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Socket.prototype.connect sets up the client handshake state and prepends
onConnectEnd to 'end' for every connect() call, then hands off to
internalConnect or internalConnectMultiple. Both of those carried a copy
of the same block, so a host/port tls.connect() attached onConnectEnd
twice (once more per address with autoSelectFamily) while the handshake
completion path removes it once, leaving stale copies in listeners('end').
Reduce the two per-attempt sites to building the native tls options for
the address being dialed, which is the only part that differs per
attempt; the handshake state and the listener stay owned by connect().
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Updated 8:15 AM PT - Aug 13th, 2026
❌ @robobun, your commit 8093dec has 1 failures in
🧪 To try this PR locally: bunx bun-pr 38007That installs a local version of the PR into your bun-38007 --bun |
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I reviewed this PR and didn't find any bugs. The refactor is sound and thoroughly tested, but since it removes handshake-state assignments from the TLS client connect path on the argument that Socket.prototype.connect already set them, a human sign-off on the TLS bits would still be worthwhile.
Checked that Socket.prototype.connect (net.ts:1929-1968) sets every field the two removed blocks were re-assigning (_requestCert, authorized, secureConnecting, _secureEstablished, _securePending, kConnectOptions, and the onConnectEnd prepend), and that internalConnect/internalConnectMultiple are only reachable via lookupAndConnect from that same connect() call. Confirmed the connection local was dead in both functions (nothing after the removed block reads it; the { socket } upgrade returns early from connect() before reaching either). The security-relevant per-attempt fields (applyRejectUnauthorized, requestCert, session, checkServerIdentity, bunTLSConnectOptions) are preserved in clientTLSOptionsForAttempt. Verified onClientHandshakeComplete emits secureConnect (line 337) before removeListener (line 343), matching the test's { duringSecureConnect: 1, afterHandshake: 0 }.
Extended reasoning...
Overview
This PR fixes duplicate onConnectEnd 'end' listener registrations on client TLSSockets. Socket.prototype.connect already prepends onConnectEnd and initializes the client handshake state; internalConnect and internalConnectMultiple each carried a near-identical copy of that block (from #18962), so the listener was registered 2× (or N+1× under autoSelectFamily), and the single removeListener in onClientHandshakeComplete left stale copies. The fix extracts the per-attempt native-tls-options rebuild into a shared clientTLSOptionsForAttempt(self, options, port) and drops the redundant state re-assignments and the dead connection local. Four new tests in node-tls-connect.test.ts pin the listener count through the handshake for host/port, an autoSelectFamily retry (asserting both addresses were attempted), the { socket } upgrade, and a peer-dropped handshake.
Security risks
The change lives inside the TLS client connect path but does not alter any verification or trust decision. All security-relevant per-attempt fields — applyRejectUnauthorized, tls.requestCert, tls.session, tls.checkServerIdentity, self[bunTLSConnectOptions] — are preserved verbatim in the new helper. What is removed are duplicate writes of state connect() set moments earlier on the same object, plus a connection local nothing read. I traced the call graph: internalConnect/internalConnectMultiple are only reached from connect() via lookupAndConnect (or recursively for retry), so the state is always already initialized. No path resets secureConnecting/_requestCert/etc. between connect() and the internal-connect call. The autoSelectFamily retry path can no longer re-prependListener, but nothing between attempts consumes or removes the original listener, so it is still armed for a mid-handshake FIN on any attempt.
Level of scrutiny
Medium-high. The user-visible defect is cosmetic (listener count only; the extra onConnectEnd copies were inert because bun's version guards on secureConnecting), but the fix removes a block of handshake-state initialization from two code paths on the basis that a third path already ran. That reasoning is correct as far as I can verify, and the PR description walks through it precisely, but it is exactly the kind of "redundant, therefore removable" argument in a security-adjacent file that benefits from a second pair of eyes.
Other factors
The PR description is unusually thorough (traces Node's reference implementation with line citations, lists every removed field and why it is redundant, tabulates before/after listener names against Node v26.3.0, enumerates the compat tests re-run). The new tests follow harness conventions (local server, port: 0, error wired to reject, try/finally cleanup, no sleeps). No prior human review comments to address. The bug-hunting pass found nothing. I am deferring rather than approving solely because the guidelines ask for human sign-off on TLS/security-sensitive paths, not because I found anything wrong.
…path } and late setServername()
The helper comment credited the rebuild to self._host, which is assigned once
per connect() (and not at all for { path } connects). The per-attempt input is
this.servername / the session: the native connect takes them from the options
object at dispatch, so a setServername()/setSession() made after tls.connect()
returned, or between autoSelectFamily attempts, is what gets dialed.
Tests: tls.connect({ path }) also goes through internalConnect, so it gets a
listener-count case too; two cases pin the late setServername() contract the
comment describes.
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I reviewed this PR and didn't find any bugs. Because it deletes ~60 lines from the TLS client connect path (internalConnect / internalConnectMultiple), a human look would still be worthwhile to confirm every removed assignment is indeed redundant with what Socket.prototype.connect sets.
