YardMaster holds provider API keys and every user's gateway tokens, and it sits between your team's tools and the model providers. Security reports are welcome and taken seriously.

Please report vulnerabilities privately, not in a public issue. On this repository's GitHub page, open the Security tab and choose Report a vulnerability. Only the maintainer can see the report.

Include what you can of:

• what an attacker can do, and what they need first (network access, a user account, an admin account);
• the steps to reproduce it, and the YardMaster and Switchyard versions (shown at the bottom of the sidebar);
• how YardMaster was set up: built-in sign-in or behind another proxy, and the HTTPS mode.

You'll get an answer within a week. Once a fix is released, the report can be made public, with credit to you if you want it.

YardMaster is young: fixes go into the latest release only.

In scope is everything in this repository and the Docker image it builds, for example:

• sign-in, sessions, gateway tokens, the trusted-proxy mode and the roles they grant;
• anything that returns, logs or stores a secret in clear: provider keys, tokens, passwords;
• the gateway forwarding YardMaster's own credentials, or letting a caller claim to be someone else;
• the built-in certificate authority and the HTTPS setup;
• one user seeing another user's usage.

Out of scope:

• vulnerabilities in Switchyard itself: report those to Switchyard;
• a model provider's behaviour, or what a model answers;
• attacks that need the admin account or write access to /data, which already control everything YardMaster does;
• running with HTTPS off on an untrusted network, which the UI warns about.

install.md covers the setup. In short: turn on HTTPS, set YARDMASTER_SECRET_KEY so provider keys are encrypted at rest, don't publish the ports beyond the network that needs them, and back up /data and the secret key separately.