later than on `main`, in 1 to 16 s instead of at once, waiting for unsent ciphertext or for the peer's close_notify, and 79 more of them deliver all that `write()` reported. RSS and time with 16 to 256 stalled writers are the same. - What they found that `main` does worse: a `WebSocket` that calls `close()` with sends pending loses messages in 81 of 999 scenarios (0 here), 37 server sockets left open, 10 `server.close()` that never call back, 20 write callbacks that never run. - The kqueue fix cannot be run on Linux. The `connectionListener` count test now says what became of a missing connection, which is how the cause was found (`'tlsClientError'` "socket hang up", then `read ECONNRESET` at the client of the same port, after its `'secureConnect'`). On macOS x64 it failed every attempt of the three builds before the fix and passed at the first attempt of the build with it. - Windows and macOS were only run by CI. Four new tests asserted what only the Linux kernel does (a FIN read ahead of a reset, unread bytes surviving a reset, loopback buffer sizes, `fstat()` on a socket) and now say so per platform. --------- Co-authored-by: autofix-ci[bot] <114827586+autofix-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: robobun <117481402+robobun@users.noreply.github.com>

robobun · 2026-10-15T17:39:43Z

Confirmed on linux-x64 with a canary build of main that contains #44618 (1.4.4-canary.1+5f5799ed1):

The tests from this PR are on main and pass: the two tls.connect cases in node-tls-connect.test.ts, the two Bun.connect cases in socket.test.ts, and the h2 case in node-http2.test.js. A build from before the merge (367d939d9) fails the four socket cases. The fault-injection test is on main in a wider form, for the client and the server.
HTTP/2 over TLS with a reset that a write sees first: the session and the stream now get ECONNRESET (rstCode 2), and a response that arrived before the reset is still delivered first.

Nothing more to do here.

robobun added 3 commits September 11, 2026 16:04

github-actions Bot added the claude label Sep 11, 2026

robobun mentioned this pull request Sep 11, 2026

node:http2: report a peer reset that a client write sees first #42182

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Comment thread packages/bun-usockets/src/crypto/openssl.c

Comment thread src/runtime/api/bun/h2_frame_parser.rs

Comment thread test/js/bun/net/socket.test.ts

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Comment thread src/runtime/api/bun/h2_frame_parser.rs Outdated

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Comment thread src/runtime/socket/socket_body.rs Outdated

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github-actions Bot reviewed Sep 11, 2026

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Comment thread src/uws_sys/socket.rs Outdated

Cut the new comments under src/ to one line each

6dd9136

The reasons they gave are in the commit that added the code and in the PR description.

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Comment thread src/runtime/api/bun/h2_frame_parser.rs

claude Bot reviewed Sep 11, 2026

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Comment thread test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts Outdated

test: drain the child's stderr while its stdout is read

e344105

The three reset tests read stdout to the end before they started to read stderr. A child that writes more than the pipe buffer to stderr would block, and the test would hang with no output to explain it.

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claude Bot reviewed Sep 11, 2026

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Comment thread test/js/node/http2/node-http2.test.js Outdated

test: say what the h2-over-TLS test pins

3fed981

The comment still described an earlier shape of the change, where the frame parser was told about the failed send. Over TLS it is not, and the reset reaches JS through the read side.

claude Bot reviewed Sep 11, 2026

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robobun mentioned this pull request Sep 21, 2026

node:net: finish an accepted socket whose native close leaves a write parked #43698

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robobun mentioned this pull request Sep 22, 2026

node:net: return false from write() when the send fails at once #43755

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This was referenced Sep 25, 2026

tls: drop the handshake records that are sealed after our own FIN #43957

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Bun.listen / Bun.connect: report a write error when a close loses the queued tail of end(data) #44313

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robobun mentioned this pull request Sep 30, 2026

usockets: do not act on a peer reset while a node:net TCP socket does not read #43705

Open

robobun mentioned this pull request Oct 3, 2026

tls: queue unsent ciphertext per connection so write() counts every sealed record #44529

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Jarred-Sumner mentioned this pull request Oct 6, 2026

tls: consolidate the open TLS fixes (both engines, node:tls, node:https, WebSocket, SQL) #44618

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Jarred-Sumner closed this Oct 6, 2026

Jarred-Sumner added a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 6, 2026

usockets: split the failed-send classification out of us_socket_write…

6dd19fb

…_check_error (#42336, #34510) Pure move. The TLS write path needs the same answer for its raw sends.

Jarred-Sumner added a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 7, 2026

usockets: split the failed-send classification out of us_socket_write…

c6ea1a6

…_check_error (#42336, #34510) Pure move. The TLS write path needs the same answer for its raw sends.

Jarred-Sumner added a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 8, 2026

usockets: split the failed-send classification out of us_socket_write…

32ea693

…_check_error (#42336, #34510) Pure move. The TLS write path needs the same answer for its raw sends.

Jarred-Sumner added a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 10, 2026

usockets: split the failed-send classification out of us_socket_write…

9347756

…_check_error (#42336, #34510) Pure move. The TLS write path needs the same answer for its raw sends.

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