What was reviewed:
- Traced each removed field (
_requestCert,authorized,secureConnecting,_secureEstablished,_securePending,kConnectOptions,prependListener('end', onConnectEnd)) back toconnect()at net.ts:1929-1968 — all are set there before eitherinternalConnect*runs. - Confirmed the deleted
connectionlocal was dead: onlyreq.tls = tlsreads the block's output, and the{ socket }upgrade path returns fromconnect()before reaching these functions. clientTLSOptionsForAttemptpreserves the per-attemptapplyRejectUnauthorized/checkServerIdentity/sessionhandling verbatim; only the redundant socket-state writes and the duplicate listener registration are dropped.- Tests: seven new cases cover host/port, autoSelectFamily retry (asserts both addresses attempted),
{ path },{ socket }, peer-dropped handshake, and twosetServername()-after-tls.connect()timing pins; hermetic (local servers, customlookup), error paths wired to reject.
Extended reasoning...
Overview
The PR deduplicates the TLS client-handshake setup that appeared in three places: Socket.prototype.connect, internalConnect, and internalConnectMultiple. The latter two now call a shared clientTLSOptionsForAttempt(self, options, port) that only builds the per-attempt tls options object handed to the native connect. All socket-state writes and the prependListener('end', onConnectEnd) are dropped from the two internalConnect* copies because connect() (net.ts:1929-1968) already performs them once. The only observable change is listeners('end') / listenerCount('end') matching Node.
Security risks
This is TLS client connect setup. I verified that applyRejectUnauthorized(self, tls, rejectUnauthorized), tls.requestCert = true, tls.checkServerIdentity, tls.session, and self[bunTLSConnectOptions] are all still applied per attempt in the new helper, byte-identical to the removed blocks. The removed lines were either (a) re-assigning the exact values connect() had just written to the same socket, or (b) computing a connection local that nothing after the block read. No security-relevant flag or check is weakened, but since ~60 lines are being deleted from a TLS path, a maintainer should independently confirm the redundancy claim.
Level of scrutiny
Medium-high: the diff is mechanically simple (extract-helper + delete-redundant-copies) and the PR description accounts for every removed line, but the file is node:tls client connect and mistakes here fail open. I traced all seven removed state fields to their still-live assignment in connect(), confirmed only one prependListener('end', onConnectEnd) remains (net.ts:1968) balanced by one removeListener (net.ts:343), and confirmed req.tls is the only downstream consumer of the block's output in both functions.
Other factors
- No CODEOWNERS entry for
src/js/node/net.ts. - Seven new tests in
node-tls-connect.test.ts; the four onConnectEnd-count tests fail on the unfixed build per the PR description, and the two setServername tests pin why the options build stays per-attempt rather than being hoisted intoconnect(). - The comment-cop bot's feedback was addressed (comment trimmed to one line in 8093dec).
- The autoSelectFamily test uses a custom
lookupreturning[::1, 127.0.0.1]against an IPv4-only server, so the ::1 refusal is deterministic rather than depending on the host's resolver — hermetic per REVIEW.md.
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Issue #42280 reports this bug from the user side. With |
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Superseded by #44618, which consolidates the open TLS pull requests. This fix and its tests are in there, either as written, rewritten smaller, or merged with the other PRs that patched the same cause (see the "By area" list in that PR). Closing in favor of it. |
…38007) connect() prepended onConnectEnd, then internalConnect() prepended it again and internalConnectMultiple() once more per attempt, while the handshake removes one copy. The two per-attempt blocks only re-assigned state connect() had just set, so they are gone; what has to be rebuilt per attempt (the native tls options, so a late setServername()/setSession() reaches the dial) is one helper. connect() drops a copy a failed dial left behind, so a retry loop on one socket no longer warns about a listener leak.
…38007) connect() prepended onConnectEnd, then internalConnect() prepended it again and internalConnectMultiple() once more per attempt, while the handshake removes one copy. The two per-attempt blocks only re-assigned state connect() had just set, so they are gone; what has to be rebuilt per attempt (the native tls options, so a late setServername()/setSession() reaches the dial) is one helper. connect() drops a copy a failed dial left behind, so a retry loop on one socket no longer warns about a listener leak.
…38007) connect() prepended onConnectEnd, then internalConnect() prepended it again and internalConnectMultiple() once more per attempt, while the handshake removes one copy. The two per-attempt blocks only re-assigned state connect() had just set, so they are gone; what has to be rebuilt per attempt (the native tls options, so a late setServername()/setSession() reaches the dial) is one helper. connect() drops a copy a failed dial left behind, so a retry loop on one socket no longer warns about a listener leak.
…38007) connect() prepended onConnectEnd, then internalConnect() prepended it again and internalConnectMultiple() once more per attempt, while the handshake removes one copy. The two per-attempt blocks only re-assigned state connect() had just set, so they are gone; what has to be rebuilt per attempt (the native tls options, so a late setServername()/setSession() reaches the dial) is one helper. connect() drops a copy a failed dial left behind, so a retry loop on one socket no longer warns about a listener leak.
