DBus API rate limiting missing

[montfort]

Severity: Medium
Component: DBus Service
Simulation: SIM-L1-002
Sprint: 4

Description

No rate limiting on DBus calls allows denial of service by flooding the service with requests.

Proposed Fix

Per-caller rate limiting with token bucket algorithm.

Source

Imported from .straymark/02-design/risk-analysis/BACKLOG-simulation-issues.md on 2026-05-29.

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Cross-referenced analysis: RISK-002-3

Risk ID: RISK-002 / VULN-003
Severity: MEDIUM (CVSS 5.3)
Component: DBus Service
Attack Vector: Local
Privileges Required: Low
Impact: Service Degradation

Description

The DBus service does not implement rate limiting. A malicious process can flood the service with requests, causing CPU exhaustion and making the daemon unresponsive to legitimate clients.

Attack Vector

# Flood the service with 10,000 requests/second
while true; do
  dbus-send --session --dest=com.strangedaystech.LNXDrive \
    /org/strangedaystech/LNXDrive/Sync \
    com.strangedaystech.LNXDrive.Sync.GetStatus &
done

Impact

• Daemon CPU at 100%
• Legitimate UI clients timeout
• Sync operations delayed
• System-wide responsiveness degradation

Remediation (Short-term P1)

1. Implement per-caller rate limiting
2. Add request prioritization (UI clients > unknown callers)
3. Implement circuit breaker for abusive callers

Simulation Scenario

SIM-L1-002

Source

Imported from .straymark/02-design/risk-analysis/RISK-002-security-vulns.md on 2026-05-29.

[montfort]

Triage M0 — confirmado vigente; asignado a v0.2.0-beta (epic D-Bus hardening).

Verificado 2026-07-04: sin rate-limiting por-caller en la capa D-Bus (el único token-bucket del repo es el AdaptiveRateLimiter de lnxdrive-graph, que limita tráfico saliente hacia Graph, no llamadas entrantes). Igual que #20: en session bus es defensa-en-profundidad — P2 correcto.