…ps, WebSocket, SQL) (#44618) ### What does this PR do? Consolidates the open TLS pull requests into one. Each was reproduced on `main` and, for `node:*` behavior, on Node v26.3.0 first. About a third are ported as written, the rest are rewritten smaller or merged into one fix where several PRs patched the same cause. One commit per fix, so it can be read commit by commit. Fixes #43520, fixes #31396, fixes #43635, fixes #37193, fixes #43846, fixes #17932, fixes #41061, fixes #36887, fixes #31810, fixes #35240, fixes #32234, fixes #44365, fixes #43807, fixes #42280, fixes #44517. Addresses #41856 (SNI and `servername`; not `checkServerIdentity` for SQL), #24845 (the spin is gone, shown with fault injection on Linux; not run on macOS), #19754 (node-fetch forwards the agent's TLS options; the Kubernetes client itself was not run). #### The ones that matter most | | On `main` | PRs | |---|---|---| | Client certificate disclosure | `https.request()` with a client certificate sends it to a server it then refuses (wrong name, `checkServerIdentity`, `destroy()` in `'secureConnect'`, `terminate()` in `handshake`). A server can force it with a junk record behind its Finished | #43946 | | False `authorized` | Over a Duplex, `secureConnect` with `authorized === true` for a peer that failed the key proof; `secureConnect` for a plaintext peer with `rejectUnauthorized: false` | #44422, #32929 | | Cleartext https | `https.createServer()` without a usable key/cert answers plain HTTP | #41672, #33539 | | Revoked client certificates | An https mTLS server never sees `crl`, so a revoked client is `authorized` | #41641 | | Pooled sockets | Requests with different client certificates or CAs share an `https.Agent` socket and session | #42498 | | Silent plaintext | `tls: [...]` given to `Bun.listen` / `Bun.connect` is plain TCP | #41490 | | Server weakened by a client knob | `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0` turns off a server's client-certificate enforcement | #35245 | | Pins never checked | `WebSocket` never calls `tls.checkServerIdentity` and ignores `tls.serverName` | #41648 | | `verify-full` dropped | `PGSSLMODE=verify-*` is lost next to a `TLS_*` URL variable; `tls: true` sends no SNI | #44498 | | Crashes | use-after-free from `destroy()` in `ALPNCallback` over a Duplex; `abort()` on a late `setSession()`; SIGABRT in `fetch` with an https proxy from the environment and a `Bun.file()` body | #44462, #41671, #44458 | | Stream corruption | A TLS `write()` can lose 16 KiB it reported as written while another socket on the loop is stalled | #44529 | | Hangs and spins | 100% CPU on a failing `send()`; a fatal `SSL_write` leaves the socket open forever; `idleTimeout` never sheds a TLS client that ignores `close_notify` | #34510, #38176, #42336 | | Wrong certificate (regression since 1.3.14) | Connections accepted before `stop()` / `close()` get the default certificate and skip their entry's `requestCert` / `ca` | #42355 | | Quadratic Duplex / proxy tunnel | Reading one chunk over a Duplex, CPU: 8 MB 0.88 s → 0.14 s, 16 MB 3.18 s → 0.23 s, 32 MB 11.75 s → 0.39 s; `fetch` upload through CONNECT: 1.7 s → 0.18 s (debug build) | #44464 | #### By area - **fd engine, write path** (`openssl.c`, `socket.c`): #42352, #34510 + #38176 + #42336 as one change, #44529, #44458, #44192. A rejected `send()` ends the write side only and closes at the next writable event unless the peer's bytes are still queued (a 413 sent before a reset is still read). No new per-socket state. Also, on kqueue, **a FIN no longer ends a socket that waits in the low-priority queue** (`loop.c`): with more than 5 TLS handshakes at once, a client that ended right after its handshake could be reset and its server socket report `socket hang up`, because the eof that the sentinel read knote reports was acted on ahead of the unread Finished. That is on `main` too (the macOS entry for `node-tls-server.test.ts` in `test/flaky-tests.txt`: 7 of 48 recent builds of other branches), and this branch made it likelier (6 of 8 builds), since Finished now leaves in one segment with the close_notify. - **Error reporting, both engines**: #44422, #32929, #44516, #37094, #41272 + #42324 + #44223 as one change, #44021, #37472, #43946, #33630. One channel: a fatal error on an established session is reported, then **the engine closes the connection itself**, whatever the owner does with the report. `test/js/bun/net/tls-fatal-error-closes.test.ts` asserts closed-and-nothing-delivered for every owner (node:tls, `Bun.connect`, `Bun.listen`, `fetch` direct and through CONNECT, `Bun.serve`, `WebSocket` direct and through a proxy, Postgres, MySQL, Valkey, Duplex). - **Duplex engine** (`SSLWrapper`, `UpgradedDuplex`): #44462, #43529, #42332, #44464. #43877 + #44394 were in and are **out again**, see "Worth a look" 5. - **node:tls wrap lifecycle** (`net.ts`, `tls.ts`): #38007, #38058, #38028 + #38122 + #38076 as one change (six copies of the attach code become two helpers), #38311, #39008, #38154, #42340 + #42343 + #42339 + #42453 as one change, #43791, #42425, #44085, #42683, #39088, #39040, #40375, and what was still real of #36534. - **SNI, ALPN, server contexts**: #43080, #42050, #37195 + #43849 as one change (**one** SNI matcher for TCP and HTTP/3), #42355, #42285, #33253, part of #37896, part of #37013. A `tls.Server` has one `SSL_CTX`. - **Verification and options**: #44738, #41490, #37005 + the cwd pin of #40984, #31811, #43982, #33483 + #35245, #41810, #32235, #44441, #38092. - **node:tls API and CA store**: #41671, #38145, #32824, #43594, #39997, #41696, #33534, #34748, #42991, #42996, #42970. - **node:https, Agent, `ws`, node-fetch**: #41672 (https half), #41641, #38261, #42498, #44346, #35609, #31397, #42325. - **WebSocket client**: #41648, #37487 + #43048 as one change. - **SQL, Redis**: #33666, #41711, #44498, part of #42054. - **Tests only**: #41426, #40040, #44395, #44016, #37860, #40591, #44440, #41424. Found on the way and fixed here: an upload that a TLS 1.2 server interrupts with a renegotiation never completes on `main` (0 of 32 runs over `https.request`, `fetch`, `node:tls` and `Bun.connect`: the renegotiation ClientHello lands inside an application record that is still unsent, or the socket gets no `drain` again) and completes here, with two tests from robobun; the fix for #40653 (final flight and first write in one segment) stopped working whenever another TLS socket on the loop was stalled, on `main` too; the `tls.Server` prototype pinned the last server constructed and every `SSL_CTX` it owned; `Object.create(process.env).NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED = "0"` turned verification off process-wide once a `SHARE_ENV` worker existed; two debug panics when wrapping a shut-down or still-connecting socket; a `fetch` POST through a proxy sent its headers twice when the origin renegotiated; `BlockList` ignored IPv6 zone ids; a test now ties `root_certs.der` to `certdata.txt`. #### Behavior changes - **A server's `ca` without `requestCert` no longer asks for a client certificate** (`Bun.serve`, `Bun.listen`, HTTP/3, node:tls). It matches the docs and Node. On `main` such a server refused clients with no certificate but served any unrelated self-signed one, so it was never authentication. **Set `requestCert: true` to require a certificate.** A matrix test pins that `requestCert: true` still refuses no certificate and an untrusted one on 8 kinds of server, TLS 1.2 and 1.3, with `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED` unset and `0`. - `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0` no longer relaxes a server. - `Bun.connect` / `Bun.listen` hear of a fatal TLS error after the handshake through `error(socket, err)`. With no `error` handler the socket just closes. - HTTP/3 server names match like TCP: `*.` covers exactly one label, case is ignored, a trailing dot is ignored, the last registration of a name wins. - `requestCert` on node:https is `=== true`, as in Node. - An array where a generated options dictionary is expected throws (`tls: []`, `jest.useFakeTimers([])`). - `key` / `cert` arrays serve every identity. A client that can use both gets ECDSA, where `main` served whichever pair came last. - `ecdhCurve` is forwarded by node:https, `ws` and node-fetch now, so a group BoringSSL lacks (`X448`) throws there as it already does in `tls.createServer`. - A wrapped socket's error is re-emitted on the TLS socket as in Node, so `raw.destroy(err)` with a listener on `raw` only is uncaught, as in Node. - `sql.options.tls` is always an object, never `true`. `RedisClient` sends SNI. - `tls: { secureContext }` alone asks for TLS on `Bun.listen` / `Bun.connect` (it was plain TCP), and a value that is not a `SecureContext` throws. The context is served as it is: the `requestCert` / `rejectUnauthorized` it was created with hold whatever the options next to it say, and `requestCert` in the options over a context that does not ask throws at `listen()`. - `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS` reaches every client once assigned (`fetch`, `WebSocket`, `Bun.connect`, `RedisClient`, `Bun.SQL`, `S3Client`, proxy tunnels) and servers again. A list that selects no cipher throws `ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_MATCH` at the assignment. `fetch.preconnect()` dials nothing after an assignment. - The warning for an unreadable `NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS` is Node's one line, without the `warn:` prefix. - `BUN_CONFIG_WS_CLOSE_TIMEOUT` (default 30 s): how long a `WebSocket` client waits for the server to close the connection after the closing handshake. #### Worth a look in review 1. **#44529**: the kernel-refused remainder of a TLS write moves from the loop's one slot onto the connection (in the existing rare struct), so the write BIO never refuses a sealed record. Nothing is allocated on an unstalled path (200 writes: 0 appends, same `send()` count as `main`), memory with 16 stalled writers is lower than on `main` (276 KB vs 340 KB, which `main` holds inside BoringSSL's buffers), `us_socket_t` stays 80 bytes. It needs a bound on how long a deferred close waits, or a peer that stops reading pins the fd past `destroy()`: `US_SSL_CLOSE_AFTER_SPILL_TIMEOUT` is a fixed 10 s, not re-armed on progress. Separate commits, but the fix that keeps the client certificate off the wire beside a stalled socket builds on them. 2. **The default name check of node:tls also runs inside the handshake**, so a wrong-name server gets no client certificate on TLS 1.2 either. JS still runs it after every successful handshake, so a difference between the two matchers can only refuse. Error objects are byte-identical. 3. **#44441** widens trust by design: a self-issued leaf whose `keyUsage` lacks `keyCertSign` (`dotnet dev-certs`) is its own anchor when the store holds a byte-identical copy. No BoringSSL change. Expired pin, same subject with another key, wrong EKU and a pinned intermediate are tested to fail. 4. **#32235** only adds Ed25519 and ECDSA P-521 to the verify list. A captured ClientHello shows `main`'s list with the two inserted; `rsa_pkcs1_sha1` stays. 5. **A stream that a TLS socket wraps, when that TLS socket closes.** An earlier state of this branch lost data here while CI was green (found by #44709's report): with the peer closing first, 4 of 8 MiB arrived with TLS in TLS, 4 of 32 MiB on the http2 `emit("connection")` path, and a `write()` with no `'error'` listener ended the process. Three Node-parity changes only hold together: destroying the wrapped stream at the close (#38028 + #38122 + #38076, #38154) is safe only if every write has really completed (#43877), which in turn needs Node's handling of the peer's close_notify, which needs half-open sockets that the GC can collect. So: - #43877 + #44394 are reverted and reopened. A write over a stream completes once the stream has taken the ciphertext, as on `main`. - Until the verdict on the peer lets the session through, the application cannot have written over it. There the wrapped stream is destroyed as in Node, with the sessions below it. That keeps the release of the connection after a failed handshake, a rejected certificate and an early `destroy()`. The same for an http2 socket the application never got, and for `resetAndDestroy()`. - After that it is `main`'s teardown: a `net.Socket` only gets the engine's `end()`, closes at its peer's FIN, keeps its own timeout and reports its own errors. Any other stream is destroyed with the TLS socket. The regular suites cannot see any of this (999 files were green on every broken variant), so it was steered by eleven seeded differential fuzzers run on this build, `main`, Node v26.3.0 and the earlier state: close, `end()`, `destroy()`, `destroySoon()`, resets, hung and half-open peers, paused writers, timeouts, two and three sessions deep, over TCP and over Duplexes, before, at and after the handshake, and http2 requests. See "How did you verify". #### Known limits - `fetch` with a `checkServerIdentity` function still sends the client certificate (not the request) to a server the function refuses. On TLS 1.2 any verdict a JS callback gives is too late, as in Node. - `addContext()` / `SNICallback` still do not apply to a server-side socket on the stream engine (`emit("connection", duplex)`, TLS in TLS, unflushed writes, named pipes), as on `main`. - A CA bundled in a pfx extends an explicit `ca` only, for `ws` / node-fetch / `WebSocket`: the native `ca` can only replace the default store, and that store keeps `SSL_CERT_FILE` / `SSL_CERT_DIR`. - P-521 leaves work on TLS 1.3 only. TLS 1.2 needs secp521r1 in every ClientHello (`it.todo`). - Once `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS` is assigned, `fetch(url, { protocol: "http3" })` is `HTTP3Unsupported`, as with an explicit `ciphers`. - `addCACert()` by hand does not extend the chains of a context with several identities. - A throwing `ALPNCallback` sends `no_application_protocol` on both engines. Node sends nothing and its client sees `ECONNRESET`. - TLS in TLS, peer FIN while the outer handshake runs: the inner socket gets one `write EPIPE`, where Node gives `ECONNRESET` (`main` gives it no error at all). - `@SECLEVEL` in `ciphers` is dropped by the `ws` / node-fetch shims, which used to ignore `ciphers`. node:tls keeps throwing `ERR_SSL_INVALID_COMMAND`. - Beside a stalled TLS socket only the first record (16 KiB) of the first write leaves with the handshake flight. The rest goes record by record, which is what bounds the memory of stalled writers. - After a fatal error on an established session the socket emits `'error'` and then `'close'`. Node emits `'error'` and leaves the socket open. - A paused reader whose own write the kernel rejects loses what it had not read yet, with an `EPIPE`, as on Node. `main` reports no error there and delivers it. - On `main` too: a `Bun.listen` socket without `allowHalfOpen` that has unsent ciphertext when the client's `shutdown()` arrives loses that ciphertext (32 KiB), and over plain TCP `end()` with the peer still sending is a close over unread input, so a reset. - Differences from both `main` and Node that the differential runs below found and that stay, all with a peer that aborts: `ECONNRESET` instead of a clean `'end'` after the socket's own `'finish'` when the peer destroyed with unread data; under TLS 1.2, a zero-length `write()` followed by `destroy()` in `'secureConnection'` leaves the client without `'secureConnect'` (a plain `destroy()` there matches Node); a TLS 1.2 client that destroys in `'secureConnect'` gets no `'session'`; a `ClientRequest` whose handshake fails with an alert emits `'error'` and `'close'` but no `'finish'` (`writableFinished` is true). - Once `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS` is assigned, `fetch.preconnect()` opens nothing: `fetch()` then uses a context of its own, and a socket warmed under the default one would never be picked up. - A TLS `send()` that the kernel refuses outside a `write()` call (the drain of unsent ciphertext) is reported with the close, as `read EPIPE` / `read ECONNRESET`. Node says `write EPIPE`. `main` does not report it at all. - Once the application has a session over a `net.Socket` (TLS in TLS, http2 `emit("connection")`), a peer that never sends its FIN holds that socket after the TLS socket closed, as on `main`. Node destroys it. Two tests of #38154 are `todo` for this. Closing it any earlier (at its `'finish'`, say) makes the kernel drop what it has not sent yet as soon as the peer's close_notify arrives. - Plaintext that was queued on a socket before it was wrapped (STARTTLS with a backlog) is dropped when the TLS socket is destroyed, or its handshake fails, before the session is accepted. Node drops it too, except on `destroySoon()`. `main` sends it. - Over a stream that is no `net.Socket`, `end()` can still cut what that stream has buffered, and there is no backpressure, both as on `main` (#43877). - `tls.secureContext` (the undocumented door node:tls uses) is not read by a Windows named pipe listener, which builds its context from the options. On `upgradeTLS({ isServer: true })` the options next to it are the policy, as with Node's `SetVerifyMode`. - `selectServerName()` rebuilds the name tree per ClientHello for injected sockets of a server with `addContext()` entries: 0.4 µs for 1 entry, 3.7 µs for 10, 41 µs for 100, against 631–1111 µs for a handshake. #### Not included Left open, because they need a decision or are not TLS: #43877 + #44394 (see "Worth a look" 5; #43874 stays open with them), #38548, #38591 (both shrink who is trusted), #41589 (`verify-full` vs `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0`), #37197, #41706, #43216, #33487, #33545, #36707, #32435, #37255, #28691, #40275, #30314 (features), #38120 (needs the BoringSSL fork, as did #33517, which the stale bot has closed since), #38529 (needs a Windows measurement), #34342, #38232, #43089, #44454, #40451, #42710, #44527, #38088, #38093, #41898. #37896, #42054 and #37013 stay open for the halves not taken. `http.createServer({ key, cert })` keeps serving TLS on purpose. One open question: `tls: {}` (an object that names no TLS option) is plain TCP on `Bun.listen` / `Bun.connect`, here and on `main`. It is the same trap as `tls: []`, but changing it changes a Bun default, so it is left alone. ### How did you verify your code works? - Every new test fails on `main` for the stated reason and passes here, except guards that pin existing behavior, each shown to fail when its clause is removed. `node:*` tests also pass on Node v26.3.0; the few that cannot say which Node version has the behavior. - 212 test files that touch TLS, sockets, http, http2, fetch, WebSocket, SQL, Valkey and workers: 6154 pass, 2 fail. Both are seen on `main` too: `serve.test.ts` "root range port" (the box runs as root), and `worker_threads.test.ts` "terminate(): nothing of the worker's runs after the request", which is flaky there and passed in the run below. - 58 of those files the way the ASAN lane runs them (LeakSanitizer + `BUN_JSC_validateExceptionChecks`): 58 files, 48 of them with leak checking, 4132 pass, 3 fail. All three also fail on `main`: `serve.test.ts` "root range port", `node-net.test.ts` "should not leak when connect({path}) fails synchronously on a reused handle" (times out under this environment), `worker_threads.test.ts` "process.exit() with a shell cp in flight" (a `ShellCpTask` leak). - 647 vendored `test-tls-*`, `test-https-*`, `test-net-*`, `test-http2-*`: the only two failures also fail on `main`. - The SNI matcher was diffed against both old matchers: 3 seeds × 1.23 M lookups × 3 registration flavours, every difference in one of the intended classes, TCP and HTTP/3 identical on every lookup. - The headline rows were also driven by hand with scripts against this build, `main` and Node v26.3.0: cleartext https, `crl`, `tls: []` / `{ secureContext }`, the `ca` / `requestCert` matrix, the client certificate on a wrong-name server, late `setSession()`, `destroy()` in `ALPNCallback`, `[rsa, ec]` identities with an intermediate from `ca`, `WebSocket` `checkServerIdentity`, a corrupted record, the Duplex read above, `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS`. - The `setSession()` guard was checked against the real `abort()` at 43 handshake states. - `bun run rust:check-all`: 12 of 12 targets. `tsc`, oxlint, source lints, prettier, rustfmt, mordant clean. - usockets' `_Nonnull` is compiled out of debug builds, so 105 of those files were also run on a local release ASAN build with the CI runner's environment (92 with leak checking): 4595 pass, 1 fail, `child_process.test.ts` "spawn reports EPERM after dropping privileges", which cannot pass as root and fails on `main` too. - The close of a TLS socket over another stream ("Worth a look" 5): eleven seeded differential fuzzers, 8,424 scenarios compared, each run on a release ASAN build of this branch, on `main`, on Node v26.3.0 and on the earlier state of the branch. Against `main`: - Data that `main` delivers in full is cut in 5 scenarios, and about 150 that `main` cuts arrive in full. Of the 5, in 2 `main` never notices the peer's close and keeps the socket for good, 2 call `end()` on the middle one of three sessions over an in-memory Duplex, and 1 does the same on Node. - No dead timeout, no silent reset and no uncaught error that `main` does not have (4 uncaught errors fewer). - A socket stays open where `main` closes it in 109, and closes where `main` keeps it in 295. 92 of the 109 do the same on Node or on the earlier state (a `destroy()` that an in-memory Duplex does not show its peer, half-open peers). 14 wait for a peer that paused reading and so does not read the FIN (#42332's backpressure, as in Node); the socket's own timeout fires there. 3 are left: one on a 5 ms timer, two with three sessions over an in-memory Duplex. - The earlier state of the branch cut data in 173 of the 400 scenarios of one of them, where `main` cuts none and this cuts none. - 23 new tests pin what they found. Each earlier attempt at this fix fails the ones that describe it, the earlier state of the branch fails 7, and all pass on Node. - After that change: 999 test files on the release ASAN build (20,246 pass; the 11 files that fail need a database, Docker, DNS or a non-root user, or share a temp directory with a parallel run and pass alone), 61 on the debug build. - TLS over a file descriptor (`openssl.c`, the path of `fetch`, `Bun.serve`, `tls.connect`, `Bun.connect`) got the same treatment after the rebase: seeded differential fuzzers on CI's release build of this branch, on `main` and, for `node:*`, on Node v26.3.0. Every runtime also against itself for the noise floor, injected faults and known bugs of `main` as positive controls, and a difference counts only if it shows in 5 of 5 fresh processes. - `node:tls` over TCP: 11,500 scenarios (one connection with Node as the oracle line by line; 2 to 60 connections beside stalled neighbours; raw peers that break the handshake). HTTPS: about 136,000 runs over `Bun.serve` + `fetch`, `node:https`, `node:http2` and `wss://`, also with the two ends in different runtimes. `Bun.connect` / `Bun.listen` / `upgradeTLS`: 11,500 scenarios and 720 slow connections, with writers driven by what `write()` returns, beside up to 6 stalled, dripping, closing or resetting neighbours, and plain TCP as a second oracle. No crash, hang, duplication, reordering or silent truncation, and no change in time or in connection reuse. - They found six things that `main` does better, none of which any test showed. All are fixed, each with a test that fails on the build before: what the peer sent lost behind a rejected `send()` (23 scenarios, and an early HTTPS response lost with only `EPIPE`), the same silently for a paused reader, `server.close()` never calling back on a half-open server after a ClientHello and a reset (17), `closeAllConnections()` taking 12 s with a stalled client, `end()` losing up to 1.3 of 4 MiB that `write()` had reported while the peer still uploads, and `end()` a little after a stall never closing beside other stalled TLS sockets. The last two fixes also deliver the 1 to 2 MiB that `main` loses there, and close the socket that `main` keeps for good without such neighbours. - All of them again after every fix, on CI's release build of it. That caught one regression of a fix itself (a reader stopped for backpressure lost 86,385 bytes, 1 of 6,000 scenarios), fixed too. On the last build: scenarios that lose data where `main` does not 23 → 2, and Node loses it in both, with the same `EPIPE`; `server.close()` that never calls back 17 → 0; connections held 4 → 0; requests that end in an error only where `main` has a response 6 → 0. With a Node server in another process, a request ends in an error only in 8 and 10 of 1,500 scenarios here, 5 and 3 on `main`, 10 with Node as the client. - `Bun.connect` / `Bun.listen` on the last build against `main`, in scenarios: hangs 0 against 1,031, sockets and fds never released 0 against 965, corrupted data 0 against 345, `abort()` 0 against 26 (`setSession()` after the handshake), writers that never close 0 against 101 of 720 connections. No kind of failure shows here and not on `main`. About a third of the slow connections close later than on `main`, in 1 to 16 s instead of at once, waiting for unsent ciphertext or for the peer's close_notify, and 79 more of them deliver all that `write()` reported. RSS and time with 16 to 256 stalled writers are the same. - What they found that `main` does worse: a `WebSocket` that calls `close()` with sends pending loses messages in 81 of 999 scenarios (0 here), 37 server sockets left open, 10 `server.close()` that never call back, 20 write callbacks that never run. - The kqueue fix cannot be run on Linux. The `connectionListener` count test now says what became of a missing connection, which is how the cause was found (`'tlsClientError'` "socket hang up", then `read ECONNRESET` at the client of the same port, after its `'secureConnect'`). On macOS x64 it failed every attempt of the three builds before the fix and passed at the first attempt of the build with it. - Windows and macOS were only run by CI. Four new tests asserted what only the Linux kernel does (a FIN read ahead of a reset, unread bytes surviving a reset, loopback buffer sizes, `fstat()` on a socket) and now say so per platform. --------- Co-authored-by: autofix-ci[bot] <114827586+autofix-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: robobun <117481402+robobun@users.noreply.github.com>
Problem
tls.connect({ host, port })andtls.connect({ path })leavesocket.listeners("end")holdingonConnectEndafter the handshake: one stale copy for a single address, one per address withautoSelectFamily. Node holds it once untilsecureConnecthas been emitted and not at all afterwards.secureConnectbun reports 2 copies (3 with twoautoSelectFamilyattempts), and 2 copies remain after a handshake the peer drops; Node reports 1 in both cases.Socket.prototype.connect(src/js/node/net.ts:1929-1969) sets up the client handshake state and prependsonConnectEndfor everyconnect()call, then hands off tointernalConnect(net.ts:3085-3107 on main) orinternalConnectMultiple(net.ts:3233-3255 on main), each of which carried a copy of that block from the node:net rework (node:net rework #18962) and prependedonConnectEndagain.internalConnectMultipleruns once per address attempt.onClientHandshakeComplete(net.ts:343) removes one copy, like Node'sonConnectSecure.onConnectEndalso checkssecureConnecting), so this only shows up inlisteners("end")/listenerCount("end"). Found while triaging fix(net): prevent onConnectEnd listener accumulation in TLS sockets #26564.Fix
internalConnectandinternalConnectMultiplenow call a sharedclientTLSOptionsForAttempt, which only builds the tls options the attempt hands to the native connect. The handshake state and the'end'listener stay owned bySocket.prototype.connect, so everyconnect()registersonConnectEndexactly once, at the same place Node'stls.connect()does, and the singleremoveListeneron handshake completion brings it to zero.connect()): the native connect takes servername and session from that object when the attempt is dispatched, so asetServername()/setSession()made aftertls.connect()returned, including from aconnectionAttemptFailedlistener betweenautoSelectFamilyattempts, is what gets dialed. Node behaves the same way; two tests pin it.connect()had set a moment earlier on the same socket (_requestCert,authorized,secureConnecting,_secureEstablished,_securePending,kConnectOptions), or computing aconnectionlocal that nothing read (the{ socket }upgrade path returns fromconnect()before reaching these functions), so the only observable change is the listener count.tls.connect({ socket })is unaffected: it only ever went through theconnect()registration and already matched Node; a test pins that.onConnectEndis still attached until the handshake completes, so a FIN during the handshake still reports ECONNRESET (test-tls-wrap-econnreset*.jsstill pass). This also composes with tls: report a handshake dropped by the peer as ECONNRESET when a write is queued #35990, which invokesonConnectEnddirectly and does not depend on how many copies are registered.describe("tls.connect() attaches onConnectEnd to 'end' exactly once"): host/port, host/port with anautoSelectFamilyretry (asserts both addresses were attempted),{ path }, the{ socket }upgrade, and a handshake the peer drops. On the unfixed build the host/port,autoSelectFamily,{ path }and dropped-handshake cases fail with counts 2/1, 3/2, 2/1 and 2;{ socket }passes both ways on purpose.describe("a setServername() made after tls.connect() returned ..."): set synchronously aftertls.connect(), and set from aconnectionAttemptFailedlistener; both pass before and after and exist to keep the options build per attempt. All seven scenarios were run under node v26.3.0 and produce the asserted values.node-tls-server.test.ts"SNICallback runs even when the requested servername matches the bind hostname" andnode-tls-root-certs-concurrent-init.test.ts, fail identically without this change in this environment: localhost resolving to::1for listen and127.0.0.1for connect, and a 5s timeout under the debug build), and test/js/node/test/parallel/test-tls-wrap-econnreset{,-socket,-pipe,-localaddress}.js, test-tls-connect-{given-socket,simple,pipe,address-family,no-host,secure-context,timeout-option}.js, test-tls-client-abort{,2}.js, test-http-autoselectfamily.js, test-https-autoselectfamily.js.Background
onConnectEndis a listener for the socket's'end'event. While a client handshake is in progress, a peer closing the connection arrives as'end', and this listener converts it into the ECONNRESET error "Client network socket disconnected before secure TLS connection was established". Node attaches it withprependListenerintls.connect()(lib/internal/tls/wrap.js#L1811 at v26.3.0) and removes it inonConnectSecureafter emittingsecureConnect(wrap.js#L1706); in Node that removal is what stops a normal post-handshake FIN from being reported as an error. Bun's copy additionally checkssecureConnecting, which is why the duplicates were inert.tls.connect()builds aTLSSocketand callsnet.Socket.prototype.connecton it.connect()either upgrades an existing connection in place (tls.connect({ socket }), returns early), callsinternalConnectdirectly for{ path }, or goes throughlookupAndConnect, which resolves the host and callsinternalConnectfor a single address orinternalConnectMultipleonce per address whenautoSelectFamilyis on. Each attempt passes a tls options object to the native connect; theTLSSocketbuilds that object from its currentservernameand session (TLSSocket.prototype[buntls]in tls.ts), which is why it is built at dispatch time.listeners('end') names, bun 1.4.0 release vs node v26.3.0, before the fix
onSocketEndis bun's name for Node'sonReadableStreamEnd;<anon>is thekCloseRawConnectiononce-listener the upgrade path adds. Neither is affected by this change.Observed while reviewing, deliberately left as is
The helper passes
self._hostto the options builder exactly as the two copies did._hostis assigned bylookupAndConnect, so for a{ path }connect it isundefinedon a fresh socket (no SNI, which is also what Node sends for a pipe connect), and on aTLSSocketthat is reused for a{ path }connect after a host/port one it still holds the previous host, which then becomes the SNI. That is pre-existing behavior on main and is not changed here.no test proof · iteration 0 · Platform-specific test(s) that do not run on this machine. Deferring to CI, which covers all platforms: test/js/node/tls/node-tls-connect.test.ts